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RECONCEPTUALIZING THE INHERENT
DISTINCTIVENESS OF PRODUCT DESIGN
TRADE DRESS
GRAEME B. DINWOODIE*
Traditionally, trademark rights subsisted in words or two-
dimensional pictoral images. Twenty years ago, courts recognized
that a product's very design might also function as its trademark.
To be accorded this status, however, the manufacturer must
demonstrate that her product design identifies the source of her
product-that the design is, in the trademark vernacular,
"distinctive." In this Article, Professor Graeme Dinwoodie
addresses the question of how to determine when a product shape
or design identifies its source. In 1992, in Two Pesos v. Taco
Cabana, the United States Supreme Court endorsed the
assimilation of the principles governing the distinctiveness of word
marks and non-verbal marks. But classical distinctiveness
analysis was developed to adjudicate the protectability of verbal
or pictorial marks, and it has proved inadequate to assist in the
determination of the distinctiveness of a product design. Judicial
efforts since Two Pesos to tackle this problem have misconstrued
the concept of distinctiveness. Professor Dinwoodie suggests how
courts might reformulate the concept of distinctiveness in terms
that are not linguistically conditioned and that better reflect spatial
or geometric subject matter. He contends that this reformulation
requires the development of the concept of the "predictive
inquiry," an inquiry into likely consumer associations in the
marketplace. Such an approach would clarify the scope of
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very grateful to Jane Ginsburg, Chair of my J.S.D. Committee at Columbia Law School,
both for her support and encouragement of that project, and for her insightful comments
on earlier drafts of this Article. I am also indebted to Jean Braucher, Tom Eisele, Brian
Havel, Jerry Reichman and Michael Van Alstine for providing me with constructive sug-
gestions on earlier drafts, and to my research assistant, Charles Sieving, for his invaluable
help. Responsibility for the views expressed and any errors that remain is, of course,
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protection for product design trade dress, an issue that within the
last eighteen months has been the subject of six petitions for
certiorari filed with the Supreme Court and which continues to
confound the courts.
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Traditionally, and still most typically, trademark disputes con-
cern the use of words or two-dimensional pictorial images employed
by manufacturers or service providers to identify their products.' In-
creasingly, however, producers are invoking the federal trademark
statute, the Lanham Act,2 to protect the design features of their
product (including three-dimensional elements such as shape or size)
against confusing imitation. Black & Decker would prefer that its
newly-marketed Snakelight flashlight not be forced to compete
against knock-offs;3 Ferrari dislikes the idea that cars other than its
classic Daytona Spyder might possess the Spyder's well-known pro-
file;4 Stickley seeks to enjoy the fruits of the resurgent market for
Mission-style furniture5 without competition from cheaper imitation
pieces;' and, the manufacturer of best-selling golf clubs wants to cur-
tail the cottage industry of club manufacturers that simulate the
shape and design features of its premium-priced products.7 It is now
1. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 9 cmt. g (1995)
[hereinafter RESTATEMENT] ("Words remain the most common type of trade-
mark .... ). The earliest forms of trademark were pictorial symbols, such as the
silversmith's hallmark. See 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS
AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 7.06, at 7-33 (3d ed. 1995).
2. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1994).
3. See Black & Decker Corp. v. Int'l Sales & Mktg., 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1851,
1853 (C.D. Cal. 1995).
4. See Ferrari S.P.A. Esercizio v. Roberts, 944 F.2d 1235, 1237-38 (6th Cir. 1991); see
also Chrysler Corp. v. Silva, 892 F. Supp. 321, 323-24 (D. Mass. 1995) (concluding that
design of Dodge Viper was protected under Lanham Act, although infringement was not
established).
5. Mission-style furniture is "'known for its severely plain and rectilinear style...
visually enriched only by expressed structural features and the warm tones of the wood.'"
L. & J.G. Stickley, Inc. v. Canal Dover Furniture Co., 79 F.3d 258, 260 (2d Cir. 1996)
(quoting DAVID M. CATHERS, FURNITURE OF THE AMERICAN ARTS AND CRAFTS
MOVEMENT 1 (1981)).
6. See L. & J.G. Stickley, Inc., 79 F.3d at 264-65 (vacating preliminary injunction
because not clear that consumers associated design with plaintiff, rather than with maker
of the original furniture design); see also Imagineering, Inc. v. Van Klassens, Inc., 53 F.3d
1260, 1263-64 (Fed. Cir.) (protecting look of garden furniture), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 277
(1995).
7. See Callaway Golf Co. v. Golf Clean, Inc., 915 F. Supp. 1206, 1209 (M.D. Fla.
1995).
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the Lanham Acte under which each of these manufacturers seeks, and
often obtains, redress.9
The Lanham Act provides protection, however, only for words,
symbols or designs that identify the source of a product-that are, in
trademark parlance, "distinctive."'0 Courts have long recognized that
consumers may identify a product by its packaging, thus justifying the
use of the Lanham Act to protect against a rival's deceptive use of
similar packaging." Recent extension of protection beyond a prod-
uct's packaging (for example, the appearance of the box in which the
flashlight is sold) to features of the product itself (for example, the
appearance of the flashlight) is, in some respects, merely judicial ac-
knowledgement of the equal capacity of product design or
configuration to identify products for consumers. In the minds of
8. Designs of useful articles are also within the coverage of the Copyright Act, and
can be the subject of design patent protection. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994) (copyright may
subsist in the design of useful articles to the extent that such design incorporates artistic
features that can be identified separately from, and are capable of existingindependently
of, the utilitarian aspects of the article); 35 U.S.C. § 171 (1994) (patent available for new,
original, and ornamental designs). Each of these alternative forms of intellectual prop-
erty protection has, however, failed to offer adequate protection to product design. See
Ralph S. Brown, Design Protection: An Overview, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1341, 1344-57
(1987); Jay Dratler, Jr., Trademark Protection for Industrial Designs, 1988 U. ILL. L. REV.
887, 891-96; J. H. Reichman, Design Protection and the New Technologies: The United
States Experience in a Transnational Perspective, 19 U. BALT. L. REV. 6, 19-81 (1989-90).
9. The list of product designs protected under the Lanham Act goes on. See, e.g.,
Kohler Co. v. Moen, Inc., 12 F.3d 632, 643-44 (7th Cir. 1993) (shape of water faucet);
Bauer Lamp Co. v. Shaffer, 941 F.2d 1165, 1172 (11th Cir. 1991) (form of neoclassical
lamps); W.T. Rogers Co. v. Keene, 778 F.2d 334, 338 (7th Cir. 1985) (outline of stacking
desk trays); Krueger Int'l, Inc. v. Nightingale, Inc., 915 F. Supp. 595, 607 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)
(design of stacking chairs); Kompan A.S. v. Park Structures, Inc., 890 F. Supp. 1167, 1174
(N.D.N.Y. 1995) (configuration of children's playground equipment); Health 0 Meter,
Inc. v. Terraillon Corp., 873 F. Supp. 1160,1171 (N.D. IIl. 1995) (look of weighing scales).
10. See infra notes 34-40 and accompanying text. The Lanham Act is not intended to
encourage (or protect) innovation as such. See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobsen Prods. Co., 115
S. Ct. 1300, 1304 (1995); cf. Dratler, supra note 8, at 909 ("[Flostering innovation is only a
minor and incidental purpose of trademark protection."). Designs are, therefore, not
protected merely because they are creative or novel. See infra note 36. Congressional
efforts to offer sui generis protection for a designer's creativity have failed. It is the ab-
sence of such a sui generis design law, and the failings of the design patent system, that
caused designers to seek protection under the Lanham Act, exerting pressure on the
threshold requirement of distinctiveness. The Supreme Court has cautioned, however,
that it is for Congress, not the courts, to close any gap in protection that exists. See Bo-
nito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 147 (1989).
11. See, e.g., George Basch Co. v. Blue Coral, Inc., 968 F.2d 1532 (2d Cir. 1992)
(container for metal polish); Federal-Mogul-Bower Bearings, Inc. v. Azoff, 313 F.2d 405
(6th Cir. 1963) (packaging for engine parts); Eastman Kodak Co. v. Royal-Pioneer Paper
Box Mfg., 197 F. Supp. 132 (E.D. Pa. 1961) (packaging for photographic film).
12. Product configuration typically refers to the three-dimensional design of a useful
product. See, e.g., Reichman, supra note 8, at 116. Courts and commentators, however,
[Vol. 75
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both producers and consumers, many products are no longer identi-
fied and distinguished only by a verbal mark or pictorial symbol, but
rather are set apart from other similar goods by their very shape or
appearance. 3
It is how this attribute is to be determined, how to ascertain the
circumstances in which products differentiate themselves literally by
their own "look," that is the subject of this Article. The expansion of
Lanham Act coverage to include product design has severely
stretched the capacity of the existing concept of distinctiveness to de-
termine the appropriate boundaries of protectable subject matter.
Classical distinctiveness analysis was developed to adjudicate the pro-
tectability of verbal or pictorial marks, and those modes of analysis
have proved inadequate when transplanted to product designs. In
this Article, I seek to refocus the distinctiveness inquiry, and to sug-
gest how courts might reformulate the concept of distinctiveness in
terms that more optimally reflect spatial or geometric, rather than
linguistic or pictorial, subject matter.
The vast majority of product design infringement suits proceed
under the principles of federal unfair competition law embodied in
use a multitude of terms---"product configuration," "product appearance," "product de-
sign," and "product feature"-interchangeably and without great attention to consistency.
Compare id. (stating that product configuration refers to three-dimensional design), with
Duraco Prods. v. Joy Plastic Enters., 40 F.3d 1431, 1439 (3d Cir. 1994) (defining product
configuration without reference to three-dimensional aspects); see also infra note 300
(discussing whether the Second Circuit's concept of "product feature" is interchangeable
with the Third Circuit's concept of "product configuration."). Three-dimensional designs
of useful products are the primary focus of this Article because it is with respect to those
designs that deficiencies in intellectual property protection are most acute, in part be-
cause they more directly trigger competitive concerns surrounding the protection of
useful matter. As explained more fully below, however, I am hesitant to accord any sig-
nificance to categorization of any matter as "packaging," "product design," or "product
configuration." See infra Part IV(E)(1). Subject to this caveat, and only where a distinc-
tion is explicitly drawn, for the purpose of this Article, I use the terms "product design,"
"product appearance," or "product features" to incorporate both three-dimensional
product configuration and other features, such as two-dimensional surface decoration,
that are part of the appearance of the product itself. Cf. Brown, supra note 8, at 1358
(noting difference between "[c]onfiguration (which is like 'overall shape' in copyright
discourse) and design (which is at once our generic term and also denotes ornamenta-
tion)").
13. See Sicilia Di R. Biebow & Co. v. Cox, 732 F.2d 417, 425 (5th Cir. 1984)
("[C]ourts have realized.., that many designs and features have both functional and
identifying aspects. 'Some designs adopted for the purpose of identification are not
wholly useless but perform a utilitarian function.'" (citation omitted)); see also John B.
Thomas, Thomson Designers Tuned In To Users, 16 INDIANAPOLIS Bus. J., July 31-Aug.
6, 1995, at 1A, 33A ("That is the purpose of design: to make your product stand out."
(comments of design manager, assured by corporate management that design would play
a big role in product development)).
1997]
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section 43(a) of the Lanham Act,4 but a producer may also institute
an action under section 32 of the Act5 if the product design has been
registered as a trademark with the Patent and Trademark Office. 6
The governing principles are, for the most part, the same whether the
claim is pursued under either section 32 or section 43,17 each cause of
14. A trademark can be registered as such under the Lanham Act, and can also be
protected as an unregistered trademark under the principles of unfair competition law
embodied in section 43(a) of the Lanham Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1994); see also
infra notes 17-18 (discussing section 43(a)). Section 43(a) is widely accepted as having
created, and providing the statutory basis for, a federal law of unfair competition. See
Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 780 (1992) (Stevens, J., concurring)
(" 'Section 43(a)... has been widely interpreted to create, in essence, a federal law of
unfair competition.' "); cf. Kohler Co. v. Moen, Inc., 12 F.3d 632, 646-47 (7th Cir. 1993)
(Cudahy, J., dissenting) ("[T]he Lanham Act (comprising the federal law of trademarks
and unfair competition) essentially federalizes the common law of trademarks and unfair
competition.").
15. Section 32 provides the basis for an action alleging infringement of a registered
trademark. See 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (1994); see also infra note 18 (quoting § 1114); see, e.g.,
Ark Plas Prods. v. Value Plastics, Inc., 913 F. Supp. 1246 (W.D. Ark. 1996) (action for
infringement of registered trade dress consisting of design of industrial pipe fittings); El-
don Indus. v. Rubbermaid, Inc., 735 F. Supp. 786 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (action for infringement
of registered trade dress consisting of design of stackable office trays and vertical sorters).
The paucity of cases pursued as section 32 claims reflects not only the historical roots of
trade dress claims in unfair competition law, but also the relatively few substantive advan-
tages that accrue from registration in light of the expansion of section 43(a), which was
endorsed by Congress in the 1988 revisions to the trademark statute. See The United
States Trademark Association Trademark Review Commission Report and Recommenda-
tions to USTA President and Board of Directors (proposing conforming language of
section 43(a) to expanded scope of protection offered by courts and extending registered
trademark remedies to section 43(a) actions), reprinted in 77 TRADEMARK REP. 375, 426-
27 (1987); see also Qualitex Co. v. Jacobsen Prods. Co., 115 S. Ct. 1300, 1308 (1995)
(identifying advantages of trademark registration: "ability to prevent importation of con-
fusingly similar goods.... constructive notice of ownership, incontestable status [and]
prima facie evidence of validity and ownership"); infra note 17 (discussing incentives to
pursue registration).
16. Proceeding parallel to developments in federal unfair competition law, courts first
affirmed federal trademark registration of the shape of containers or packaging, see, e.g.,
In re Mogen David Wine Corp., 328 F.2d 925 (C.C.P.A. 1964) (shape of wine decanter);
In re Haig & Haig Ltd., 118 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 229 (Comm'r Pat. 1958) (shape of whiskey
bottle), and later recognized that product configurations could also be registered under
the Lanham Act. See, e.g., Kohler Co. v. Moen, Inc., 12 F.3d 632, 638 (7th Cir. 1993)
(affirming registration of faucet design); see also In re Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 335
F.2d 836, 838 (C.C.P.A. 1964) (recognizing that product design could be registered on
Supplemental Register, because it might be registered on Principal Register with proof of
established secondary meaning); In re Honeywell, Inc., 497 F.2d 1344, 1349 (C.C.P.A.
1974) (accepting possibility of registration but remanding to determine functionality of
thermostat appearance); cf. Aromatique, Inc. v. Gold Seal, Inc., 28 F.3d 863,868 (8th Cir.
1994) (noting that trade dress may be registered on the Principal Register of the Patent &
Trademark Office) (packaging case).
17. "The general principles qualifying a mark for registration under § 2 of the Lan-
ham Act are for the most part applicable in determining whether an unregistered mark is
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action resting on a likelihood of public confusion as to the source of
the respective products. s Product design infringement claims, like
packaging infringement claims, are commonly referred to as "trade
dress" claims, with the term "trademark" being reserved for situa-
tions where the identifier of the product's source is a word or a
pictorial symbol. Here too, the scope of protection under the Lan-
ham Act is now largely unaffected by whether the action is
denominated as one of "trade dress" infringement or "trademark"
infringement, and I use these terms interchangeably throughout this
entitled to protection under Section 43(a)." Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 768. Unfair competi-
tion encompasses more than what is traditionally thought of as trademark infringement.
See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 2.02, at 2-13. However, the substantive rights afforded
a registered trademark owner are largely coextensive with those available to the owner of
an unregistered mark bringing an action for unfair competition under section 43(a). See
S. REP. No. 79-1333, at 2 (1946), reprinted in 1946 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1274, 1275 ("There is no
essential difference between trade-mark infringement and what is loosely called unfair
competition. Unfair competition is the genus of which trade-mark infringement is one of
the species .... All trade-mark cases are cases of unfair competition and involve the same
legal wrong."). But see, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1124 (1994) (providing trademark registrant with
procedure to facilitate border interdiction of infringing goods). In the context of product
design protection, the applicable substantive principles do not differ significantly as be-
tween trademark law and unfair competition law. Cf. Graeme B. Dinwoodie, In Defense
of Trade Dress Protection For Product Design 37-39 (Dec. 13, 1995) (work in progress, on
file with the author) (arguing that the Fourth Circuit decision in Shakespeare Co. v. Silstar
Corp. of America, 9 F.3d 1091 (4th Cir. 1993), which would deny the availability of a func-
tionality defense to a claim of infringement of an incontestable mark, has perhaps
provided further incentive to pursue registration and the incontestable status that can
flow therefrom).
18. Section 32 of the Lanham Act imposes liability upon "[a]ny person who shall,
without the consent of the registrant.., use ... a registered mark in connection with the
sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of any goods or services on or in connec-
tion with which such use is likely to cause confusion," but no longer limits actionable
confusion to source-confusion. See 15 U.S.C. § 1114; see also id. § 1125(a) (imposing li-
ability upon "[a]ny person who, on or in connection with any goods or services... uses
any word, term, name, symbol, or device ... or false designation of origin, false or mis-
leading description of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact, which... is likely
to cause confusion.., as to the affiliation, connection, or association of such person with
another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship or approval of his or her goods, services,
or commercial activities by another person"). In 1962, Congress amended section 32 of
the Lanham Act, "evincing a clear purpose to outlaw the use of trademarks which are
likely to cause confusion, mistake, or deception of any kind, not merely of purchasers nor
simply as to source of origin." Syntex Labs., Inc. v. Norwich Pharmacal, Co., 437 F.2d
566, 568 (2d Cir. 1971). In this Article, I use the terms "source-identifier" and "confusion
as to source" as shorthand for the broader concepts now encompassed by modem trade-
mark law. See Lisa H. Johnston, Drifting Toward Trademark Rights in Gross, 85
TRADEMARK REP. 19, 23-24 (1995) (discussing expansion of source-identifying function
of trademarks); cf. Nicholas S. Economides, The Economics of Trademarks, 78
TRADEMARK REP. 523, 527 (1988) ("By the beginning of the twentieth century trade-
marks were understood not to be useful in identifying the source, but rather as identifying
a quality standard.").
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Although product design trade dress claims took root under the
Lanham Act as early as twenty years ago,' they have burgeoned of
19. "For all practical purposes, there should be no difference in the substantive law of
product simulation whether one uses the labels 'trademark,' 'trade dress' or simply 'unfair
competition.' Changing the labels does not change the rules of recovery." 1 MCCARTHY,
supra note 1, § 7.25, at 7-113. As the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has ex-
plained:
Attempts to incorporate protection for a product's overall design or appearance
into section 43(a) have come under a variety of guises. Some courts have found
an unregistered trademark in the product's trade dress, overall design, combina-
tion of features, or appearance. Others simply find that copying a product's
overall trade dress or design is unfair competition. Still others have found such
copying to be trade dress infringement without attempting to link it to trade-
mark infringement or designating it a subcategory of unfair competition.
American Greetings Corp. v. Dan-Dee Imports, Inc., 807 F.2d 1136, 1140 n.2 (3d Cir. 1986)
(internal citations omitted). In Blau Plumbing, Inc. v. S.O.S. Fix-It, Inc., 781 F.2d 604, 608
(7th Cir. 1986), Judge Posner concluded that there was "probably no substantive legal differ-
ence" between trade dress and trademarks. Citing Professor McCarthy's comment that
Chevron Chemical Co. v. Voluntary Purchasing Group had " 'brought trade dress cases into
the mainstream of trademark law,'" Judge Posner commented, "And high time. Labels
should not determine rights." Id As discussed below, the Supreme Court has endorsed this
assimilation. See infra note 72 and accompanying text; see also Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 773
("There is no persuasive reason to apply different analysis to [trade dress and trademarks
under section 43(a)]."); Aromatique, 28 F.3d at 868 ("The difference between trade dress
and trademark is no longer of importance in determining whether trade dress is protected by
federal law."). But see infra notes 149-52 and accompanying text (discussing whether
Qualitex suggests that color per se will be protected only upon proof of secondary meaning).
20. Professor Litman identifies Truck Equipment Service Corp. v. Fruehauf, 536 F.2d
1210 (8th Cir. 1976) ("TESCO"), as the first successful "product imitation" action
brought under section 43 of the Lanham Act. See Jessica Litman, Note, The Problem of
Functional Features: Trade Dress Infringement Under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 82
COLUM. L. REV. 77,83 (1982); see also Robert Unikel, Better by Design: The Availability
of Trade Dress Protection for Product Design and the Demise of "Aesthetic Functionality,"
85 TRADEMARK REP. 312, 314 (1995) (identifying TESCO as the "turning point" in pro-
tection of product design as trade dress). In that case, the Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit affirmed a successful infringement claim predicated upon the extension of
packaging trade dress principles to protect the appearance of the hopper of a truck. See
TESCO, 536 F.2d at 1216. TESCO cast the claim as one of "false designation of origin"
(the language of section 43 of the Lanham Act) or "unfair competition." See id. at 1215-
16. It was not until later that references to product design as "trade dress" appear. See
Reichman, supra note 8, at 87 (tracing use of "trade dress" to describe product configura-
tions to the Ninth Circuit case of Fabrica, Inc. v. El Dorado Corp., 697 F.2d 890 (9th Cir.
1983)). Earlier efforts to protect the appearance of a product as trade dress or as a false
designation of origin under section 43(a) had failed on their facts, although courts ad-
dressing the issue had not denied that such a cause of action might be available. See, e.g.,
Spangler Candy Co. v. Crystal Pure Candy Co., 353 F.2d 641 (7th Cir. 1965); Bose Corp.
v. Linear Design Labs, 340 F. Supp. 513 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), aff'd, 467 F.2d 304 (2d Cir.
1972); Remco Indus. v. Toyomenka, Inc., 286 F. Supp. 948 (S.D.N.Y.), affd, 397 F.2d 977
(2d Cir. 1968). Formerly, trade dress protection (under either state or federal law) had
been afforded only to a product's packaging, and not to the product itself:
Historically, product imitation was the copying of the appearance of a product
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late, encouraged in part by the two most recent trademark decisions
of the United States Supreme Court." These decisions suggest an
expansionist approach to the scope of Lanham Act protection. In
Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc.,2 the Court accorded protection
to the decor and ambiance of a Mexican fast-food restaurant, and ap-
proved the assimilation of the principles governing the distinctiveness
of verbal trademarks and non-verbal trade dress. The Two Pesos de-
cision, however, raised as many questions as it answered. These
include (1) the means by which the assimilation of the principles gov-
erning the distinctiveness of verbal marks and non-verbal dress is to
be effected, and (2) the extent of any such assimilation. Those ques-
tions remained unresolved even after the Court's 1995 decision in
Qualitex Co. v. Jacobsen Products Co.,' in which the Court recog-
nized that a color per se could be registered as a product's trademark
under the Lanham Act.24
itself, while trade dress infringement was the copying of a product's package.
There has been a considerable area of overlap, however, as a product's appear-
ance may function as its packaging, incorporating elements intended to
distinguish it from competing products. Recently, the distinction between prod-
uct imitation and trade dress infringement has tended to disappear.
Litman, supra, at 79; see also Reichman, supra note 8, at 87 ("[Fabrica] and similar deci-
sions.., began to stretch the notion of trade dress to the point where prior distinctions
between 'package' or 'container' and 'product configuration' became blurred and hardly
worth defending.").
21. See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobsen Prods. Co., 115 S. Ct. 1300 (1995); Two Pesos, Inc. v.
Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763 (1992).
22. 505 U.S. 763 (1992); see also infra text accompanying notes 67-81 (discussing Two
Pesos).
23. 115 S. Ct. 1300 (1995).
24. The expansion of federal protection for product designs under the Lanham Act,
suggested by Two Pesos and Qualitex, has also raised difficult questions regarding the
interaction of trademark and patent law, which might offer cumulative protection to con-
sumer products. The Supreme Court has considered unfair competition protection for
product configurations under state law on three occasions over the past thirty years. See
Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141 (1989); Compco Corp. v.
Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376
U.S. 225 (1964). In its most recent analysis (Bonito Boats), the Court found that a Florida
plug-molding law interfered with the federal policy favoring free competition in unpat-
ented designs. However, the Supreme Court has not directly addressed the relationship
between patent law and federal trademark protection for product designs since the en-
actment of the Lanham Act. The Court's previous decision dealing with federal unfair
competition protection, Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111 (1938), was
handed down six months after the emasculation of federal common law in Erie Railroad
v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), but was brought and argued on the basis of federal
common law, the Lanham Act being passed eight years later. See Kellogg Co., 305 U.S. at
113 n.1. Other more recent decisions have considered the scope of federal protection for
non-verbal marks, but have not addressed the broader questions implicated by the pat-
ent/federal trademark relationship. See, e.g., Qualitex, 115 S. Ct. at 1308 (holding that
nonfunctional color per se can, with secondary meaning, be registered as a trademark);
1997]
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This Article attempts to fill that void. In Parts I and II, I provide
a brief outline of the two bases upon which a plaintiff may demon-
strate the distinctiveness of its mark-namely, inherent
distinctiveness and secondary meaning. Part II also explains the
means by which the distinctiveness of verbal marks has classically
been determined. In Part III, I summarize the debate surrounding
the question, resolved affirmatively by the Supreme Court in Two
Pesos, of whether a non-verbal trade dress can be inherently distinc-
tive.
Part IV contains the heart of this Article. There, I address the
questions left unanswered by Two Pesos. Neither Two Pesos nor
Qualitex offers any significant guidance as to the means by which the
analytical assimilation of verbal and non-verbal matter is to be
achieved. Difficulties with the application of existing distinctiveness
analysis have been most sharply encountered in addressing the ques-
tion of when a product design is "inherently distinctive," a possibility
which Two Pesos appears to endorse.' This Article argues that the
conceptual confusion precipitated by the advent of inherently distinc-
tive product designs can be dispelled by a limited reconceptualization
of distinctiveness.26 I reject the suggestion that the concept of dis-
tinctiveness should implement competitive concerns, preferring to
assign that task to the doctrine of functionality. Instead, this Article
develops the concept of the "predictive inquiry"-whether the prod-
Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 856-59 (1982) (reversing lower court
on point of procedure).
Two Pesos thus effectively re-ignites the contest between patent and unfair competi-
tion protection, and litigants are now pressing the Supreme Court to reconsider the issue.
In the last year, two litigants have unsuccessfully petitioned the Supreme Court to resolve
this alleged conflict. See Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc. v. Duracraft Corp., 58 F.3d
1498 (10th Cir. 1995), petition for cert. filed, 64 U.S.L.W. 3271 (U.S. Sept. 29, 1995) (No.
95-524) (petition on file with author), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 753 (1996); Imagineering,
Inc. v. Van Klassens, Inc., 53 F.3d 1260 (Fed. Cir. 1995), petition for cert. filed, 64
U.S.L.W. 3020 (July 21, 1995) (No. 95-127) (petition on file with author), cert. denied, 116
S. Ct. 277 (1995). This alleged conflict is a proper concern, but should be addressed in
stages of trade dress analysis other than inherent distinctiveness. In a forthcoming article,
I explain why an appropriate scope of protection for product design does not interfere
with or frustrate the purposes of patent law, and refute the suggestion that trade dress
protection must be subordinated to patent law in determining the availability of intellec-
tual property protection for consumer products. See Dinwoodie, supra note 17. Trade
dress protection for product designs, if properly circumscribed, can coexist peacefully
with patent law principles; ultimately, however, the most appropriate scope of intellectual
property protection for designs can best be provided by the adoption of a carefully-
tailored sui generis design law that balances the needs of producers for protection with the
rights of rivals to compete.
25. See infra Part IV(C)(2).
26. See infra Part IV(E).
[Vol. 75
PROD UCT DESIGN TRADE DRESS
uct design would be likely to identify the product's source-as the
basis for an analysis of inherently distinctive product design.27 I then
identify several "predictors" pertinent to any such inquiry.' These
predictors reflect the empirical bases upon which courts reach their
predictive conclusions as to whether consumers are likely to associate
the design of a product with its source.
This Article also considers a series of judicial efforts to articulate
alternative standards by which to adjudicate the inherent distinctive-
ness of product design. I contend that those efforts are inconsistent
with a proper understanding of the concept of distinctiveness and pay
insufficient regard to the means by which the modern consumer
makes purchasing decisions. Moreover, the practical effect of each
alternative test developed by the lower courts since Two Pesos is to
deny the inherent distinctiveness of product design. This result
violates the spirit of the Supreme Court's decision in Two Pesos?
A second question remaining unanswered after Two Pesos is the
extent of the assimilation of the principles governing verbal and non-
verbal marks. In the wake of Two Pesos, several courts and commen-
tators have attempted to limit that assimilation, suggesting that
product design should continue to be treated differently from verbal
marks or product packaging, i.e., that a new partition be established
between packaging and design. In this Article, I repudiate any dis-
27. See infra Part IV (E).
28. See infra Part IV (E)(2).
29. See infra Part IV (D)(3).
30. Critics of Two Pesos might argue that the proponents of these tests adhere more
faithfully than did the Supreme Court in Two Pesos to the principles articulated by the
Court three years earlier in Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141
(1989) (holding state anti-copying law preempted by federal patent law because it inter-
fered with the federal policy favoring free competition of unpatented designs). See, e.g.,
J.H. Reichman, Past and Current Trends in the Evolution of Design Protection Law-A
Comment, 4 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 387,392-94 (1993) ("Nowhere
in the Two Pesos opinion was there the slightest awareness of a possible contradiction
with the pro-competitive ethos of Bonito Boats .... "). As discussed below, however, the
legitimate competitive concerns aroused by product design trade dress protection should
be addressed via the doctrine of functionality. See infra notes 89-101 and accompanying
text. Courts seeking to implement the philosophical message of Bonito Boats in the in-
herent distinctiveness inquiry are using the wrong analytical vehicle. Their concern may
be legitimate; their response is not.
31. On three occasions last year, the Supreme Court declined to consider whether the
developing distinction between product configuration and product packaging, see infra
Part IV(D)(2)(a), conflicts with and undermines the Court's decision in Two Pesos. See
Thomas & Betts Corp. v. Panduit Corp., 65 F.3d 654 (7th Cir. 1995), petition for cert. filed,
64 U.S.L.W. 3518 (U.S. Jan. 22, 1996) (No. 95-1169) (asking court to consider whether the
test for secondary meaning should differ depending upon the classification of the trade
dress at issue as product packaging or product configuration), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1044
1997]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
tinction between packaging and design.32 The rationale for the dis-
tinction is circular, and the classifications are incapable of consistent
application. Instead, I propose that the inherent distinctiveness of all
trade dress be adjudicated by the same predictive inquiry: whether it
is likely that consumers will identify the product by reference to the
features claimed as trade dress.33
I. THE CONCEPT OF DISTINCTIVENESS
The primary prerequisite to trademark protection is proof of a
mark's distinctiveness? Unlike patent or copyright law, no measure
of the creative nature of the design is necessary. A trademark need
not be original, novel or non-obvious.35 Nor will a design be pro-
(1996); Chums, Ltd. v. Snugz/USA, Inc., 64 F.3d 669 (10th Cir. 1995), petition for cert.
filed, 64 U.S.L.W. 3417 (U.S. Nov. 27, 1995) (No. 95-869) (seeking review by court on
application of distinction in context of determining whether likelihood of confusion ex-
ists), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 914 (1996); Versa Prods. Co. v. Bifold Co., 50 F.3d 189 (3d
Cir. 1995), petition for cert. filed, 63 U.S.L.W. 3834 (U.S. May 12, 1995) (No. 94-1863)
(requesting review on issue of whether product configuration and product packaging
should be treated differently in determining whether likelihood of confusion exists)
(petition on file with author), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 54 (1995); see also infra note 256
(discussing arguments raised in Thomas & Betts petition).
32. See infra Part IV(E)(1).
33. See infra Part IV(E).
34. See Canal Co. v. Clark, 80 U.S. 311,323 (1871) ("[T]he trade-mark must either by
itself, or by association, point distinctively to the origin or ownership of the article to
which it is applied.").
35. See Banff Ltd. v. Limited, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 1103, 1116 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) ("That
the combination is 'obvious'... does not mean that the design is not original, nor, more
importantly, that it is not arbitrary or fanciful .... "), later proceeding, Banff Ltd. v. Ex-
press, Inc., 921 F. Supp. 1065 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); see also The Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S.
82, 94 (1879) ("The trade-mark recognized by the common law is generally the growth of
a considerable period of use, rather than a sudden invention. It is often the result of acci-
dent rather than design .... ); Canal Co., 80 U.S. at 322 ("[I]t is not necessary that the
word adopted as a trade-name should be a new creation, never before known or
used .... ); Manhattan Indus. v. Sweater Bee by Banff, Ltd., 627 F.2d 628, 630 (2d Cir.
1980) (recognizing trademark rights in mark abandoned by one company and immedi-
ately adopted for same goods by unrelated company). The Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit has, however, recently indicated that the product features of exact repro-
ductions of well-known and historically-significant public domain designs are unlikely to
be distinctive, because it will be difficult to establish that consumers associate the product
design with the manufacturer of the reproductions, rather than with the maker of the
popular originals. See L. & J.G. Stickley, Inc. v. Canal Dover Furniture Co., 79 F.3d 258,
264 (2d Cir. 1996) (denying trade dress rights in design of reproduction furniture line); see
also EFS Mktg. v. Russ Berrie & Co., 76 F.3d 487, 490 (2d Cir. 1996) ("In view of the
district court's finding that 'both parties' dolls [are] virtually indistinguishable from
the ... public domain doll,' ... it is most unlikely that consumers would look to [the plain-
tiff] ... as the sole producer of the troll dolls." (citation omitted)); cf. Frederick Wame &
Co. v. Book Sales Inc., 481 F. Supp. 1191, 1195 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (noting that for publisher
of Beatrix Potter books to show it has trademark rights in the books' cover illustrations
requires not just that "the illustrations in question have come to signify Beatrix Potter as
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tected as a trademark merely because it satisfies those levels of inge-
nuity." Rather, it must represent a feature by which consumers
identify and distinguish a product from others.
Distinctiveness is central to trademark protection because, with-
out it, no goodwill attaches to the claimed mark. Absent that
goodwill, use by competitors of the same or a similar mark would nei-
ther be an appropriation of the property of others, nor would it
confuse consumers.38 For these two basic concerns of trademark law
to be aroused, consumers must first associate the mark with a specific
source. 9 The concept of distinctiveness is expressly embodied in the
author of the books; plaintiff must show that they have come to represent its goodwill and
reputation as publisher of those books"). A design may be copyrightable even if it incor-
porates elements of a pre-existing public domain design, provided that the variations from
the public domain design are not merely trivial, but substantial or distinguishable. See
Godinger Silver Art Co. v. International Silver Co., 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1453, 1455
(S.D.N.Y. 1995). Such a copyright extends, however, only to the designer's incremental
original contribution. See 17 U.S.C. § 103(b) (1994).
36. See Sunburst Prods. v. Cyrk Int'l, Nos. 95-1091, 95-1104, 1996 WL 550071, at *4
(Fed. Cir. Sept. 30, 1996) ("To be inherently distinctive a product design must be more
than novel .... ); Pebble Beach Co. v. Tour 18 I, Ltd., 936 F. Supp. 1299, 1343, (S.D. Tex.
1996) ("Merely because no other golf holes resemble or are designed exactly like plain-
tiffs' does not make the holes inherently distinctive."); Blue Coral, Inc. v. Turtle Wax,
Inc., 664 F. Supp. 1153, 1163 (N.D. 111. 1987) (commenting that if a shape were inherently
distinctive merely because no competitive product combines precisely the same elements
in its trade dress, every new product on the market would be inherently distinctive); cf.
Duraco Prods. v. Joy Plastic Enters., 40 F.3d 1431, 1450 (3d Cir. 1994) ("Protecting a
product configuration without a showing of secondary meaning because the configuration
is pleasant rather than because it identifies the source of the product would risk seriously
transgressing the protective zones mapped by the patent laws."). These principles pertain
whether a plaintiff is proceeding nominally under trademark law or unfair competition
law. Distinctiveness is also the key to common-law protection. See Crescent Tool Co. v.
Kilborn & Bishop Co., 247 F. 299,300 (2d Cir. 1917).
37. See 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (1994); infra note 42.
38. See Canal Co., 80 U.S. at 323; Charles Jacquin et Cie v. Destileria Serralles, Inc.,
921 F.2d 467, 472 n.5 (3d Cir. 1990) ("A consumer must recognize that a particularly
packaged product comes from Source A before she can be confused by a similar package
from Source B."); see also Thomas & Betts Corp. v. Panduit Corp., 65 F.3d 654, 658 (7th
Cir. 1995) ("[T]rademark law allows a producer to prohibit the copying of a product fea-
ture which serves as a signifier of source in order to preserve his reputation and the
goodwill consumers have for his brand."), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1044 (1996). As Profes-
sor McCarthy has explained: "A trademark.., has no kind of existence apart from the
goodwill of the product or service it symbolizes." 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 2.07, at
2-34. "'Goodwill is that which makes tomorrow's business more than an accident. It is
the reasonable expectation of future patronage based upon past satisfactory dealings.
Goodwill is dependent on identification.'" 1 id § 2.08[1], at 2-38 to 2-39 (quoting
EDWARD S. ROGERS, GOOD WILL, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR TRADING 13 (1914)).
39. The purposes of trademark law, as embodied in the Lanham Act, are "to 'secure
to the owner of the mark the goodwill of his business and to protect the ability of consum-
ers to distinguish among competing producers.'" Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc.,
505 U.S. 703, 774 (1992) (quoting Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S.
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definition of "trademark" contained in the Lanham Act: "any word,
name, symbol, or device or any combination thereof [used by any
person] to identify and distinguish his or her goods, including a
unique product, from those manufactured or sold by others, and to
indicate the source of the goods, even if that source is unknown."
The courts define trade dress in more expansive terms, as "the
total image of a product"; it "may include features such as size,
shape, color or color combinations, texture, graphics, or even par-
ticular sales techniques."41 While this may appear broader than the
statutory definition of trademark, the two concepts afford largely the
same scope of protection. It is the ability of a claimed mark or dress
to serve an identifying function that sets the outer limits of protection
rather than conceptual classification as a "word, name, symbol, or
device or any combination thereof" or "total image.
4 2
189, 198 (1985)).
40. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1994). In the legislative history of the 1988 Trademark Law
Revision Act, Congress confirmed its intention that product configurations be considered
registrable subject-matter. See S. REP. No. 100-515, at 44 (1988), reprinted in 1988
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5577, 5607 ("The revised definition [of 'trademark'] intentionally re-
tains ... the words 'symbol or device' so as not to preclude the registration of colors,
shapes, sounds or configurations where they function as trademarks."); cf. 15 U.S.C.
§ 1091 (1994) (any "package" or "configuration of goods" that is capable of serving as a
trademark may be registered on the Supplemental Register).
41. John H. Harland Co. v. Clarke Checks, Inc., 711 F.2d 966, 980 (11th Cir. 1983);
accord International Jensen, Inc. v. Metrosound U.S.A., Inc., 4 F.3d 819, 822-23 (9th Cir.
1993) (similarly defining trade dress); Paddington Corp. v. Attiki Importers & Distribs.,
Inc., 996 F.2d 577,582 (2d Cir. 1993) (citing Harland); see also Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 764
n.1 (" 'The "trade dress" of a product is essentially its total image and overall appear-
ance.'" (quoting Blue-Bell Biomedical v. Cin-Bad, Inc., 864 F.2d 1253, 1256 (5th Cir.
1989))); Knitwaves, Inc. v. Lollytogs Ltd., 71 F.3d 996, 1005 (2d Cir. 1995) ("While 'trade
dress' at one time 'referred only to the manner in which a product was dressed up to go to
market with a label, package, display card, and similar packaging elements,' the concept
'has taken on a more expansive meaning and includes the design and appearance of the
product as well as that of the container and all elements making up the total visual image
by which the product is presented to customers.'" (citation omitted)); Mana Prods. v.
Columbia Cosmetics Mfg., 65 F.3d 1063, 1069 (2d Cir. 1995) ("[Tirade dress today en-
compasses a broad concept of how a product presented to the public looks .... "); SK & F
Co. v. Premo Pharm. Labs., 481 F. Supp. 1184, 1187 (D.N.J. 1979) ("Trade dress is a term
reflecting the overall general impact, usually visual, but sometimes also tactile, of all these
features taken together."), aff'd, 625 F.2d 1055 (3d Cir. 1980).
42. Qualitex Co. v. Jacobsen Prods. Co., 115 S. Ct. 1300, 1304 (1995) ("It is the source
distinguishing ability of a mark-not its ontological status as color, shape, fragrance,
word, or sign-that permits it to serve these basic purposes [of trademark law]."); see also
15 U.S.C. § 1052 (providing for registration of marks "by which the goods of the applicant
may be distinguished from the goods of others").
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II. BASES FOR ESTABLISHING DISTINCTIVENESS
AND THE ABERCROMBIE SPECTRUvi
The distinctiveness of a trademark generally may be established
by demonstrating that the mark (1) is inherently distinctive, or (2)
has acquired distinctiveness. In the first instance, distinctiveness is
measured by locating the mark in one of a spectrum of conceptual
categories that blend without clear differentiation into one another.
This analysis, most authoritatively outlined by Judge Henry Friendly
in Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc.," dictates that a
mark will be regarded as inherently distinctive if it is "arbitrary,"
"fanciful" or "suggestive" in relation to the goods upon which it is
affixed.45 Marks classified as "descriptive" of the goods are not in-
herently distinctive and can be protected only by way of the second
basis, that is, upon proof that they have actually acquired distinctive-
ness in the minds of consumers.'
43. See Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 769; see also RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 13.
These two methods of establishing distinctiveness and securing protection are available to
plaintiffs under both section 32 and section 43 of the Lanham Act. See RESTATEMENT,
supra note 1, § 13 cmt. e ("The doctrine of secondary meaning is applicable both at com-
mon law and under the various state and federal trademark registration statutes .... The
doctrine is also applicable to actions for infringement of unregistered designations under
§ 43(a) of the Lanham Act."); id. § 13 crnt. b ("Inherently distinctive designations are
eligible for protection immediately upon use .... They are also eligible for registration
under state and federal trademark statutes without further evidence of distinctiveness.");
see also 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f) (descriptive mark may be registered upon proof that the mark
has become distinctive of the applicant's goods in commerce); Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 769
(concept of secondary meaning has been applied to actions under section 43); cf. Duraco
Prods. v. Joy Plastic Enters., 40 F.3d 1431, 1439 (3d Cir. 1994) ("[T]he Supreme Court in
Two Pesos used 'distinctive' in a dual sense, meaning either inherently distinctive or hav-
ing acquired distinctiveness through secondary meaning.").
44. 537 F.2d 4 (2d Cir. 1976).
45. See id. at 9-11; see also Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 768 (adopting Judge Friendly's
formulation). As the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has explained: "The ...
definitions [of these terms] address the relation between the product and the trade
dress .... Stuart Hall Co. v. Ampad Corp., 51 F.3d 780, 786 (8th Cir. 1995). "A term is
suggestive if it requires imagination, thought and perception to reach a conclusion as to
the nature of goods." Stix Prods. v. United Merchants & Mfrs., 295 F. Supp. 479, 488
(S.D.N.Y. 1968), quoted in Abercrombie & Fitch Co., 537 F.2d at 11. A fanciful mark
consists of a word that has been invented for the sole purpose of functioning as a trade-
mark. See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 11.03, at 11-10. EXXON is an example of a
fanciful mark. "Arbitrary marks comprise those words, symbols, pictures etc., that are in
common linguistic use but which, when used with the goods or services in issue, neither
suggest nor describe any ingredient, quality or characteristic of those goods or services."
1 id. § 11.04[1], at 11-14.
46. "A term is descriptive if it forthwith conveys an immediate idea of the ingredi-
ents, qualities or characteristics of the goods." Stix Prods., 295 F. Supp. at 488, quoted in
Abercrombie & Fitch Co., 537 F.2d at 11. Generic marks can never be protected as
trademarks. See Miller Brewing Co. v. G. Heileman Brewing Co., 561 F.2d 75, 81 (7th
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Marks conceptually classified as arbitrary, fanciful or suggestive
with respect to the product to which they are affixed are regarded as
inherently distinctive, and protected without more, because the
"intrinsic nature [of such marks] serves to identify a particular source
of a product. 4 7 These marks are considered likely to identify the
product source because they have minimal natural or necessary con-
ceptual connection with the products they mark. They are, as it were,
ciphers with little meaning with respect to the product, until they la-
bel it. The inherent distinctiveness of these marks is, in effect, a legal
presumption that they will operate to identify the source of the prod-
uct and distinguish it from others.48
No empirical proof of actual source-identification or consumer
association is, or can be, demanded of inherently distinctive marks.
Descriptive marks, in contrast, must evidence acquired distinctive-
ness, which is shown through proof of secondary meaning.4 The
Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition indicates that
"[s]econdary meaning exists only if a significant number of prospec-
tive purchasers understand the term, when used in connection with a
Cir. 1977) (trademark rights cannot be acquired in generic term); King-Seeley Thermos
Co. v. Aladdin Indus., 320 F. Supp. 1156, 1159 (D. Conn. 1970) (term THERMOS had
become generic and thus unprotectable as a trademark); see also 15 U.S.C. § 1064(3)
(1994) (petition to cancel trademark registration can be made on ground that the regis-
tered mark has become generic); id. § 1127 (trademark shall be deemed to have been
abandoned when any course of conduct of the owner causes the mark to become a generic
name for the goods in connection with which it is used). In trademark law, "[a] generic
term is one that refers, or has come to be understood as referring, to the genus of which
the particular product is a species." Abercrombie & Fitch Co., 537 F.2d at 9. See gener-
ally 1 J. GILSON, TRADEMARK PROTECTION AND PRACrICE § 2.02[1] (1994) (discussing
the test for determining whether a mark is generic); 2 McCARTHY, supra note 1, § 12.01
(same).
47. See Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 768.
48. See 1 GILSON, supra note 46, § 2.09[1] ("The public is presumed to regard
[inherently distinctive marks] on first encounter as designating the origin of the products
and distinguishing them from the products of others."); see also Mulberry Thai Silks, Inc.
v. K & K Neckwear, Inc., 897 F. Supp. 789,794 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) ("[A] sine qua non of any
test of inherent distinctiveness must be a requirement that the design be of such a charac-
ter 'that one can assume without proof that it automatically will be perceived by
customers' as an identifier of the source of the product .... (quoting 1 MCCARTHY,
supra note 1, § 8.02[4], at 8-18.1)); Thompson Med. Co. v. Pfizer, Inc., 753 F.2d 208, 216
(2d Cir. 1985) ("Suggestive marks are eligible for protection without any proof of secon-
dary meaning, since the connection between the mark and the source is presumed.");
Blisscraft of Hollywood v. United Plastics Co., 294 F.2d 694, 700 (2d Cir. 1961) ("The
presumption that a fanciful word or mark becomes distinctive and identifies the source of
goods upon which it is used immediately after adoption and bona fide first use is basic in
trademark law.").
49. See Sidney A. Diamond, Untangling the Confusion in Trademark Terminology, 78
PAT. & TRADEMARK REv. 195, 199 (1980) ("[T]o 'acquire a secondary meaning' is the
same as to 'become distinctive.' ").
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particular kind of good, service, or business, not merely in its lexico-
graphic sense, but also as an indication of association with a
particular, even if anonymous, entity. "' In the context of packaging
or product designs, the term denotes that "the feature, although not
inherently distinctive, has come through use to be uniquely associ-
ated with a particular source."5'
Important differences exist between the two bases of establish-
ing distinctiveness. One such difference is evidentiary. The inherent
distinctiveness analysis is prospective, even speculative. It is a pre-
dictive inquiry. In contrast, the secondary meaning inquiry focuses
on evidence of actual consumer association." Another difference is
50. RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 13 cmt. e.
51. Id; see also Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 766 n.4 (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
UNFAIR COMPETITION § 13 cmt. e (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1990) definition as applied to
trade dress); Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 851 n.11 (1982) ("To
establish secondary meaning, a manufacturer must show that, in the minds of the public,
the primary significance of a product feature or term is to identify the source of the prod-
uct rather than the product itself."), quoted in Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 766 n.4, and in
Qualitex Co. v. Jacobsen Prods. Co., 115 S. Ct. 1300, 1303 (1995). The truism that to be
protected a mark must "identify the source of the product rather than the product itself"
has given rise to misunderstanding by several courts. The meaning of this mantra was
explained by Judge Helen Nies in In re DC Comics, Inc.:
A word, name, symbol or device, indicates 'source' within the meaning of the
truism if it indicates goods of one producer to the public, and it indicates 'goods'
if the public does not identify the asserted mark with goods from a particular
source. The board apparently interpreted the truism as imposing a requirement
that to indicate 'source,' a word, name, symbol or device must not identify goods
of anyone. This misunderstanding led the board and has led some courts into an
esoteric and extraneous inquiry focusing on what motivates the purchasing pub-
lic to buy particular goods, the product itself or the source. Once it is
understood that a trademark is functioning to indicate 'source' when it identifies
goods of a particular source, the truism then reflects the... objectives of trade-
mark law ....
689 F.2d 1042, 1054 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (Nies, J., concurring). The use of the adjective
"secondary" is also somewhat misleading in that the key to the concept is that its source-
identification meaning is now a significance ascribed to the term by consumers, whereas
formerly consumers attributed to the term only a linguistic, descriptive or other initial
meaning (i.e., "secondary" is used in a temporal rather than a cognitive sense). See L. &
J.G. Stickley, Inc. v. Canal Dover Furniture Co., 79 F.3d 258, 263 (2d Cir. 1996)
("Secondary meaning refers to 'a subsequent significance added to the original meaning'
of the trade dress due to a producer's use of it.") (quoting RESTATEMENT, supra note 1,
§ 13 cmt. e) (emphasis added). The alternative terms "acquired distinctiveness" or
"learned association" better express the concept. See International Jensen, Inc. v. Metro-
sound U.S.A., Inc., 4 F.3d 819,824 (9th Cir. 1993).
52. Secondary meaning may be proven by direct or indirect evidence from which we
can circumstantially infer consumer association. Direct evidence of secondary meaning
normally takes the form of consumer surveys linking trade dress to a particular source.
See Vision Sports, Inc. v. Melville Corp., 888 F.2d 609, 615 (9th Cir. 1989). While par-
ticular factors vary among circuits, indirect indicia of secondary meaning are: advertising
expenditures; sales success; unsolicited media coverage; attempts to plagiarize the trade
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that, in temporal terms, because inherent distinctiveness can be pre-
sumed immediately upon use, it affords instant protection.
Secondary meaning takes time to develop. Even if it is inferred cir-
cumstantially, proof of secondary meaning must await the
development of the evidence from which it can be inferred, and thus
protection is not available upon first use. 3
III. THE POSSIBILrrY OF INHERENTLY DISTINCrIVE SHAPES
Prior to the development of product design protection under the
Lanham Act, producers were protected against competitors' confus-
ing or deceptive use of product design features under common-law
principles of unfair competition.' In modem times, recourse was first
sought primarily under state unfair competition laws, until the Su-
preme Court's 1964 decisions in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co.,5
and Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 56 substantially closed
that particular avenue of protection and forced producers to use fed-
eral unfair competition law to protect product designs.
dress; and the length and exclusivity of use. See George Basch Co. v. Blue Coral, Inc., 968
F.2d 1532, 1536 (2d Cir. 1992); see also Echo Travel, Inc. v. Travel Assocs., 870 F.2d 1264,
1267 (7th Cir. 1989) (noting that factors to be considered include: consumer testimony;
consumer surveys; exclusivity, length and manner of use; amount and manner of adver-
tising; amount of sales and number of customers; established place in the market; and
proof of intentional copying). Advertising expenditures are of limited probative value in
establishing secondary meaning unless there is evidence of that expenditure's effect. See
First Bank v. First Bank Sys., Inc., 84 F.3d 1040, 1045 (8th Cir. 1996); Braun Inc. v. Dy-
namics Corp. of Am., 975 F.2d 815, 826-27 (Fed. Cir. 1992). Nor does a large consumer
demand in itself determine the question of secondary meaning. See Braun, 975 F.2d at
827; Aloe Cream Labs., Inc. v. Milsan, Inc., 423 F.2d 845, 850 (5th Cir. 1970); see also
International Jensen, Inc., 4 F.3d at 824 ("While evidence of a manufacturer's sales, adver-
tising and promotional activities may be relevant in determining secondary meaning, the
true test of secondary meaning is the effectiveness of this effort to create it.").
53. See infra note 74 and accompanying text.
54. See, e.g., Ross Whitney-Corp. v. Smith Kline & French Labs., 207 F.2d 190, 197
(9th Cir. 1953) (shape of pills); Rushmore v. Manhattan Screw & Stamping Works, 163 F.
939, 942 (2d Cir. 1908) (shell for automobile search lights); Yale & Towne Mfg. v. Alder,
154 F. 37,38 (2d Cir. 1907) (padlocks); Enterprise Mfg. v. Landers, Frary & Clark, 131 F.
240,241 (2d Cir. 1904) (shape of grinding mills); George G. Fox Co. v. Hathaway, 85 N.E.
417 (Mass. 1908) (shape, color and condition of bread); Dior v. Milton, 155 N.Y.S.2d 443
(Sup. Ct. 1956) (fashion designs).
55. 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
56. 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
57. See Jerome H. Reichman, Design Protection And The Legislative Agenda, 55
LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 281, 288 (1992). In the Sears and Compco cases, both of which
involved the unauthorized copying by the defendant of the unpatentable, uncopyrighted
designs of lighting fixtures, the U.S. Supreme Court found claims under Illinois unfair
competition law to conflict with and be pre-empted by federal patent law under federal
supremacy principles. See Sears, 376 U.S. at 232-33; Compco, 376 U.S. at 238. Courts
interpreted Sears/Compco narrowly, permitting the use of federal unfair competition law
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Under state unfair competition law, while words or symbols
could be protected without proof of secondary meaning if they were
inherently distinctive," a product configuration only received protec-
tion upon proof of secondary meaning.59 As the Supreme Court
to protect product designs. See Dinwoodie, supra note 17, at 92-93; see, e.g., Truck Equip.
Serv. Corp. v. Fruehauf, 536 F.2d 1210, 1214 (8th Cir. 1976). This distinction was sup-
ported not only by a careful reading of the Sears/Compco decisions, which were clearly
founded upon the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, but also by refer-
ence to one of the declared purposes of the Lanham Act, namely to ensure uniform
protection in a national economy after Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). See
H.R. REP. No. 76-944, at 4 (1939) (according to Erie, "there is no Federal Common
Law .... However, trade is no longer local, but is national .... It would seem as if na-
tional legislation along national lines securing to the owners of trade-marks in interstate
commerce definite rights should be enacted."). Moreover, in Sears, the Supreme Court
expressly excluded from the scope of its decision protection under federal statutes, see
376 U.S. at 232, and the Court has since confirmed that its Sears/Compco reasoning has
no application to federal causes of action under the Lanham Act. See Bonito Boats, Inc.
v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 166 (1989); see also Dinwoodie, supra note 17,
at 92-93 (discussing limits of Sears/Compco). One writer has recently suggested that only
Sears rested upon application of the Supremacy Clause. See Theodore H. Davis, Jr.,
Copying in the Shadow of the Constitution: The Rational Limits of Trade Dress Protection,
80 MINN. L. REV. 595, 610-611 (1996) ("Notwithstanding the Court's reliance on the Su-
premacy Clause in Sears, its decision on the same day in Compco made no reference
whatsoever to that provision."). Although the Compco opinion does indeed omit express
reference to the Supremacy Clause, the Supreme Court itself (which handed down both
opinions on the same day) appears to have treated Sears and Compco as companion
cases, presenting the same issues, and resting upon the same reasoning. See Sears, 376
U.S. at 225 (stating question before Court); Compco, 376 U.S. at 234 (stating that the
question before the Court was the same as in Sears); id. at 237-38 (repeated reference
throughout opinion to the fact that the operative proposition had been stated in Sears);
see also Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 152-57 (treating Sears and Compco decisions largely as
one); RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 16 reporters' note at 169-70 (noting that the Su-
preme Court has made clear that Sears and Compco rest solely on the Supremacy
Clause).
58. See Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 786 (Thomas, J., concurring) (citing Heublein v. Ad-
ams, 125 F. 782,784 (C.C.D. Mass. 1903)).
59. See Crescent Tool Co. v. Kilborn & Bishop Co., 247 F. 299, 300 (2d Cir. 1917); 1
MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 7.23[1]; see also Duraco Prods. v. Joy Plastic Enters., 40 F.3d
1431, 1443 (3d Cir. 1994) (collecting cases). Early courts failed to articulate fully their
reasons for requiring secondary meaning for shapes but not verbal marks in common-law
claims. It appears that the primary basis for placing an additional hurdle in the way of
product configuration plaintiffs was the concern that trademark could supplant patent law
and provide infinite patent protection. See American Fork & Hoe Co. v. Stampit Corp.,
125 F.2d 472, 475 (6th Cir. 1942) (" 'In the absence of a patent the freedom of manufac-
ture cannot be cut down under the name of preventing unfair competition.' " (quoting
Flagg Mfg. v. Holway, 59 N.E. 667, 667 (Mass. 1901))). It is clear that these courts pro-
ceeded from the premise of free imitation, whereas many modern courts start with an
assumption of protecting against piracy. See, e.g., J.C. Penney Co. v. H.D. Lee Mercantile
Co., 120 F.2d 949, 955 (8th Cir. 1941) (" 'The public interest in competition ordinarily
outweighs the interest in securing to a person the rewards of his ingenuity in making his
product attractive to purchasers.'" (quoting RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 742, at 622
(1938))).
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noted in 1989, "[t]he common law tort of unfair competition [had]
been limited to protection against copying of nonfunctional aspects
of consumer products which [had] acquired secondary meaning such
that they operate[d] as a designation of source."' When the courts
began to offer enhanced protection to product shapes under federal
unfair competition law, they substantially imported the elements of
the common-law unfair competition claim. However, a conflict arose
between the principles of common-law protection and federal trade-
mark law. The common-law rule that, to be protectable, a shape
must have acquired secondary meaning, clashed with the trademark
rule that certain classifications of marks would be treated as inher-
ently distinctive and protected without proof of actual consumer
association.
The federal courts split on the issue of whether trade dress in the
form of a product shape could be protected as inherently distinctive,
without proof of secondary meaning, in actions brought under the
Lanham Act. Certain courts viewed the assimilation of the common
law of unfair competition with the trademark provisions of the Lan-
ham Act as complete, and drew no distinction between trade dress
and trademarks. Each could be inherently distinctive, thus obviating
the need to prove secondary meaning in such cases." A larger num-
ber of courts,62 however, retained the common-law rule that trade
60. Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 158; see also 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 7.23[1] ("At
common law, product and package configurations, to be protected against unfair competi-
tion by simulation, have to meet three basic criteria: (1) nonfunctionality; (2) proof of
secondary meaning; and (3) likelihood of confusion.").
61. See, e.g., Roulo v. Russ Berrie & Co., 886 F.2d 931, 936 (7th Cir. 1989) (greeting
cards); Vaughan Mfg. Co. v. Brikam Int'l, Inc., 814 F.2d 346, 348 (7th Cir. 1987)
(accepting possibility of inherently distinctive product configuration) (folding tables);
AmBrit, Inc. v. Kraft, Inc. 812 F.2d 1531, 1535 n.13 (11th Cir. 1986) (wrapping); Sicilia Di
R. Biebow & Co. v. Cox, 732 F.2d 417, 426 (5th Cir. 1984) (design of citrus juice bottles);
In re Morton-Norwich Prods., Inc., 671 F.2d 1332, 1343 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (product and
container configurations can be inherently distinctive); Chevron Chem. Co. v. Voluntary
Purchasing Groups, Inc., 659 F.2d 695, 702 (Former 5th Cir. 1981) (packaging); Remcraft
Lighting Prods., Inc. v. Maxim Lighting, Inc., 706 F. Supp. 855, 857 (S.D. Fla. 1989)
(accepting possibility of inherently distinctive product configurations) (lamps); Westward
Co. v. Gem Prods., Inc., 570 F. Supp. 943, 951 (E.D. Mich. 1983) (packaging); see also
Blau Plumbing, Inc. v. S.O.S. Fix-It, Inc., 781 F.2d 604, 608 (7th Cir. 1986) ("If any of
these cases stands for the broader proposition that secondary meaning must be shown
even if the trade dress is a distinctive, identifying mark, then we think they are
wrong .... "); cf. M. Kramer Mfg. v. Andrews, 783 F.2d 421, 448 & 449 n.26 (4th Cir.
1986) (noting cases recognizing the possibility of inherently distinctive trade dress, but
including secondary meaning requirement in articulation of test).
62. This approach was adopted most notably in the Second Circuit, see infra notes 64-
66, but the distinction between trade dress and verbal trademarks was also adhered to by
other courts. See, e.g., Can-Am Eng'g Co. v. Henderson Glass, Inc., 814 F.2d 253, 256
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dress protection was contingent upon proof of secondary meaning.'
Decisions in the Second Circuit, where proof of secondary meaning
was required, diverged on whether the basis for that requirement was
that the action was brought under the unfair competition provision of
the Lanham Act, section 43(a),' or because it involved trade dress
(6th Cir. 1987) (requiring plaintiff to show that "product features.., are nonfunctional
and have acquired secondary meaning"); American Greetings Corp. v. Dan-Dee Imports,
Inc., 807 F.2d 1136, 1141 (3d Cir. 1986) (listing secondary meaning as an element of trade
dress claim); Prufrock Ltd. v. Lasater, 781 F.2d 129, 132 (8th Cir. 1986) (applying the
secondary meaning requirement to the claimed trade dress of a restaurant); Black &
Decker Mfg. Co. v. Ever-Ready Appliance Mfg. Co., 684 F.2d 546, 550 (8th Cir. 1982)
(holding that lack of secondary meaning precludes claim of trade dress infringement);
Keebler Co. v. Rovira Biscuit Corp., 624 F.2d 366, 378 (1st Cir. 1980) (referring to secon-
dary meaning as an "essential element" of a trade dress claim); White Swan, Ltd. v. Clyde
Robin Seed Co., 729 F. Supp. 1257, 1260 (N.D. Cal. 1989) (court declaring itself
"unpersuaded" that cylindrical, shaker-type container with design on label can be pro-
tected without secondary meaning: "although other circuits have clearly stated that an
inherently distinctive trade dress may be protected without proof of secondary meaning,
the Ninth Circuit has refused to take such a step"); see also Tesco Chems., Inc., 181
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 59, 60 (T.T.A.B. 1973) (explaining that product configuration is registra-
ble only if it has acquired secondary meaning because such a shape is "necessarily merely
descriptive"); cf. In re DC Comics, Inc., 689 F.2d 1042, 1050-51 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (Nies, J.,
concurring) (suggesting that no product shape could be inherently distinctive, although
packaging might). In Two Pesos the Supreme Court suggested that the Ninth Circuit
followed the Chevron rule of the Fifth Circuit, which accepted the possibility of inherently
distinctive trade dress, see Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 773-74 & 781 n.13, but the case law in
the Ninth Circuit was more ambivalent than the court implied. See, e.g., White Swan, 729
F. Supp. at 1260; Fuddruckers, Inc. v. Doc's B.R. Others, Inc., 826 F.2d 837, 843 (9th Cir.
1987) (not deciding issue, but both accepting possibility of claim based upon inherent
distinctiveness, and noting that if purchasers do not in fact make the source association
then "it is difficult to see" how the trade dress is distinctive); First Brands Corp. v. Fred
Meyer, Inc., 809 F.2d 1378, 1381 (9th Cir. 1987) (including secondary meaning as a re-
quirement of trade dress cause of action under section 43(a) or at common law, but not
addressing issue of inherent distinctiveness).
63. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which rejected the Second Circuit
position, took the view that "section 43(a) created a sui generis federal statutory cause of
action for 'false representation' [and that, tiherefore, common-law decisions interpreting
this tort, while suggestive, are not controlling." Chevron Chem. Co., 659 F.2d at 702; see
also Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 779 (Stevens, J., concurring) (" 'We find nothing in the legis-
lative history of the Lanham Act to justify the view that [section 43(a)] is merely
declarative of existing law.'" (quoting L'Aiglon Apparel, Inc. v. Lana Lobell, Inc., 214
F.2d 649, 651 (3d Cir. 1954))). Justice Thomas, in concurring in Two Pesos, and agreeing
that secondary meaning was not required in trade dress actions under section 43 of the
Lanham Act, asserted that section 43(a) merely codified the common-law torts of trade-
mark infringement and passing off. See 505 U.S. at 785 (Thomas, J., concurring).
Although the Second Circuit's approach implemented the distinction operable at common
law, Justice Thomas was willing to join the opinion of the Court on the basis of his view of
prior judicial developments accepting that packages or images may be as arbitrary as
words or symbols. See id. at 785-87 (Thomas, J., concurring).
64. See, e.g., Vibrant Sales, Inc. v. New Body Technique, Inc., 652 F.2d 299, 303-04
(2d Cir. 1981) (suggesting that "registered marks are presumed to represent the source in
the minds of the public, whereas unregistered marks are not, absent a showing of secon-
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inhering in a shape as opposed to a verbal trademark." Later courts
emphasized the latter, although their decisions often also rested on a
combination of the non-verbal composition of the mark and the un-
registered nature of the trade dress at issue."
dary meaning"). The analysis of the Vibrant court affords too great a presumption (and
the wrong presumption) to registration. Contrary to the assertions in Vibrant, the pre-
sumptions flowing from registration are rebuttable presumptions regarding the
correctness of administrative decisions, namely that a mark is inherently distinctive, if
registered on that basis, or possesses secondary meaning, if registered on that basis. See
Aromatique, Inc. v. Gold Seal, Inc., 28 F.3d 863, 870 (8th Cir. 1994) (stating that regis-
trant receives presumption corresponding to basis upon which registration granted);
Pizzeria Uno Corp. v. Temple, 747 F.2d 1522, 1529 (4th Cir. 1984) (same); McGregor-
Doniger, Inc. v. Drizzle, Inc., 599 F.2d 1126, 1132 (2d Cir. 1979) (registration of mark
without requiring secondary meaning affords a rebuttable presumption that the mark is
more than merely descriptive); see also 15 U.S.C. § 1057(b) (1994) (registration is prima
facie evidence of mark validity, that registrant owns the mark and has exclusive right to
use the mark); cf. 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b) (1994) (incontestability establishes conclusive evi-
dence of valid ownership and right to use, subject to stated defenses). In contrast, the
presumption of consumer association that lies at the root of inherent distinctiveness is not
based on registration (although registration on that basis affords a helpful rebuttable pre-
sumption in an infringement action) but upon the likelihood that consumers would
immediately identify the product by reference to the feature or mark at issue. Thus, a
mark which is inherently distinctive "even if not registered, remain[s] inherently capable
of distinguishing the goods of the users of these marks." Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 772.
65. See Thompson Med. Co. v. Pfizer, Inc., 753 F.2d 208, 213 n.10 (2d Cir. 1985)
(reconciling Vibrant with other trademark decision by noting that it involved a "design
claimed to be a trademark" whereas other trademark decision involved a "word mark").
The Second Circuit did not explain why the distinction between shapes and verbal marks
justified this difference in approach. See Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 781 n.14 (Stevens, J.,
concurring). However, the differentiation arguably could be founded not only on the
common-law origins of the protection of shapes under unfair competition law but also
upon the practical difficulty of rendering an objective judgment about the distinctiveness
of shapes based upon the classical conceptual categories, and without some more concrete
evidence, such as that typically advanced in a secondary meaning analysis. See Malla
Pollack, Unconstitutional Incontestability? The Intersection of the Intellectual Property
and Commerce Clauses of the Constitution: Beyond a Critique of Shakespeare Co. v. Sil-
star Corp., 18 SEATME U. L. REv. 259, 264 n.27 (1995) ("These tests, and these
categories of marks, were created in an age when word marks predominated. Acceptance
of packages and the configuration of the goods themselves as marks strains the system.
The Supreme Court's decision that unregistered trade dress may be protected without a
showing of secondary meaning exacerbates this problem."). The Second Circuit's ap-
proach, which sought the assistance of empirical study of consumer association, thus not
only paid deference to the common-law roots of the protection offered but also inciden-
tally corresponded with recognition that traditional trademark classifications of
distinctiveness are rather enigmatic when the mark is not verbal. See infra text accompa-
nying notes 105-12. As suggested below, however, it is possible to fashion guidelines for
the development of evidence relevant to the distinctiveness question without imposing a
secondary meaning requirement. See infra Part IV(E)(2).
66. See, e.g., Murphy v. Provident Mut. Life Ins. Co., 923 F.2d 923, 927 (2d Cir. 1990)
("[11n our circuit .... non-verbal marks that are unregistered always require proof of sec-
ondary meaning."); Stormy Clime, Ltd. v. ProGroup, Inc., 809 F.2d 971, 974 (2d Cir.
1987); Union Mfg. Co. v. Han Baek Trading Co., 763 F.2d 42,48 (2d Cir. 1985) ("Unlike
arbitrary or suggestive verbal marks, which are eligible for protection under section 43(a)
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In Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc. ,67 the Supreme Court
addressed the split among the circuits. The trade dress at issue in
Two Pesos was the decor and ambiance of a fast-food Mexican res-
taurant. At trial, the jury found that the plaintiff had established a
trade dress that was inherently distinctive but which had not acquired
secondary meaning in the Texas market.68 The jury also found that
the trade dress was nonfunctional and that there was a likelihood of
confusion.69 Applying its rule that permitted protection of inherently
distinctive trade dress without proof of secondary meaning, the Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the verdict of trade dress
infringement, and the Supreme Court in turn affirmed the Fifth Cir-
cuit.70
Reasoning that "there is no persuasive reason to apply to trade
dress a general requirement of secondary meaning which is at odds
with the principles generally applicable to infringement suits under
section 43(a)," the Court decided that an inherently distinctive trade
dress can be protected without proof of secondary meaning.7' The
Court found no textual basis (either in the terms of the Lanham Act
or in its legislative history) for applying different standards to trade
without proof of secondary meaning, non-verbal marks that are unregistered always re-
quire proof of secondary meaning." (citations omitted) (footnote omitted)). In Two
Pesos, where the issue was resolved, the Supreme Court itself was not entirely clear about
the body of Second Circuit case law it was addressing. See 505 U.S. at 772-73. It noted
the Fifth Circuit's acknowledgment that the Fifth Circuit approach "conflict[ed] with...
the holding of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Vibrant... that section
43(a) protects unregistered trademarks or designs only where secondary meaning is
shown." Id. at 767. Yet, the Supreme Court also characterized the "line of decisions by
the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit" as finding "protection for trade dress un-
available absent proof of secondary meaning." Id. at 772. Overall, the scope of the
Court's decision-as the Court defines its scope-is a composite, and relates to the ab-
sence of a distinction between verbal and non-verbal marks in actions under section 43(a).
See id. at 767 (noting that the Court granted certiorari on the question "whether trade
dress which is inherently distinctive is protectable under section 43(a) without a showing
that it has acquired secondary meaning"); see also id. at 773 ("The Second Circuit has...
continued to deny protection for trade dress under section 43(a) absent proof of secon-
dary meaning, despite the fact that section 43(a) provides no basis for distinguishing
between trademark and trade dress."). The Two Pesos decision is critical of either dero-
gation from full assimilation of Lanham Act claims under a unitary set of standards,
whether on the basis of registration or mark composition. See infra note 72. But see
Qualitex Co. v. Jacobsen Prods. Co., 115 S. Ct. 1300, 1303 (1995) (appearing to base pro-
tection of color per se on existence of secondary meaning, equating color per se with
descriptive words).
67. 505 U.S. 763 (1992).
68. See id. at 766.
69. See id2 at 767.
70. See id-
71. See id. at 770.
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dress and trademarks, especially since protection of trade dress and
trademarks under section 43(a) serve the same statutory purpose."
The Court also recognized that a secondary meaning require-
ment would make investment in trade dress vulnerable in the early
stages of product marketing and distribution." Where the distinct-
72. See id. at 774. The Supreme Court addressed its various textual arguments both
to the suggestion that verbal marks and non-verbal trade dress be treated differently and
to the contention of the Vibrant court that a distinction should be drawn between cases
alleging infringement of a registered mark and causes of action under section 43(a). As to
the former, the court concentrated on the lack of any textual basis for a difference, noting
that section 43(a) did not contain any reference to "trade dress" or "trademarks," or to
"verbal" or "symbolic" marks, let alone establish any distinctions among them. See id.
Rebuttal of the Vibrant distinction found affirmative support in the fact that secondary
meaning is mentioned only in connection with the registration of descriptive marks and
not in section 43(a). See id.
73. See id at 771 (recognizing argument that "a general requirement of secondary
meaning imposes an unfair prospect of theft or financial loss on the developer of fanciful
or arbitrary trade dress at the outset of its use"); id at 775 ("[A]dding a secondary
meaning requirement ... would present special difficulties for a business ... that seeks to
start a new product in a limited area and then expand into new markets."). The Court
accepted the force of this argument even though, in the same opinion, the Court rejected
the doctrine of "secondary meaning in the making," which was designed to address pre-
cisely this vulnerability. Some district courts in the Second Circuit had periodically
floated the doctrine in the two decades before Two Pesos; if adopted, it would have
greatly aided designers in that exposed early period of marketing by protecting goodwill
that was still nascent. Under the doctrine, a producer received protection for its as-yet
non-distinctive marks against competitors' deliberate efforts to copy the mark, provided
that the producer was attempting to create secondary meaning, See Metro-Kane Imports,
Ltd. v. Federated Dept. Stores, 625 F. Supp. 313, 316 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (accepting that
trade dress will be protected against "intentional, deliberate attempts to capitalize on a
distinctive product" where secondary meaning is "in the making but not yet fully devel-
oped"), affd, 800 F.2d 1128 (2d Cir. 1986). Only one reported decision appeared to rest
squarely on the doctrine, see Metro-Kane, 625 F. Supp. at 316 (granting preliminary in-
junction on basis of doctrine), but several district court opinions appeared receptive to its
adoption. See, e.g., Jolly Good Indus., Inc. v. Elegra Inc., 690 F. Supp. 227, 230-31
(S.D.N.Y. 1988); see also 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 15.21[2], at 15-83 n.6 (collecting
cases). See generally John M. Scagnelli, Dawn of a New Doctrine?-Trademark Protec-
tion for Incipient Secondary Meaning, 71 TRADEMARK REP. 527 (1981).
Although this doctrine had the advantage of affording instant protection, it was in-
consistent with the basic premise of trademark law that only marks with consumer
association (actual or presumed) can be protected. Outside the Second Circuit, courts
rejected the doctrine. See, e.g., Black & Decker Mfg. Co. v. Ever-Ready Appliance Mfg.
Co., 684 F.2d 546, 550 (8th Cir. 1982); Devan Designs Inc. v. Palliser Furniture Corp., 25
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1991, 2000 (M.D.N.C. 1992) (criticizing the doctrine on the basis that
"secondary meaning in the making focuses on the intent and actions of the seller, but
Lanham Act protection rests upon mental processes of the public in its association of the
trade dress with a particular producer"), aff'd, 998 F.2d 1008 (4th Cir. 1993); A.J. Canfield
Co. v. Concord Bev. Co., 629 F. Supp. 200,211-12 (E.D. Pa. 1985), aff'd on other grounds,
808 F.2d 291 (3d Cir. 1986); see also RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 13 cmt. e reporters'
note at 117 ("The doctrine, if taken literally, is inimical to the purpose of the secondary
meaning requirement."); 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 15.21[2], at 15-86 (criticizing doc-
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iveness of a mark is based upon secondary meaning, infringement will
only occur if the secondary meaning existed prior to the date upon
which the accused infringer commenced using a confusingly similar
trade dress. ' Deferral of protection, as is precipitated by the refusal
to countenance inherently distinctive trade dress, thus creates the
danger that "the acquisition of trademark rights in a design may be
prevented by the timely entry of others into the market using the
same or similar designs."'75 According to the Court, that vulnerability
trine). It targeted blatant piracy rather than consumer confusion or the misappropriation
of goodwill, because without the consumer association that is at the root of secondary
meaning, there would be no confusion and no goodwill to misappropriate. In any event,
the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit-whose district courts had developed the
doctrine-itself rejected the doctrine in 1992, concluding that it "constrains unnecessarily
the freedom to copy and compete." Laureyssens v. Idea Group, Inc., 964 F.2d 131, 138
(2d Cir. 1992). The Second Circuit had previously indicated in dicta that it would be re-
luctant to adopt the doctrine. See Lang v. Retirement Living Publ'g Co., 949 F.2d 576,
581 (2d Cir. 1991); ef. Murphy v. Provident Mut. Life Ins. Co., 923 F.2d 923, 929 (2d Cir.
1990) (explaining that even if court were to adopt the doctrine, this was not the case in
which to do it). The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit had also previously con-
cluded that the "Second Circuit, if faced with the question, would reject the doctrine of
secondary meaning in the making." Cicena Ltd. v. Columbia Telecomms. Group, 900
F.2d 1546, 1550 (Fed. Cir. 1990). Within one month of rejection by the Second Circuit,
the Supreme Court in Two Pesos also rejected the doctrine. See Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at
775.
74. See Tone Bros., Inc. v. Sysco Corp., 28 F.3d 1192, 1201 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Co-Rect
Prods., Inc. v. Marvy! Adver. Photography, Inc., 780 F.2d 1324, 1330 (8th Cir. 1985) ("The
user must also show that secondary meaning existed prior to the date on which the defen-
dant commenced using the same or similar mark.").
75. In re DC Comics, Inc., 689 F.2d 1042, 1051 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (Nies, J., concurring).
Judge Nies cast this situation not as a danger, but as part of the balancing of competing
public interests that supported a deferral of protection. See id. While all trademarks
relying on secondary meaning for protection are susceptible to imitation in the first
months or years after being placed on the market, this weakness is more significant for
product configuration trade dress because so few are protected from the start as inher-
ently distinctive. While "no absolute time span can be posited as a yardstick in cases
involving secondary meaning," Centaur Comms., Inc. v. A/S/M Comms., 830 F.2d 1217,
1225 (2d Cir. 1987), the longer a product is on the market, the stronger a claim of ac-
quired distinctiveness becomes. See, e.g., Duraco Prods. v. Joy Plastic Enters., 40 F.3d
1431, 1454 (3d Cir. 1994) (more than five years on market insufficient to establish secon-
dary meaning); Braun, Inc. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 975 F.2d. 815, 826 (Fed. Cir. 1992)
("[W]hile not impossible, it is difficult for a product to acquire secondary meaning during
an 18-month period."); Cicena, 900 F.2d at 1552 (noting that eighteen months on the mar-
ket cuts against a finding of secondary meaning); Devan Designs, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at
1998 (eighteen months insufficient period); e. L.A. Gear, Inc. v. Thom McAn Shoe Co.,
988 F.2d 1117, 1130 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (secondary meaning established despite short time of
one year on market). Assertions that "[i]n a world of fad products and modem merchan-
dising, a new trademark can receive wide exposure and secondary meaning within a very
short time," Devan Designs, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1998, are little comfort to many
producers. Initial vulnerability is a particular problem for small producers who have nei-
ther the resources nor the marketing or distribution network to ensure expedited and
broad product exposure. It is also a problem that may be more acute for certain indus-
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would undermine the statutory purpose both of protecting goodwill
and of protecting consumers. 7
Finally, the potentially anti-competitive effects that a secondary
meaning requirement might create influenced the Court.' An initial
tries where, for reasons cultural or otherwise, the marketing blitz is unused or counter-
productive. See icL (holding that eighteen months insufficient period to establish
secondary meaning in furniture line notwithstanding "national media attention and mar-
keting" because it "was not promoted via a marketing blitz like certain new cars or other
products"); see also S. Priya Bharathi, There is More Than One Way to Skin a Copycat:
The Emergence of Trade Dress to Combat Design Piracy of Fashion Works, 27 TEx. TECH
L. REV. 1667, 1691 (1996) ("In a rapidly changing industry [such as fashion] where trends
arise almost every season, the length of time required to establish secondary meaning is
unlikely to be met."); Steven Schortgen, Note, "Dressing" Up Software Interface Protec-
tion: The Application of Two Pesos To "Look And Feel," 80 CORNELL L. REv. 158, 191
(1994) ("In the rapidly changing computer [software] landscape, the length of time re-
quired to establish secondary meaning could be quite long relative to significant changes
in technology .... ).
76. See Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 774 ("By making more difficult the identification of a
producer with its product, a secondary meaning requirement for a nondescriptive trade
dress would hinder improving or maintaining the producer's competitive position.").
While, from a producer's perspective, denying a possible claim of inherent distinctiveness
does indeed create an exposure to imitative competition, the Court's argument fails in the
circumstance, admittedly rare but present in Two Pesos, where there is an affirmative
finding of no secondary meaning. If it is demonstrated that there is in fact no consumer
association, then no consumers will be confused and no goodwill will be misappropriated
because there is none to be taken. Any rule that limits the availability of trademark pro-
tection necessarily renders the producer's position less favorable, but if empirical
evidence suggests that consumer association is non-existent it is difficult to see how the
producer has lost anything that is protected by trademark law. Cf. Kenneth B. Germain,
Unfair Trade Practices Under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act: You've Come a Long
Way, Baby-Too Far, Maybe?, 49 IND. L.J. 84, 103 (1973) ("Unless the public has come
to know a particular mark as indicating a particular source of origin, a finding of the req-
uisite falsity would be anomalous since there would be no standard against which to
measure such falsity.") (commenting on pre-1988 Lanham Act language in section 43).
The Court does not fully explain its reasons for accepting a claim based on inherent dis-
tinctiveness in the face of empirical rebuttal of the factual premises underlying that
concept. It treats as an immutable truth (consumers are likely to make an association)
that which is no more than a factual generalization demonstrated to be incorrect in the
particular instance before the court. The prediction that consumers will likely associate a
product shape with a specific source should surely give way to factual findings that it does
not. While protection needs to be offered to distinctive designs, and the Court properly
acknowledges that such protection might appropriately be accorded designs on the basis
that they are likely to identify source, it is not appropriately furnished by trademark law
to designs that affirmatively do not do so. (Although a defendant could use this argument
to trump a finding of inherent distinctiveness in litigation soon after the product's first
marketing, the burden of rebutting the conclusion of inherent distinctiveness by showing a
lack of secondary meaning would at least rest with the defendant.)
77. The Two Pesos Court noted:
[A]dding a secondary meaning requirement could have anticompetitive effects,
creating particular burdens on the start-up of small companies.... It would pre-
sent special difficulties for a business.., that seeks to start a new product in a
limited area and then expand into new markets. Denying protection for inher-
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period of vulnerability would have the most burdensome effect on
the start-up of small businesses, whose product developments could
be appropriated by large companies with established and substantial
distribution channels. Thus, an absolute secondary meaning re-
quirement would discourage new market entrants. s The Court
rejected concerns that its approach was overprotective and would ex-
haust a limited number of trade dresses, noting that the functionality
rule (which limits the availability of claimed trade dress rights if pro-
tection would hinder competition) already worked against such anti-
competitive effects. 9 Although not mentioned by the Supreme
Court, another consequence of removing an absolute secondary
meaning requirement, which is especially helpful to smaller busi-
nesses with more limited resources, is that the cost of pursuing
litigation is arguably reduced because of the lesser need for commis-
ently distinctive nonfunctional trade dress until after secondary meaning has
been established would allow a competitor, which has not adopted a distinctive
trade dress of its own, to appropriate the originator's trade dress in other mar-
kets and to deter the originator from expanding into and competing in these
areas.
Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 775.
78. Cf. id. (noting concession that "protecting an inherently distinctive trade dress
from its inception may be critical to new entrants to the market"). Over-emphasis on the
vulnerability of market entrants, without regard to whether the design acts, or is likely to
act, as a source-identifier, carries the risk of extending trade dress law beyond its legiti-
mate objectives of confusion-avoidance and the protection of goodwill. See supra note 76.
The problem of safeguarding the creative efforts of new market entrants as such would
best be resolved by adoption of an appropriately tailored design law. See Graeme B.
Dinwoodie, Addressing Functionalism 8 (Sept. 27, 1995) (calling for sui generis design law
that "provide[s] the certainty of protection for industrial designs while maintaining a
properly competitive environment") (draft article on file with author).
79. See Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 774-75; see also Qualitex Co. v. Jacobsen Prods. Co.,
115 S. Ct. 1300, 1306 (1995) (explaining that protection can be afforded colors per se
without restricting alternatives because the functionality doctrine is available to prevent
such anticompetitive consequences). The Supreme Court has noted that "in general
terms a product feature is functional if it is essential to the use or purpose of the article or
if it affects its cost or quality." Inwood Lab., Inc. v. Ives Labs, Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 850 n.10
(1982) (O'Connor, J., concurring), quoted in Qualitex, 115 S. Ct. at 1306. A significant
factor in determining whether a claimed product design trade dress is functional, and thus
unprotectable, is the range of feasible alternative designs. See, e.g., Knitwaves, Inc. v.
Lollytogs Ltd., 71 F.3d 996, 1006 (2d Cir. 1995) (rejecting defendant's argument of func-
tionality where no evidence that the number of designs available to compete with
plaintiff's product were limited). For a fuller analysis of the functionality doctrine and its
role as the safety-valve built in to trade dress protection of product design, see Din-
woodie, supra note 17, at 2-40.
80. Surveys assessing the different question of actual consumer confusion do, how-
ever, remain important in establishing trade dress claims, and in particular in proving
infringement. A trade dress plaintiff need not demonstrate actual consumer confusion in
order to prove infringement: a likelihood of consumer confusion is sufficient. See
RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 23 cmt. b; RICHARD L. KIRKPATRICK, LIKELIHOOD OF
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sioned surveys to demonstrate the requisite secondary meaning."
CONFUSION IN TRADEMARK LAW § 7.1, at 7-1 (1995); 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 1,
§ 23.02[l], at 23-30; cf. RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 36 cmt. i ("[A]ctual confusion...
is normally a prerequisite to the recovery of compensatory damages."). Proof of in-
stances of actual consumer confusion is, however, persuasive evidence of a likelihood of
consumer confusion. See Michael J. Allen, The Role of Actual Confusion Evidence in
Trademark Infringement Litigation, 83 TRADEMARK REP. 267, 269 (1993). Conversely,
some courts have suggested that "[i]f a defendant's product has been sold for an appre-
ciable period of time without evidence of actual confusion, one can infer that continued
marketing will not lead to consumer confusion in the future." Versa Prods. Co. v. Bifold
Co., 50 F.3d 189, 205 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 54 (1995); see also Allen, supra, at
299 (arguing that inability of plaintiff to introduce evidence of instances of actual confu-
sion may in certain circumstances be relevant, but should not lead to the blanket
presumption that confusion is unlikely); cf. Chevron Chem. Co. v. Voluntary Purchasing
Groups, Inc., 659 F.2d 695, 704 (Former 5th Cir. 1981) (absence of evidence of actual
confusion does not necessarily prove that confusion unlikely). Proof of actual confusion
may take the form of the testimony of a reasonably prudent purchaser who was in fact
confused by defendant's use of the trade dress, or of consumer surveys. See RE-
STATEMENT, supra note 1, § 23 cmt. c ("Actual confusion can be established through the
direct testimony of consumers... [and] through evidence of conduct probative of confu-
sion such as misdirected letters and telephone calls."); see also Allen, supra, at 299
("Many courts have considered a properly conducted likelihood of confusion market sur-
vey to be probative evidence of actual confusion."); cf 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 1,
§ 23.01[2], at 23-11 ("While survey evidence is sometimes said to be evidence of 'actual'
confusion, it is so only to the extent that the survey mirrors the real world setting which
can create an instance of actual confusion."). The best evidence of actual confusion is
testimony of actually confused purchasers, but most trade dress plaintiffs will seek to in-
troduce survey evidence to support assertions of likely confusion. See 3 id. § 23.02[2][e],
at 23-40 ("In borderline cases where evidence of actual confusion is not available or is not
overwhelming, the gap should best be filled by a properly conducted survey of the rele-
vant class of prospective customers of the goods or services at issue."). Such surveys are
not, however, essential. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 23 cmt. c ("Surveys are use-
ful but not indispensable evidence of the likelihood of confusion, and no inference on that
issue should be drawn from a mere failure to offer survey evidence."). But cf. Merriam-
Webster, Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 35 F.3d 65, 72 (2d Cir. 1994) ("The lack of survey
evidence counts against finding actual confusion."), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1252 (1995).
81. See Paul Farhi, Texas Tortilla Flap Widens Trademark Law's Reach, WASH. POST,
June 27, 1992, at D5 (noting that "previously... a company might have had to conduct
consumer surveys and bring in expert testimony to prove that a product's packaging or
presentation was essential to its identity among consumers, an expensive proposition");
Mark Hamstra, Trade Dress Lawsuits: Unique, Nonfunctional, Design Signatures are Key
to Copycat Cases, NATION'S RESTAURANT NEwS, Oct. 9, 1995, at 142, 142 (1995) (noting
importance of Two Pesos in eliminating need for exhaustive consumer research and ex-
pert witnesses); see also Taco Cabana, Inc. v. Two Pesos, Inc., 932 F.2d 1113, 1120 n.7 (5th
Cir. 1991) (remarking on the "necessarily imperfect (and often prohibitively difficult)
methods for assessing secondary meaning"), aff'd, 505 U.S. 763 (1992); cf. Roulo v. Russ
Berrie & Co., 886 F.2d 931, 936-37 (7th Cir. 1989) (noting that plaintiff "did not offer as
much evidence on the secondary meaning of her cards as on their [inherent] distinctive-
ness, no doubt since it is easier to show the cards are unique than to poll greeting card
consumers on whether they identify [her] cards with a single source"). The Lanham Act
permits a prevailing plaintiff to recover the cost of its action, see 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a)
(1994), but this is unlikely to include the costs of conducting consumer surveys. See Gil-
lette Co. v. Wilkinson Sword, Inc., No. 89 Civ. 3586, 1992 WL 30938, at *10 (S.D.N.Y.
Feb. 3,1992) (declining to award costs of conducting consumer confusion survey).
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Thus, even in the Second Circuit, trade dress infringement under
either section 32 or section 43 is now established by showing: (1) the
trade dress is distinctive either because it is inherently distinctive or
because it has achieved secondary meaning; (2) the trade dress is
nonfunctional; and (3) the defendant's use of plaintiff's trade dress is
likely to cause confusionY
Although a survey is not required to establish secondary meaning, its absence may be
considered as part of the secondary meaning analysis. See Eldon Indus., Inc. v. Rubber-
maid, Inc., 735 F. Supp. 786, 817 (N.D. Ill. 1990); cf. Herbko Int'l, Inc. v. Gemmy Indus.,
916 F. Supp. 322, 329 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (recognizing that plaintiff's failure to produce sur-
vey evidence weighs against a finding of secondary meaning but does not preclude it). In
some cases, the lack of survey evidence appears almost to have been determinative of the
issue of secondary meaning. See, e.g., Spex, Inc. v. Joy of Spex, Inc., 847 F. Supp. 567, 577
(N.D. Il1. 1994) ("[Pllaintiff's failure to produce consumer surveys is crippling (although
not dispositive), especially when combined with the scarcity of direct consumer testimony
on [the] issue [of secondary meaning]."); Investacorp, Inc. v. Arabian Inv. Banking Corp.,
722 F. Supp. 719, 723-24 (S.D. Fla. 1989) (stating that plaintiffs failure to provide survey
evidence is significant evidence of no secondary meaning), aff'd, 931 F.2d 1519 (11th Cir.
1991); see also Braun Inc. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 975 F.2d 815, 827 (Fed. Cir. 1992)
(finding by jury of secondary meaning was speculative, because there was "no survey,
quantitative evidence, or testimony suggesting secondary meaning"); American Televi-
sion & Communications Corp. v. American Communications & Television, Inc., 810 F.2d
1546, 1549 (11th Cir. 1987) (concluding that plaintiff's failure to submit survey evidence
of secondary meaning supported finding that none existed).
82. See Dorr-Oliver, Inc. v. Fluid-Quip, Inc., 94 F.3d 376, 380 (7th Cir. 1996) (design
of industrial product); L. & J.G. Stickley, Inc. v. Canal Dover Furniture Co., 79 F.3d 258,
262 (2d Cir. 1996) (design of line of reproduction furniture); Knitwaves, Inc. v. Lollytogs
Ltd., 71 F.3d 996, 1007 (2d Cir. 1995) (design of sweaters) (regarded by court as "product
features"); Mana Prods. v. Columbia Cosmetics Mfg., 65 F.3d 1063, 1068-69 (2d Cir. 1995)
(design of makeup compacts) (apparently regarded by court as packaging); Fabrication
Enters., Inc. v. Hygenic Corp., 64 F.3d 53, 57-58 (2d Cir. 1995) (color design of set of latex
exercise bands); Villeroy & Boch Keramische Werke K.G. v. TIC Sys., Inc., 999 F.2d
619, 620 (2d Cir. 1993) (design of high quality china); Paddington Corp. v. Attiki Import-
ers & Distribs., Inc., 996 F.2d 577, 582-83 (2d Cir. 1993) (product packaging); EFS Mktg.
v. Russ Berrie & Co., 836 F. Supp. 128, 134 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (design of toy dolls), aff'd, 37
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1646 (2d Cir. 1996). Although the Knitwaves court approvingly cited
this twin track approach to trade dress distinctiveness, it may have effectively re-
established the bar to inherent distinctiveness for product features that Two Pesos swept
away for other forms of trade dress. See infra Part IV(D)(3).
To these three requirements, the Tenth Circuit has added a fourth for product con-
figuration trade dress: the product configuration must not be a significant inventive
component of an invention covered by an expired utility patent. See Vornado Air Circu-
lation Sys., Inc. v. Duracraft Corp., 58 F.3d 1498. 1500 (10th Cir. 1995) ("Where a product
configuration is a significant inventive component of an invention covered by a utility
patent, so that without it the invention cannot fairly be said to be the same invention,
patent policy dictates that it enter into the public domain when the utility patents on the
[products] expire. To ensure that result, it cannot receive trade dress protection under
section 43(a)."), cert denied, 116 S. Ct. 753 (1996). It is not clear quite what the Tenth
Circuit means by "significant inventive component." See Recent Case, 109 HARV. L.
REV. 1457, 1460 (1996) (arguing that the Tenth Circuit's test "lacks doctrinal coher-
ence"); see also Thomas & Betts Corp. v. Panduit Corp., 935 F. Supp. 1399, 1409 (N.D. Ill.
1996) ("[T]he subject of an expired utility patent which is disclosed as the 'best mode' in
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IV. THE STANDARD FOR INHERENTLY DISTINCTIVE TRADE DRESS
Although the Two Pesos Court decided that non-verbal trade
dress could be inherently distinctive, it did not directly address how
inherent distinctiveness was to be determined. Two leading tests had
been articulated by the lower federal courts before Two Pesos, and
others are being developed in the wake of that decision. In order to
assess the merit of the respective tests, it is helpful to re-emphasize
what courts are trying to determine in considering inherent distinct-
iveness.
A. Relevant Considerations: Likely Consumer Association, Not
Competitive Impact
The central question in determining inherent distinctiveness is
whether "because of the nature of the designation and the context in
which it is used, prospective purchasers are likely to perceive it as a
designation [of source]."' Commentators and courts have suggested,
however, that the distinctiveness inquiry attempts to gauge both the
likely reaction of prospective purchasers and the potential impact on
other sellers." In the context of word marks, the appraisal of pur-
the patent cannot be the subject of trademark protection with respect to the invention
disclosed to the public."); Zip Dee, Inc. v. Dometic Corp., 931 F. Supp. 602, 611-12 (N.D.
Ill. 1996) (recasting Vornado requirement in terms of functionality because the Tenth
Circuit's test "goes into uncharted" territory). Earlier Supreme Court case law empha-
sized the relevance of prior utility patents to the scope of protection, see, e.g., Kellogg Co.
v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 120 (1938), but the Tenth Circuit appears to regard
this consideration in absolute terms. See Dinwoodie, supra note 17, at 95-102.
83. RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 13; see also Mana, 65 F.3d at 1070 (discussing
distinctiveness in terms of likely consumer response); infra note 186 (citing cases).
84. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 13 cmt. c. Paul Goldstein, for example, has
succinctly articulated the double-barreled nature of the inquiry:
Trademark law's distinctiveness requirement serves two related purposes. One
is to ensure that a mark identifies a single source for goods or services, thus se-
curing consumer expectations respecting source. Second, by denying protection
to descriptive terms, the requirement ensures that competitors will be free to use
those terms in describing their own goods or services.
PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT, PATENT, TRADEMARK AND RELATED STATE
DOCTRINES 223 (Rev. 3d ed. 1993); see also Duraco Prods. v. Joy Plastic Enters., 40 F.3d
1431, 1448 (3d Cir. 1994) (distinctiveness analysis of product configurations different from
that applied to other trade dress because of possibility of substantially hindering competi-
tion, range of competitive alternatives, and likelihood that consumers will trust it as an
indicium of source); Estee Lauder, Inc. v. Gap, Inc., 932 F. Supp. 595, 608-11 (S.D.N.Y.
1996) (analyzing distinctiveness of mark by considering how consumers are likely to con-
strue the mark and whether protection would impair the ability of competitors to describe
their products); RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 14 cmt. b ("The classification of a desig-
nation as either suggestive or descriptive thus depends upon both the likelihood that
prospective purchasers will perceive it as an indication of source and the potential effect
on competitors of its appropriation as a trademark by a particular seller."); 1
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chaser reaction involves assessing whether consumers are likely to
attach source-identifying rather than lexicographic significance to the
use of the mark.y The analysis of the impact on competitors centers
on whether restrictions on use of the mark would "interfere with the
ability of other sellers to convey information about competing
goods."s' The archetypal analysis of the treatment of merely descrip-
tive terms exemplifies these different considerations. A word that
merely conveys the nature or characteristics of the product on which
it appears is more likely to be viewed by consumers not as an identi-
fier of source but as a mere description of the productY Similarly,
preventing competitors from using such a word to describe their
MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 11.21[2] ("The imagination test [for suggestiveness] naturally
leads into the competitors' need test."); cf. Thompson Med. Co. v. Pfizer Inc., 753 F.2d
208, 216 (2d Cir. 1985) ("The rationales for denying protection to marks that do not con-
note a source of origin include: (1) the public's inherent 'right' to call a product by its
name; (2) exclusive appropriation of a generic/descriptive mark is 'unfair' to competitors;
and (3) such an appropriation creates or entrenches a monopoly." (citations omitted));
Pollack, supra note 65, at 263-64 (noting that tests of whether a mark is descriptive or
suggestive include: looking at the role played by imagination, considering whether or not
competitors need the term to indicate the nature of their goods, and focusing on the ex-
tent to which competitors already use the term).
85. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 13 cmt. c; see also Thompson Med., 753 F.2d
at 213 ("[T]he determination whether a mark is descriptive or suggestive cannot be made
in a vacuum; it is necessary to surmise the mental processes of those in the marketplace at
whom the mark is directed."); In re Colonial Stores Inc., 394 F.2d 549, 551 (C.C.P.A.
1968) (noting that whether a mark is suggestive or descriptive is based upon "what it
would mean to the potential consumer when applied to applicant's goods"); Estee Lauder,
932 F. Supp. at 609-11 (analyzing distinctiveness of mark by considering how consumer is
likely to construe the mark).
86. RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 13 cmt. c; accord In re DC Comics, Inc., 689 F.2d
1042, 1044 (C.C.P.A. 1982) ("Trademark law has traditionally imposed restrictions on the
right to exclude others from using certain 'descriptive' symbols to ensure that the oppor-
tunity for all to associate such symbols with their common referents remains
unencumbered."); Thompson Med., 753 F.2d at 216 ("In protecting only those descriptive
terms that have acquired secondary meaning, we recognize that potential market entrants
should not be foreclosed from using descriptive terms to label their products."); see also
Estee Lauder, 932 F. Supp. at 608 (noting that classification of a mark as suggestive or
descriptive is helped by "consideration of whether protection should be restricted to
avoid precluding competitors from describing their products in an appropriate and neces-
sary way"); 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 11.21[2] (explaining the difference between
suggestive and descriptive marks as whether "the suggestion made by the mark [is] so
remote and subtle that it is really not likely to be needed by competitive sellers to de-
scribe their goods"); Adam J. Cermak, Inherent Distinctiveness in Product Configuration
Trade Dress, 3 U. BALT. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 79, 88 (1994) ("The policy of not protecting
both generic and merely descriptive marks is thus cast in terms of adverse impact on
competing market players .... ).
87. See Beckwith's Estate v. Commissioner of Patents, 252 U.S. 538,543 (1920) ("The
function of a trade-mark is to point distinctively, either by its own meaning or by associa-
tion, to the origin or ownership of the wares to which it is applied, and words merely
descriptive of qualities, ingredients or characteristics, when used alone, do not do this.").
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products impedes their ability to communicate relevant and accurate
information about those products." Thus, merely descriptive terms
are not regarded as inherently distinctive, as assessed by reference
either to likely consumer association or to the potential impact on
competitors, and will not be protected absent proof that consumers in
fact have come to associate that term with a specific source.
Despite the apparent neatness of these coupled considerations of
likely association and competitive consequences, and notwithstanding
the relevance of competitive impact to the scope of trademark pro-
tection, 9 it is difficult to discern the relevance of the effect on other
88. As the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit explained:
[Plaintiff] cannot appropriate the English language, and by doing so render a
competitor inarticulate....
"'" [l]t is no purpose of trademark protection to allow a firm to prevent its
competitors from informing consumers about the attributes of the competitors'
brands. That is why trademarks that are fanciful ... or arbitrary... or sugges-
tive.., are favored, why generic words... may not be trademarked at all, and
why descriptive words ... may be trademarked only if they have acquired sec-
ondary meaning ....
Blau Plumbing, Inc. v. S.O.S. Fix-It, Inc., 781 F.2d 604, 609-10 (7th Cir. 1986); see also
Thomas & Betts Corp. v. Panduit Corp., 65 F.3d 654,657 (7th Cir. 1995) ("[In the case of
descriptive marks,] a court must determine whether the mark really signifies a particular
source or the product itself .... [T]he dispute concerns limitations on the language com-
petitors can use to communicate with consumers about their products and the effect such
limitations would have on competition."), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1044 (1996); In re Abcor
Dev. Corp., 588 F.2d 811, 813 (C.C.P.A. 1978) (stating that the reasons for not protecting
descriptive marks are "(1) to prevent the owner of a mark from inhibiting competition in
the sale of particular goods; and (2) to maintain freedom of the public to use the language
involved, thus avoiding the possibility of harassing infringement suits by the registrant
against others who use the mark when advertising or describing their own products").
89. The functionality analysis is centered on the effect on competition of protecting
the trade dress at issue. See supra note 79 and accompanying text. Because trademark
law (unlike copyright or patent law) offers potentially perpetual protection to the design
of functional products without regard to their originality or creativity, many commenta-
tors fear that trademark protection for designs might be anti-competitive. See, e.g.,
Reichman, supra note 8, at 111 (arguing that broad trade dress protection could result in
patent-like monopoly protection, "without any requirements of novelty or nonobvious-
ness, that could last as long as the proprietor cared to defend it"); Anthony E. Dowell,
Note, Trade Dress Protection of Product Designs: Stifling the Progress of Science and the
Useful Arts for an Unlimited Time, 70 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 137, 137 (1994) ("Federal
courts have thus created a powerful form of intellectual property that requires little or no
standards for protection, affords monopoly rights, lasts forever, and eliminates rightful
competition."); see also Ralph S. Brown, Copyright-Like Protection For Designs, 19 U.
BALT. L. REv. 308, 318 (1989) (noting need for judicial sensitivity to conferring perpetual
patents in form of trade dress protection); David Klein, The Ever-Expanding Section
43(a): Will the Bubble Burst?, 2 U. BALT. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 65, 88 (1993) ("It is anti-
competitive to provide section 43(a) protection to the trade dress of a product's feature,
where that feature is sought after by consumers, as opposed to, or in addition to, that
feature being a means for indicating source."); Reichman, supra note 57, at 284-85
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sellers to the question of distinctiveness." Consider the same two
stated concerns at the stage where the descriptive term achieves sec-
ondary meaning and thus is protectable as a trademark. The
demonstration of secondary meaning indicates that consumers have
come to associate the term with a specific source and have made that
association notwithstanding any descriptive meaning they might first
have attributed to the term. However, the effect on competitors of
preventing use of the term is no different than before." Distinctive-
ness is a measure of consumer association, and analysis of
competitive impact adds little to our understanding of whether word
(characterizing protection for product designs under section 43(a) as "far more of the
wrong kind of protection than is good for a competitive economy"). Indeed, the per-
ceived inability of the courts to circumscribe this extension of trademark protection
provoked one scholar, even before Two Pesos, to label this developing body of trademark
law as "the most protectionist design law of them all." See Reichman, supra note 8, at 98.
I address these additional concerns in a forthcoming article entitled In Defense of Trade
Dress Protection For Product Design. There, I argue that any potentially anti-competitive
ramifications can be averted by paying heed to the essential nature and limits of trade-
mark protection. See Dinwoodie, supra note 17, at 2 (arguing that the limits of trademark
protection-distinctiveness, nonfunctionality and likelihood of confusion-prevent con-
flict with the goal of encouraging competition). The strength and acceptability of
trademark protection for product designs lie, somewhat ironically, in the limits of that
protection. In particular, in In Defense of Trade Dress Protection For Product Design, I
discuss the exclusion from protection of so-called "functional" designs, an exclusion de-
signed to forestall the potentially anti-competitive consequences of broad trademark
protection for product designs; and, I appraise the application of the trademark infringe-
ment test to product design marks. See id Trademark and unfair competition law
protects a mark owner only against the use of its design in such a way as to cause confu-
sion as to the source or certain other attributes of goods or services. It does not prohibit
the mere copying and marketing by another of the same design under a clearly differenti-
ated trademark.
90. Professor Litman has argued that while functionality-the issue of whether pro-
tecting a particular feature would hinder competition-may well be an important
consideration in determining relief, it has no bearing on whether consumers are likely to
be confused. See Litman, supra note 20, at 85. Similarly, it sheds no light on whether a
design serves to identify its source.
91. While the meaning of the term for consumers, upon achieving secondary mean-
ing, is to identify a specific product, that does not alter the fact that for competitors there
is, upon protection of the previously descriptive mark, a restriction on the use of terms
that convey accurate information regarding its competing product. This problem is miti-
gated, but not fully resolved, by the descriptive fair use defense. See 15 U.S.C.
§ 1115(b)(4) (1994) (recognizing defense, even in an action for infringement of incontest-
able mark, on basis of good faith non-trademark use to describe product); cf. Sunmark,
Inc. v. Ocean Spray Cranberries, Inc., 64 F.3d 1055, 1059 (7th Cir. 1995) (concluding that
truthful good faith descriptive use by defendant cannot be wrong, even if it causes confu-
sion, at least with respect to unrelated products). The Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit has in one recent case afforded a particularly broad scope to the fair use defense
in the product design context. See Car-Freshner Corp. v. S.C. Johnson & Son, 70 F.3d
267, 270 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding that defendant's sale of a pine-tree shaped, pine-scented
air freshener under its own trademark was a good faith descriptive use that did not in-
fringe plaintiff's trade dress in pine-tree shaped air fresheners).
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marks identify and distinguish a particular product.' Competitive
concerns may underlie trademark protection, but they do not provide
appropriate guidance on the concrete question of distinctiveness.
This point is further highlighted by the Restatement's discussion
of these considerations in assessing the inherent distinctiveness of
symbols and designs. The Restatement carefully explains the factors
that contribute to whether a prospective purchaser is likely to con-
sider a design a source-identifying feature, such as whether the shape
is "commonplace" or "striking [or] unusual."" Its analysis of the im-
pact on competitors is, however, less illuminating and wholly
conclusory: "Recognition of exclusive rights in symbols or designs
that are inherently distinctive is also unlikely to inhibit the legitimate
activities of competitors."94  How that is determined-or what are
"legitimate activities"-is not explained in the Restatement, and in-
deed cannot be explained as a matter of distinctiveness.
The most common judicial implementation of the perceived
need to examine the competitive impact of protecting shapes95 in-
volves an assessment of the range of viable alternative shapes for
92. Despite this, courts routinely connect the needs of a competitor with the question
of distinctiveness. See, e.g., Estee Lauder, Inc. v. Gap, Inc., 932 F. Supp. 595, 608
(S.D.N.Y. 1996) (noting that the classification of a mark as suggestive or descriptive is
helped by "consideration of whether protection should be restricted to avoid precluding
competitors from describing their products in an appropriate and necessary way"); Vor-
nado Air Circulation Sys., Inc. v. Duracraft Corp., No. 92-1543-WEB, Memorandum and
Order at 29 (D. Kan. Mar. 4, 1994) ("Because a descriptive mark is one which a competi-
tor would likely need to use in describing his product, the term does not indicate that a
product comes from a particular source."), rev'd on other grounds, 58 F.3d 1498 (10th Cir.
1995), cert denied, 116 S. Ct. 753 (1996). The proper connection is not between competi-
tive need and source-identification, but rather between the intrinsic nature of a
descriptive term and the likelihood that a consumer would regard such a term as indicat-
ing a source.
93. RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 13 cmt. d.
94. Id.
95. Other courts have determined (and denied) distinctiveness by more direct appeal
to the competitive impact of protecting an idea. See, e.g., Jeffrey Milstein, Inc. v. Greger,
Lawlor, Roth, Inc., 58 F.3d 27, 32-34 (2d Cir. 1995) ("In evaluating claims to distinctive
trade dresses, two additional considerations should be borne in mind .... Second, just as
copyright law does not protect ideas but only their concrete expression, neither does trade
dress law protect an idea, a concept, or a generalized type of appearance.") (denying
trade dress claim because plaintiff sought protection for the generalized idea of using die-
cut photographs on greetings cards); Fashion Victim, Ltd. v. Sunrise Turquoise, Inc., 785
F. Supp. 1302, 1308 (N.D. Ill. 1992) (rejecting claim of trade dress in tee-shirt design be-
cause to find design inherently distinctive would grant monopoly in idea of depicting
skeletons in sexual positions on tee-shirts); Jungle Rags, Inc. v. Rainbow Graphics, Inc.,
29 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1704, 1708 (M.D. Fla. 1993) (flap in shirt in shape of animal's
mouth not inherently distinctive because to make that finding would grant monopoly on
the fashion idea).
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such products or packaging.96 Cast in these terms, a similar workable
analysis might be applied to words and shapes. Such questions are,
however, more appropriately left to the functionality inquiry, not
only because of the lack of conceptual connection to distinctiveness,
but also in order more fully to accommodate competing policies in
this area. By considering the issue of competitive impact as part of
96. See, e.g., Duraco Prods. v. Joy Plastic Enters., 40 F.3d 14.31, 1448 (3d Cir. 1994)
(resting stricter test of inherent distinctiveness for product configurations on basis that
"[a] product configuration ... commonly has finite competitive variations that, on the
whole, are equally acceptable to consumers"); id. at 1442 (identifying rationales support-
ing the trademark taxonomy as including the competitive effect of the number of
alternatives left from a finite number of possibilities); Paddington Corp. v. Attiki Import-
ers & Distribs., Inc., 996 F.2d 577, 583 (2d Cir. 1993) ("Since the choices that a producer
has for packaging its products are ... almost unlimited, typically a trade dress will be
arbitrary or fanciful and thus inherently distinctive .... "); see also Two Pesos, Inc. v.
Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 786-87 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring) (explaining
common-law development toward acceptance of inherently distinctive shapes by refer-
ence to recognition that number of alternatives unlimited); Chevron Chem. Co. v.
Voluntary Purchasing Groups, Inc., 659 F.2d 695, 702-03 (Former 5th Cir. 1981)
(explaining acceptance of inherently distinctive packaging by reference to available alter-
natives); RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 13 cmrts. b-c (noting that protection of inherently
distinctive designations or fanciful terms does not diminish the ability of sellers of similar
products to communicate information about their goods).
Commentators have also assessed distinctiveness of designs in terms of alternatives.
See, e.g., Dratler, supra note 8, at 950-51 (proposing "alternatives test" to determine dis-
tinctiveness of design); C. Andrew Wattleworth, Comment, Inherently Distinctive Product
Configurations Under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act: Where Do We Stand in the Aftermath of
Two Pesos, 26 CUMB. L. REV. 1071, 1096 (1995-96) (endorsing variant of Dratler's pro-
posal). Professor Dratler suggests that an alternatives-based distinctiveness doctrine
could "separate trademarks from the proper subject matter of design patents" and "help
preserve freedom of competition while alleviating much... doctrinal confusion." Drat-
ler, supra note 8, at 950-51. The distinctiveness doctrine is not, however, intended to
serve those roles. There is no reason why the subject matter of a design patent might not
also operate as a trademark. See In re Mogen David Wine Corp., 328 F.2d 925, 930
(C.C.P.A. 1964); Krueger Int'l, Inc. v. Nightingale, Inc., 915 F. Supp. 595, 604 (S.D.N.Y.
1996) ("A design patent is analytically distinct from a protectable trade dress, and indus-
trial products may qualify for both kinds of protection without violating the policy goals
of either patent or trade dress law."); cf. Regulations of the U.S. Copyright Office, 37
C.F.R. § 202.10(a) (1995) (providing that availability of design or utility patent protection
does not affect registrability of copyright in pictorial, graphic or sculptural work). Fur-
thermore, freedom of competition can appropriately be protected by the later application
of the functionality doctrine without denying that such a feature might also operate as an
identifier of source. See Dinwoodie, supra note 17, at 31-32. That denial fails to acknowl-
edge the conflicting competitive concerns that stem from the likelihood of confusion. As
Professor Litman has observed, "[t]he promotion of competition involves more than the
prevention of monopoly over any item of value." Litman, supra note 20, at 97; see also
Fabrication Enters., Inc. v. Hygenic Corp., 64 F.3d 53, 59 (2d Cir. 1995) ("[T]he competi-
tive benefits of protecting the source-identifying aspects of the feature under the Lanham
Act may outweigh the competitive costs of precluding competitors from using the fea-
ture."). In particular, competitive goals are furthered by avoiding confusion as to the
source of products.
1997]
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the distinctiveness inquiry, a distinctive shape that is one of only a
limited number of alternatives may receive no protection whatsoever,
even though it clearly satisfies the threshold for trademark protec-
tion-distinctiveness. 9 If, instead, analysis of competitive effect were
to be conducted after protectability had been established, some
measure of remedial assistance could be provided to the mark owner,
even if only in the form of confusion-dispelling labeling.9"
This alternative approach balances and attempts to accommo-
date concerns surrounding both anti-competitive situations: the
imposition of unreasonable constraints on creation, and potential
purchaser confusion that could arise with a second-coiner's unregu-
lated use of a shape with which consumers have come to associate a
specific source.99 Observations made by the Supreme Court in its two
97. A threshold based solely upon competitive impact also presents the possibility of
over-protection for undistinctive shapes to which there remain alternatives. Even a fea-
ture that is not essential or the only option (and thus nonfunctional) can clearly still fail to
meet the standard for inherent distinctiveness. See Pebble Beach Co. v. Tour 18 I, Ltd.,
936 F. Supp. 1299, 1344 n.41 (S.D. Tex. 1996) ("[T]he non-functionality of trade dress
does not dictate a corresponding finding of inherent distinctiveness .... "); Mana Prods. v.
Columbia Cosmetics Mfg., 858 F. Supp. 361, 367 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) (noting that case colors
were not arbitrary just because they did not need to be that color and because there were
other options), affd, 65 F.3d 1063 (2d Cir. 1995).
98. At common law, courts often required the imitator of a functional design to take
reasonable steps (such as labeling) to avoid confusion. See, e.g., Shredded Wheat Co. v.
Humphrey Cornell Co., 250 F. 960, 965 (2d Cir. 1918); see also Kellogg Co. v. National
Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 120 (1938) (holding that defendant was free to use pillow-
shaped form "subject only to the obligation to identify its product lest it be mistaken for
that of plaintiff"). This approach has been adopted by several courts in causes of action
under section 43(a), see, e.g., Keene Corp. v. Paraflex Indus., Inc., 653 F.2d 822, 824 (3d
Cir. 1981); Vuitton et Fils, S.A. v. Young Enters., 644 F.2d 769, 774 (9th Cir. 1981); Dallas
Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200, 203 (2d Cir. 1979),
and it is also endorsed by the recently-published Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competi-
tion. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 16 cmt. d ("Although the possibility or even
certainty of... confusion will not deprive competitors of their right to copy functional
designs, the general proscription against misrepresentations of source may require subse-
quent users of functional but distinctive designs to take reasonable precautions to
minimize the risk of confusion."); see also Duraco, 40 F.3d at 1445 (noting that the doc-
trine remains intact); cf. Litman, supra note 20, at 87 n.78 (discussing operation of
nonfunctionality as element of plaintiff's claim, as opposed to affirmative defense for
defendant, and noting that such a rule prevents a producer of functional features from
obtaining any relief including precautionary labeling); id at 78 (arguing that the func-
tional nature of features be considered not in determining liability but in setting the type
and scope of relief). Although the Supreme Court in Qualitex described functionality as a
complete defense to an action under section 43(a), the Court did not purport to address
the remedial measures that might still be available to a court to avoid the concomitant
false representation made by the defendant. See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobsen Prods. Co., 115
S. Ct. 1300, 1304 (1995).
99. "[B]oth product distinguishability and the doctrine of functionality are procom-
petitive policies .... ." Litman, supra note 20, at 96-97. As the Court of Appeals for the
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most recent trademark decisions, particularly in Qualitex Co. v. Ja-
cobsen Products Co., support the suggestion that the availability of
competitive alternatives (or a lack thereof) should not impact any
determination of distinctiveness (inherent or otherwise),' ° but rather
is a matter for the functionality doctrine."'
Second Circuit noted recently in the context of conducting a functionality analysis:
[A] court conducting a functionality inquiry must take account of two risks
which, if badly managed, might result in either too great or too little protection
of competition. On the one hand, to the extent that the product feature or de-
sign at issue enhances the distinctiveness of the product, there is a risk that
failure to protect the feature or design will cause confusion and allow competi-
tors to benefit unfairly from the original manufacturer's investment in its
product's appearance. If such confusion occurs, meaningful competition is frus-
trated because "[w]ithout some.., method of product identification, informed
consumer choice, and hence meaningful competition in quality, could not exist."
On the other hand, because a product feature or design that enhances the dis-
tinctiveness of the product also might contribute to the usefulness of the
product, there is a risk that protecting the feature or design would give the
manufacturer an unfair competitive advantage because competitors will be pro-
hibited from incorporating that feature into their designs.
Fabrication Enters., 64 F.3d at 58 (citations omitted).
100. Actual third party use of similar trade dress features may be of relevance to dis-
tinctiveness insofar as it may blur consumer association of the product trade dress with a
specific source. See Mana Prods. v. Columbia Cosmetics Mfg., 65 F.3d 1063, 1070 (2d Cir.
1995) ("When it is readily allowed that other cosmetic distributors and retailers have used
the identical packaging or containers, it defies logic to suggest that the packaging was
inherently distinctive."); see also infra notes 118-21 and accompanying text (discussing
relevant distinctiveness considerations); cf. Fabrication Enters., 64 F.3d at 61 (noting that
objection to use by third parties relevant in determining distinctiveness). For a discussion
of the relevance of a lack of alternatives to this issue, see infra note 389.
101. See Qualitex, 115 S. Ct. at 1306 (1995) (accepting that protection can be afforded
colors per se without depleting alternatives because the functionality doctrine is available
to prevent such anticompetitive consequences); Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505
U.S. 763, 774-75 (1992) (rejecting argument that allowing inherently distinctive trade
dress would be anti-competitive because the functionality doctrine "serves to assure that
competition will notbe stifled by the exhaustion of a limited number of trade dresses").
But cf. Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 786 (Thomas, J., concurring) (suggesting that "[tirade
dress, which consists not of words or symbols, but of a product's packaging (or 'image,'
more broadly), seems at common law to have been thought incapable ever of being inher-
ently distinctive, perhaps on the theory that the number of ways to package a product is
finite." (emphasis added)). The capacity of the functionality doctrine to perform this role,
and thus to allow distinctiveness to be considered independently of the range of available
alternatives, requires that the functionality defense always be available to a defendant. A
recent appellate decision-which denies the functionality defense to a defendant alleged
to have infringed a registered mark that has become incontestable--endangers this capa-
bility. See Shakespeare Co. v. Silstar Corp. of Am., 9 F.3d 1091, 1097-99 (4th Cir. 1993);
see also Northwestern Corp. v. Gabriel Mfg. Co., No. 95 Civ. 2004, 1996 WL 251433, at *4
(N.D. Ill. May 8, 1996) (following Shakespeare); Kransco Mfg. Inc. v. Hayes Specialties
Corp., 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1999, 2001 (E.D. Mich. 1994) (same), aff'd in part, rev'd in
part, 77 F.3d 503 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Dinwoodie, supra note 17, at 37-39 (arguing that func-
tionality defense should always be available).
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B. Pre-Two Pesos Tests
1. Chevron: Product/Mark
Prior to Two Pesos, courts permitting trade dress protection for
shapes on the basis of inherently distinctive features had formulated
two tests to assess inherent distinctiveness. The first test was articu-
lated by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Chevron
Chemical Co. v. Voluntary Purchasing Groups.'°2 In Chevron, the
plaintiff sought to enjoin a competitor from copying the packaging in
which the plaintiff sold garden products. The defendant sold its
competing products in bottles of similar shape and size with a similar
label design, but replaced the plaintiff's registered verbal trademark
with the name of its own product. The plaintiff claimed trade dress
rights in its packaging and alleged that defendant's use of similar
packaging gave rise to a likelihood of confusion as to the source of
the respective products. The district court dismissed the plaintiff's
claim because no secondary meaning had been proved to attach to
the packaging trade dress. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
rejected the suggestion that secondary meaning was a prerequisite to
every trade dress infringement suit. Instead, the court decided that
the same principles should apply to trade dress as applied to trade-
marks, and thus secondary meaning was required only if a dress was
not inherently distinctive.
The Chevron court purported to apply the classical Abercrombie
trademark analysis to trade dress features, although it did provide
some limited elaboration. It identified inherently distinctive shapes
as features that are "arbitrary" and, supplementarily, that "serve no
function either to describe the product or assist in its effective pack-
aging."10 3  The Fifth Circuit appears to have been influenced in
accepting this test by the belief that just as "the number of nonfunc-
tional words and symbols available for use by later comers in the
marketing of their products is unlimited," so too "the possible varie-
ties of advertising display and packaging are virtually endless."0 4 By
102. 659 F.2d 695,702 (Former 5th Cir. 1981); see also Lisa Frank, Inc. v. Impact Int'l,
Inc., 799 F. Supp. 980, 988 (D. Ariz. 1992) (applying both Chevron and Seabrook); Turtle
Wax, Inc. v. First Brands Corp., 781 F. Supp. 1314, 1318 n.6 (N.D. Ill. 1991) (recognizing
that Seventh Circuit has not decided whether to apply Seabrook or Abercrombie).
103. Chevron, 659 F.2d at 702.
104. Id at 702-03. Reflecting this reference to alternatives, courts purporting to apply
the Chevron test often look at whether other products of the same type can be developed
without using the shape at issue. See, e.g., Paddington Corp. v. Attiki Importers & Dis-
tribs., Inc., 996 F.2d 577, 584 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding that bottle's trade dress inherently
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equating packaging and words in terms of possible alternatives, the
court felt able to adopt the Abercrombie test.
However, the Abercrombie test, adopted by the Chevron court,
is based on a linguistic reference between word and mark and is thus
ill-suited to determine the inherent distinctiveness of shapes gener-
ally and of product design in particular. In assessing the conceptual
strength of word marks, and the degree of correlation between word
and product upon which that assessment is based, the limits of lexi-
con and established usage provide invaluable guidance. 5 Courts
have, however, acknowledged the difficulty of locating verbal marks
on the distinctiveness spectrum. 6 Even the relatively circumscribed
meanings that flow from the place of words as the primary forms of
societal communication (not to mention the presence of objectivizing
tools such as dictionaries), 7 though well understood by judges, 8
distinctive where it was selected from an "almost limitless supply of patterns, colors and
designs"); Mana Prods. v. Columbia Cosmetics Mfg., 858 F. Supp. 361, 367 (E.D.N.Y.
1994) (makeup compacts not inherently distinctive under Chevron when "[t]he size and
shape of the products at issue are characteristic of the entire genre of hand-held makeup
compacts .... [and] it is difficult to imagine an 'infinite variety' of meaningful alterna-
tives that would not hamper the products' usefulness as portable makeup cases that fit in
one hand"), affd, 65 F.3d 1063 (2d Cir. 1995). The court's mention of alternative shapes
sowed the seed for unhelpful fusion of the distinctiveness and functionality questions by
later courts applying Chevron. See infra notes 387-92; supra note 92 and accompanying
text.
105. "To make [the] test meaningful, it is necessary, therefore, to consider the estab-
lished usages and associations which inhere in the words [sought to be protected as
marks]." In re Colonial Stores Inc., 394 F.2d 549,551 (C.C.P.A. 1968); cf. RESTATEMENT,
supra note 1, § 13 cmt. b ("A word with no existing meaning coined to identify the prod-
ucts of a particular manufacturer, for example, is inherently distinctive because its lack of
lexicographic significance makes it likely that the designation will be perceived as a sym-
bol of identification.").
106. See, e.g., Banff, Ltd. v. Federated Dept. Stores, 841 F.2d 486, 489 (2d Cir. 1988)
("[W]e must acknowledge that placing a mark in one of these four categories is far from
an exact science, and that the differencel between the classes, which is not always readily
apparent, makes placing a mark in its proper context and attaching to it one of the four
labels a tricky business at best.").
107. See Cadbury Beverages, Inc. v. Cott Corp., 73 F.3d 474, 479 (2d Cir. 1996)
(describing a fanciful mark as "a term without any dictionary meaning"); Spraying Sys.
Co. v. Delavan, Inc., 975 F.2d 387,392-93 (7th Cir. 1992) (looking at dictionary definition
in determining that mark descriptive); Daddy's Junky Music Stores v. Big Daddy's Family
Music Ctr., 913 F. Supp. 1065, 1073 (S.D. Ohio 1996) (referring to dictionary to determine
word's typical connotation, and thus to ascertain the uniqueness of plaintiff's particular
use of word); see also Murphy Door Bed Co. v. Interior Sleep Sys., 874 F.2d 95, 101 (2d
Cir. 1989) (remarking that dictionary references may be evidence of genericness);
GILSON, supra note 46, § 7.02[7][d], at 7-72 ("[W]ith trade dress there are no dictionaries
to consult, and often little more than the 'eyeball test' to apply."). While courts use dic-
tionaries to assist in determining whether a verbal mark is inherently distinctive, similar
reference in assessing secondary meaning may be positively unhelpful. At that stage of
the analysis, the question for a court is whether the meaning denoted in the dictionary has
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cannot conclusively determine the conceptual classification of verbal
marks.09 Nevertheless, they do steer and confine the distinctiveness
inquiry, rendering analysis more predictable.
With shapes or the composites of features encountered in trade
dress cases, less guidance is readily available.10 Shapes are subject to
precluded the purchasing public from reaching an additional understanding of the term as
a source-identifier. See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, §11.06[2] ("Dictionary definitions
are relevant evidence of the ordinary significance of words."); cf. GILSON, supra note 46,
§ 2.02[2], at 2-35 (noting, in discussing determinations of genericness, that dictionaries
"may not reflect word meaning among those persons who purchase the particular prod-
ucts involved").
108. As a result of judicial awareness of the meaning of language, opinions analyzing
the conceptual strength of word marks often appear to be entirely intuitive. While the
conceptual classification of a mark is necessarily somewhat speculative, a court's reliance
on its own language skills is merely an unsurprising (if not necessarily appropriate) short-
cut, by-passing dictionaries, to the predictive consideration of established meanings.
109. See Walt-West Enters. v. Gannett Co., 695 F.2d 1050, 1057 (7th Cir. 1982) ("The
labels themselves are merely springboards for analysis, not a substitute for it. The point is
a basic one, but bears repeating, for it is all too often forgotten when the law is reduced to
a few conclusory classifications: such abstract categories are analytical touchstones for a
much more sophisticated inquiry.").
110. Cf. SUSANNE K. LANGER, PHILOSOPHY IN A NEW KEY: A STUDY IN THE
SYMBOLISM OF REASON, RITE, AND ART 93-96 (2d ed. 1951) (arguing that visual forms
"are just as capable of articulation, i.e. of complex combination, as words," but visual
forms have no vocabulary, no "defining dictionary," and no "translating dictionary").
Langer argues that because visual forms are not discursive their complexity
is not limited, as the complexity of discourse is limited, by what the mind can re-
tain from the beginning of an apperceptive act to the end of it .... An idea that
contains too many minute yet closely related parts, too many relations within
relations, cannot be 'projected' into discursive form: it is too subtle for speech.
Id. at 93. Thus, although Langer recognizes that discursive forms (i.e., language) differ
from presentational forms (e.g., visual symbols), she suggests that the meaning conveyed
by a visual form is in fact more precise and nuanced than that communicated by language.
See id. at 95 ("[T]o the intelligent eye, an incredible wealth and detail of information is
conveyed by the portrait, where we do not have to stop to construe verbal meanings.
That is why we use a photograph rather than a description on a passport or in the Rogues'
Gallery."). Langer also argues, however, consistent with the thesis of this Article, that
non-discursive forms (such as shapes) have no independent meaning devoid of the context
in which they are combined and presented. See id. at 94-97; id. at 97 ("The meanings
given through language are successively understood, and gathered into a whole by the
process called discourse; the meanings of all other symbolic elements that compose a
larger, articulate symbol are understood only through ... their relations within the total
structure."). As discussed below, alternative sources of information do exist to guide our
assessment of the distinctiveness of product designs. See infra Part IV(E)(2). Proceeding
from that premise, one writer has argued that the Abercrombie taxonomy should be ap-
plied to product designs because "[s]ources such as encyclopedias, design manuals, and
surveys can assist in determining whether a particular design is inherently distinctive."
David W. Opderbeck, Form and Function Protecting Trade Dress Rights in Product Con-
figurations, 20 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 1, 38 (1996). The availability of alternative
evidence to direct our analysis of the distinctiveness of product design calls, however, for
the formulation of an analytical model that easily taps those sources of information. It
does not warrant straining to measure likely public association by reference to a set of
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fewer objective constraints on comprehension or meaning; the proc-
essing of visual signals is far more ambiguous than the processing of
signals with immediate linguistic connotation. Shapes register visu-
ally, and to apply a test formulated for gradations of linguistic
meaning effects an unhelpful sensory equation."' Thus, in practice,
the use of the classical distinctiveness categories becomes somewhat
Delphic for shapes.
categories (i) that are designed to test likely public perception of word marks, and (ii)
that are themselves merely vehicles by which to evaluate that ultimate predictive ques-
tion. See supra note 109.
111. Courts applying tests of distinctiveness in the context of shapes have occasionally
attempted to express their conclusion in verbal terms. See, e.g., Windmill Corp. v. Kelly
Foods Corp., 76 F.3d 380 (6th Cir. 1996) (Table opinion, decision published at 1996 WL
33251, at *4) (to satisfy the secondary meaning test "the article must proclaim its identifi-
cation with its source"); Ferrari S.P.A. Esercizio v. Roberts, 944 F.2d 1235, 1246 (6th Cir..
1991) (finding secondary meaning in exterior design of Ferrari cars and noting that "[t]he
evidence is that Ferraris need no labeling; the shape of the vehicles 'says Ferrari' ");
Chevron Chem. Co. v. Voluntary Purchasing Groups, Inc., 659 F.2d 695, 699 (Former 5th
Cir. 1981) (reporting the district court's dismissal of unfair competition claim because
there was no evidence that "trade dress says 'Ortho' " to consumers); Mana Prods. v.
Columbia Cosmetics Mfg., 858 F. Supp. 361, 366-67 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) ("The makeup com-
pacts at issue in the present case, however, draw upon a small, rudimentary vocabulary of
forms which, even in combination, do not speak audibly of the products' origin."), affd,
65 F.3d 1063 (2d Cir. 1995). This modification of the communicative medium might re-
flect not only a desire to relate the decision to the classical trademark terminology, but
also a broader inclination regarding the use of metaphors in American law. Cf. Bernard
J. Hibbitts, Making Sense of Metaphors: Visuality, Aurality, and the Reconfiguration of
American Legal Discourse, 16 CARDOZO L. REv. 229, 232 (1994) (noting a
"jurisprudential turn from metaphoric visuality towards metaphoric aurality"). Use of the
metaphor is not, however, restricted to courts. See Gary van Deursen, The Globalization
of Design, APPLIANCE MANUFACTURER, March 1995, at 10 ("The image your product
projects depends on the language that speaks to the consumer. Rely on your designers to
create tangible and intangible product language capable of speaking to global consum-
ers."). Other courts have acknowledged the sensory differences involved in analyzing
verbal trademarks and non-verbal trade dress. See, e.g., Fun-Damental Too, Ltd. v.
Gemmy Indus., No. 96 Civ. 1103, 1996 WL 125641, at *1 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 21, 1996)
("In a trade dress case, seeing does not necessarily mean believing, but it sometimes
helps. Therefore, attached to this opinion are copies of photographs depicting the trade
dress of the competing products.").
112. Krueger Int'l, Inc. v. Nightingale Inc., 915 F. Supp. 595, 601 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)
("[T]he Abercrombie classifications do not translate easily to the trade dress context ....
Does the shape of a chair seat 'suggest' a chair seat? Does it 'describe' a chair seat? Or
is it just a chair seat? No matter how beautifully designed, an industrial product is what it
is."); see also Mulberry Thai Silks, Inc. v. K & K Neckwear, Inc., 897 F. Supp. 789, 793
(S.D.N.Y. 1995) ("Nor does pinning the label 'arbitrary' or 'fanciful' on the design neces-
sarily assist in focusing the analysis on the concern of the Lanham Act .... "); Pollack,
supra note 65, at 264 n.27 ("These tests, and these categories of marks, were created in an
age when word marks predominated. Acceptance of packages and the configuration of
the goods themselves as marks strains the system."); cf. Dratler, supra note 8, at 938
(suggesting that because distinctiveness doctrine was developed for use with verbal marks
it requires some reformulation for application to industrial designs). In its most recent
non-verbal trademark case, Qualitex Co. v. Jacobsen Products Co., 115 S. Ct. 1300, 1303
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To say, for example, that the shape of an article or container is
"suggestive" of the source of a particular product just by examining it
comes very close to being nothing more than what Professor Ralph
Brown has called an exercise in "intuitive judging," a gauge perhaps
of the depth of judicial spirit or imagination, but hardly a serviceable
formulation for directing our assessment of the distinctiveness of
shapes.' 3 To the extent that any less intuitive analysis is being con-
ducted, it is misdescribed by explanation in terms of the Abercrombie
spectrum.
2. Seabrook: Product/Similar Products
Whereas the Chevron court looked to the distinctiveness of the
trade dress by conceptual reference only to the product itself, in
(1995), the Supreme Court did not try to place the particular color on the Abercrombie
spectrum, but instead analogized to that spectrum. The Court compared color to descrip-
tive terms, but did not explicitly identify the color as a descriptive mark. The need to
depart from strict application of the Abercrombie analysis will recur as the subject-matter
of trademarks continues to expand. For example, "[i]n the [computer graphic user inter-
face] context, how can one say whether a particular set of menus, or a pattern on screens,
or computer-generated noises at particular times are suggestive of the software itself,
describe the software, or are completely arbitrary or fanciful?" Matthew E. Watson,
Trade Dress Theory and the Software Graphic User Interface: Sorting Through the Gooey
Mess, 34 JURIMETRICS J. 251,284 (1994).
While it is easy to see how a word or phrase, or perhaps even a picture, can be
descriptive, it is not clear what it means for the design of a product or a software
user interface to be descriptive .... [T]he traditional definitions ... only make
sense in the context of standard trademarks (i.e., words and pictures).
Lisa T. Oratz, User Interfaces: Copyright vs. Trade Dress Protection, 13 COMPUTER LAW.
1, 4 (1996). Or, how would a trademarked scent be placed on the Abercrombie spectrum?
Cf. Clarke, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1238, 1239-40 (T.T.A.B. 1990) (permitting trademark
registration of scent as applied to sewing thread).
113. Professor Brown has argued:
To say that the overall design of a useful article is "inherently distinctive" of a
particular source just by examining it and perhaps dissecting it, seems to me an
impermissible exercise of intuitive judging. It substitutes an impression that the
design is outstanding, or eccentric, or clever, or something, for the proofs of as-
sociation with a source, gained in the marketplace, that add up to a showing of
secondary meaning.
Brown, supra note 8, at 1380; see also Stuart Hall Co. v. Ampad Corp., 31 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1468, 1471 (W.D. Mo. 1994) ("[L]ike obscenity, it is far easier to make observa-
tions and reach conclusions directly than to articulate standards in a meaningful way."),
rev'd, 51 F.3d 780 (8th Cir. 1995); cf. Melissa R. Gleiberman, Note, From Fast Cars to Fast
Food:- Overbroad Protection of Product Trade Dress Under Section 43(a) of the Lanham
Act, 45 STAN. L. REv. 2037, 2042-43 (1993) ("What makes words, symbols, and even
product packaging 'inherently distinctive' is that they do not describe the product with
which they are identified. When the mark being protected is the configuration of the
product itself, to say that the design feature is not descriptive of the product is simply
inaccurate in the large majority of cases.").
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Seabrook Foods, Inc. v. Bar-Well Foods, Ltd.,114 the Court of Customs
and Patent Appeals conducted the evaluation by comparing the trade
dress to others in the field.115 Courts applying the Seabrook test'16
consider whether a shape or feature is "a 'common,' basic shape or
design, whether it [is] unique or unusual in a particular field, or
whether it [is] a mere refinement of commonly-adopted and well-
known forms of ornamentation for a particular class of goods viewed
by the public as a dress or ornamentation for the goods."...7
The exclusion of basic or common designs is closely keyed to
relevant distinctiveness considerations. Extensive use of the same or
similar designs may impair the likelihood that consumers can or will
use the design to identify a specific product."' Thus, if most products
114. 568 F.2d 1342 (C.C.P.A. 1977).
115. See id. at 1345; Stuart Hall, 51 F.3d at 787 ("[T]he Chevron and Abercrombie tests
focus on the arbitrariness of the trade dress and its relevance to the product, whereas the
Seabrook test focuses on a comparison of the trade dress with others in the field.").
116. This test is also referred to as the AmBrit test. See AmBrit, Inc. v. Kraft, Inc., 812
F.2d 1531, 1536-37 (11th Cir. 1986) (upholding the inherent distinctiveness of the pack-
aging of ice-cream novelty products). Some courts have conducted an analysis of inherent
distinctiveness under both the Seabrook and Abercrombie tests. See, e.g., Turtle Wax,
Inc. v. First Brands Corp., 781 F. Supp. 1314, 1318 n.6 (N.D. Ill. 1991) (deciding to apply
both because the Seventh Circuit had not identified which test to apply). Other courts
apply Seabrook, but their analysis is interspersed with references to the Abercrombie
categories of distinctiveness. See, e.g., Wiley v. American Greetings Corp., 762 F.2d 139,
141 (1st Cir. 1985) ("[A design is considered] 'inherently distinctive' if it is fanciful or
arbitrary, as opposed to descriptive or generic .... [W]hether it is arbitrary or merely
descriptive, is ordinarily a question of fact.., that is decided by reference to [the
Seabrook standard]."). Even the AmBrit court, in addition to evaluating the packaging
trade dress by the standards it announced, attempted to frame its conclusion in terms of
the Abercrombie spectrum, characterizing the overall appearance of the packaging as
"arbitrary and suggestive." See AmBrit, 812 F.2d at 1537.
117. Seabrook, 568 F.2d at 1344; accord AmBrit, 812 F.2d at 1536 (utilizing the same
language); see also Nexxus Prods. v. Gentle Concepts, Inc., 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1257,
1266 (M.D. Fla. 1993) (applying Seabrook to appearance of bottles for hair care prod-
ucts); Remcraft Lighting Prods., Inc. v. Maxim Lighting, Inc., 706 F. Supp. 855, 857-858
(S.D. Fla. 1989) (applying Seabrook to product configuration).
118. See AmBrit, 812 F.2d at 1537; Seabrook, 568 F.2d at 1345; RESTATEMENT, supra
note 1, § 13 cmt. d (basic or common shapes are not inherently distinctive because "their
appearance on numerous products makes it unlikely that consumers will view them as
distinctive of the goods or services of a particular seller"); 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 1,
§ 7.12, at 7-55 ("Ordinary geometric shapes... are regarded as non-distinctive and pro-
tectable only upon proof of secondary meaning."); cf. AmBrit, 812 F.2d at 1537
("[I]solated... third party uses of various elements ... do not detract from the distinct-
iveness of the overall impression conveyed by the combination of those elements on the
[product]."). Even when dealing with verbal or pictorial marks, the measure of a mark's
inherent distinctiveness is affected by the use of the same mark by others in the market.
See International Star Class Yacht Racing Assoc. v. Tommy Hilfiger U.S.A., Inc., Civ. No.
94-2663, 1995 WL 241875, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. April 26, 1995) ("Extensive third party use of
'star' and its graphic symbol weakens the inherent distinctiveness of the mark and indi-
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of the type in dispute are of similar appearance, courts are unlikely to
find inherent distinctiveness.'19 On the other side of this inquiry, if a
dress is unique or unusual, prospective purchasers are more likely to
perceive it as a source-designator." Such analysis, which measures
industry rather than lexicographic significance, is arguably even more
attuned to consumer perception than verbal mark analysis by virtue
of its express market orientation.' Moreover, the Seabrook test, an-
chored by reference to other product shapes, sets up an inquiry for
which evidence can be developed and a more predictable judgment
formed (both by courts and legal advisers) than the Chev-
cates that the mark's primary meaning is... descriptive."), affd in part, rev'd in part, 80
F.3d 749 (2d Cir. 1996); RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 14 cmt. b ("It is also appropriate
to consider the extent to which the same or similar terms have been used by others in
connection with comparable goods. If the term has been frequently employed by other
sellers, an inference of descriptiveness may be justified.").
119. See, e.g., Naso v. Park, 850 F. Supp. 264,270 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (concluding that
since most microfilm reels are of similar appearance, it is doubtful that inherent distinct-
iveness can be shown). As the Wiley court explained in finding that a red heart-shaped
design on the chest of a teddy bear was too common to be protected:
It is hornbook law that "[o]rdinary geometric shapes such as circles, ovals,
squares, etc., even when not used as background for other marks, are regarded
as non-distinctive and protectable only upon proof of secondary meaning." A
plain heart shape, like an "[o]rdinary geometric shape," carries no distinctive
message of origin to the consumer, and could not carry such a message [absent
secondary meaning] given the heart shape's widespread use as a decoration for
any number of products put out by many different companies.
762 F.2d at 142 (internal citations omitted) (first and second alteration in original); see
also Mana Prods. v. Columbia Cosmetics Mfg., 65 F.3d 1063, 1070 (2d Cir. 1995) ("When
it is readily allowed that other cosmetic distributors and retailers have used the identical
packaging or containers, it defies simple logic to suggest that the packaging was inher-
ently distinctive."); Turtle Wax, 781 F. Supp. at 1321 (rejecting claim of inherently
distinctive trade dress for automotive polish where basic shape and design of plaintiff's
trade dress were common and merely a combination and refinement of elements already
found in abundance in automotive products).
120. See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 8.02[4] (suggesting that Seabrook represents
"ways to ask whether the design, shape, or combination of elements is so unique, unusual
or unexpected in this market that one can assume without proof that it will automatically
be perceived by customers as an indicia [sic] of origin"). However, a trade dress will not
be considered inherently distinctive merely because "no competitive product combines
precisely the same elements in its trade dress." Turtle Wax, 781 F. Supp. at 1321; see also
Blue Coral, Inc. v. Turtle Wax, Inc., 664 F. Supp. 1153, 1163 (N.D. Ill. 1987) (reasoning
that if a shape was inherently distinctive merely because no competitive product combines
precisely the same elements in its trade dress, every new product on the market would be
inherently distinctive).
121. The context of the marketplace significantly affects distinctiveness because that
background can either blur or sharpen consumer association. See Paddington Corp. v.
Attiki Importers & Distribs., Inc., 996 F.2d 577, 583-84 (2d Cir. 1993) ("[P]ackaging lime-
flavored soda in green twelve-ounce cans is so common in the soft drink industry that
such packaging probably is not inherently distinctive, although without that industry prac-
tice green cans would be either suggestive or arbitrary and therefore inherently
distinctive.").
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ron/Abercrombie test permits."
Although Seabrook represents a much more workable test,
rooted in predictive factors more practically pertinent to non-verbal
marks, few courts applying it have recognized a product configura-
tion as inherently distinctive." This may in part be due to the small
number of courts applying the test, but may also be attributable to
the test's exclusion of "mere refinements" of commonly adopted and
well-known forms of ornamentation. Consideration of whether a de-
sign is a "mere refinement" of existing designs is also proper in the
predictive inquiry of whether consumers are likely to associate the
product design with its source. The likelihood of consumer associa-
tion is lessened not only by prior identical designs, but also by only
small differences separating the design of two rival products. How-
ever, most industrial design tends to improve incrementally on what
has gone before, 24 and this "mere refinement" consideration thus
122. See 1 GILSON, supra note 46, § 7.02[7][d], at 7-73 ("The [Seabrook] test appears
much more reliable than 'not descriptive' for purposes of educating future courts and
juries."); see also Krueger Int'l, Inc. v. Nightingale Inc., 915 F. Supp. 595, 603 (S.D.N.Y.
1996) ("The Seabrook test is the most useful of the three tests, in my view, because it
clarifies the importance of market context.... [It] highlights the notion that a design
cannot be considered in a vacuum .... Any test of inherent distinctiveness must ask,
'Inherently distinctive as compared to what?' ").
123. Nominally, most courts finding inherently distinctive product configuration trade
dress have done so after applying AbercrombielChevron, or without articulating their
reasons for doing so. See infra notes 276-77. Two courts have expressly applied Seabrook
and found an inherently distinctive product configuration. See Krueger, 915 F. Supp. at
607 (design of metal-frame stacking chairs inherently distinctive under Seabrook); Calla-
way Golf Co. v. Golf Clean, Inc., 915 F. Supp. 1206, 1212 (M.D. Fla. 1995) (design of "Big
Bertha" golf clubs inherently distinctive under Seabrook). Courts have also recognized
inherently distinctive product features under the Seabrook standard where the feature at
issue has been primarily two-dimensional in nature. See, e.g., Lisa Frank, Inc. v. Impact
Int'l, Inc., 799 F. Supp. 980, 988-89 (D. Ariz. 1992) (finding product design replicated in
both two and three dimensions inherently distinctive, citing and applying both Chevron
and Seabrook).
124. Much industrial design today is largely a form of innovation that proceeds incre-
mentally upon existing designs. It ordinarily concerns "variations on known style trends
that seldom take major strides beyond the prior art," Reichman, supra note 57, at 291,
and only infrequently advances the product beyond publicly anticipated extensions of
existing styles. See Dinwoodie, supra note 78, at 36. Often the design project is a re-
sponse to a minor problem with an existing design. See id. at 34 (noting responsive nature
of industrial design); see, e.g., Duraco Prods. v. Joy Plastic Enters., 40 F.3d 1431, 1435 (3d
Cir. 1994) (describing process of creation of plastic planters and, in particular, changes
made to prevent problem of prior design tipping over); Gasser Chair Co. v. Infanti Chair
Mfg. Corp., No. 88 Civ. 3931, 1996 WL 370162, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. June 28, 1996) (noting
that design of chair came from "need to solve ... problems" with prior designs), vacated,
No. 96-1448, 1996 WL 455579 (Fed. Cir. Aug 1, 1996); see also James Braham, What Do
Design Firms Really Do?, 67 MACHINE DESIGN 42, 43 (1995) (describing designers as
"problem solvers"); Ralph Caplan, The C-Word, I.D., Jan./Feb. 1995, at 38, 40 ("[T]he
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renders design vulnerable to an unfavorable finding on the issue of
inherent distinctiveness. It should, therefore, be regarded merely as
a relevant predictive factor rather than an absolute bar to inherent
distinctiveness."
C. A Secondary Meaning Requirement for Product Design
1. Rationales (Before Two Pesos)
Prior to 1992, in courts rejecting the possibility of inherently dis-
tinctive shapes, the absolute requirement of secondary meaning
burdened all trade dress causes of action, whether involving product
packaging or product configuration."2 Before the Supreme Court
dispensed with that requirement in Two Pesos in 1992, however,
some courts and commentators had suggested that a line should be
drawn not between trade dress and trademarks, but between product
design and other forms of trade dress."z In particular, in the dis-
practice of design addresses the user in terms of a problem to solve, a job to do, an irritant
to remove, a strategy to formulate, an itch to scratch.").
125. This effect of applying the "mere refinement" factor might also be mitigated by
reading the elements of the Seabrook test in the alternative, but courts have weighed the
three elements together. See Adam J. Cermak, Inherent Distinctiveness in Product Con-
figuration Trade Dress, 3 U. BALT. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 79,89 (1994).
126. See, e.g., Coach Leatherware Co. v. AnnTaylor, Inc., 933 F.2d 162, 168 (2d Cir.
1991) (design of handbag); Stormy Clime Ltd. v. ProGroup, Inc., 809 F.2d 971, 974 (2d
Cir. 1987) (design of rain jacket); American Greetings Corp. v. Dan-Dee Imports, Inc.,
807 F.2d 1136, 1141 (3d Cir. 1986) (graphic design on stomach of teddy bears); Prufrock
Ltd. v. Lasater, 781 F.2d 129, 132 (8th Cir. 1986) (restaurant decor); Union Mfg. v. Han
Baek Trading Co., 763 F.2d 42,48 (2d Cir. 1985) (stainless steel thermos design); Black &
Decker Mfg. Co. v. Ever-Ready Appliance Mfg. Co., 684 F.2d 546, 550 (8th Cir. 1982)
(design of folding step stool); Keebler Co. v. Rovira Biscuit Corp., 624 F.2d 366, 378 (1st
Cir. 1980) (packaging); White Swan, Ltd. v. Clyde Robin Seed Co., 729 F. Supp. 1257,
1260 (N.D. Cal. 1989) (cylindrical, shaker-type container with design on label).
127. See, e.g., Sicilia Di R. Biebow & Co. v. Cox, 732 F.2d 417, 426 n.7 (5th Cir. 1984)
("Unlike a product's configuration, which may acquire trademark value over time and by
exposure to consumers, arbitrary and nonutilitarian trade dress or packaging usually is
designed to act immediately as an identifier of source."); In re DC Comics, Inc., 689 F.2d
1042, 1050-51 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (Nies, J., concurring) (noting different considerations
where one seeks protection of a product design itself). The Sicilia Di R. Biebow court
suggested that several of the claimed reasons for the secondary meaning requirement
were particularly diminished when applied to packaging: "such trade dress generally does
not begin with a 'primary' meaning," and the "wide range of available packaging and
design options allows a producer to appropriate a distinctive identity without unduly hin-
dering his competitor's ability to compete." 732 F.2d at 426 n.7; see also RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, § 16 cmt. b (Tentative Draft No. 2, Mar. 23, 1990)
(suggesting that product design, unlike packaging, could not be inherently distinctive)
[hereinafter RESTATEMENT TENT. DRAFT NO. 2]; 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 7.23[2]
("Some courts and commentators would draw a line between product shapes and other
trade dress formats such that product shape is never inherently distinctive (and hence
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tinctiveness context, it was argued that while some forms of trade
dress (such as packaging) might be inherently distinctive, product
shapes could not be, and would always require proof of secondary
meaning.
These arguments rested on a variety of related bases. Those
viewing competitive concerns as appropriate to the distinctiveness
inquiry raised several questions. Some argued that a different range
of alternatives exists with respect to product design as opposed to
product packaging.' Others perceived the distinction between pack-
aging and design as another aspect of the balance between (1) the
general default rule of free competition (and the penumbral patent
"right to imitate or copy"), under which competitors should be en-
couraged to enter the market with similar designs before the
originator's secondary meaning develops, and (2) avoidance of the
deception that might occur upon entry into the market after the
plaintiff has made exclusive use of the design over a substantial pe-
riod of time. 29 By deferring protection until secondary meaning was
established, a balance of those two competing interests could be
always requires proof of secondary meaning) while other formats such as packaging could
be."); Brown, supra note 8, at 1380-81 (arguing that development of inherently distinctive
trade dress should be confined to packaging and advertising); Reichman, supra note 8, at
109 (commenting that inherently distinctive trade dress "could be rationalized so long as
the term trade dress retained its historical reference to packaging and container de-
signs"); William F. Gaske, Note, Trade Dress Protection: Inherent Distinctiveness as an
Alternative to Secondary Meaning, 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 1123, 1139 (1989) (arguing that
while inherent distinctiveness is appropriate for package design, it is not for product de-
sign).
128. See, e.g., Sicilia Di R. Biebow, 732 F.2d at 426 n.7 (suggesting that several of the
reasons for the secondary meaning requirement were particularly diminished when ap-
plied to packaging; including the "wide range of available packaging and design options
allows a producer to appropriate a distinctive identity without unduly hindering his com-
petitor's ability to compete"); RESTATEMENT TENT. DRAFT No. 2, supra note 127, § 16
cmt. b ("[T]he competitive interest in copying product designs is more substantial than in
the case of packaging, containers, labels, and related subject matter. Product designs are
therefore not considered inherently distinctive; such designs are protectable only upon
proof of secondary meaning .... The wide range of designs available for labels and pack-
aging generally permits the recognition of exclusive rights without significantly hindering
competition."); Reichman, supra note 8, at 110 n.694 (arguing that inherent distinctive-
ness appropriate for package design but not product design because infinite number of
packaging alternatives); Gaske, supra note 127, at 1139 (same); cf. Perfect Fit Indus. v.
Acme Quilting Co., 618 F.2d 950, 953 (2d Cir. 1980) (discussing secondary meaning re-
quirement, and noting that monopolization is not a problem in the realm of trade dress
"because the possible varieties of advertising display and packaging are virtually end-
less").
129. See, e.g., DC Comics, 689 F.2d at 1051 (Nies, J., concurring) (expressing the view
that "[d]eferred protection" of product designs "represents a balance of two competing
interests" of competitive imitation and prevention of confusion).
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achieved.'"
The distinction between product design and other forms of trade
dress was sustained for others by the relative likelihood of packaging
and product design operating immediately as an indicium of source.'31
The late Judge Helen Nies of the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit, for example, argued that one reason why product design can-
not be inherently distinctive is that "[t]he public simply is not likely
to associate origin immediately with the shape of goods (or a repre-
sentation thereof) .... In our economy, we expect that similar
products will come from a number of sources....""'
Finally, many commentators reprised various workability con-
cerns regarding the applicability of the Abercrombie analysis to
product configurations. The difficulty of Abercrombie to rationalize
fully the basis for protection of shapes as inherently distinctive is re-
vealed most starkly in relation to product design.33 Both product
design and packaging suffer from the complications of applying to
shapes a test formulated to judge linguistic meaning. However, the
form of appraisal mandated by Abercrombie connotes a relation (and
thus a distinction) between the mark and the product. Product con-
figuration trade dress (arguably unlike that which comprises the
appearance of packaging)TM cannot provide that relation.3 ' Aber-
130. See id. (Nies, J., concurring).
131. See id. (Nies, J., concurring); see also RESTATEMENT TENT. DRAFt No. 2, supra
note 127, § 16 cmt. b ("[I]t is less common for consumers to recognize the design of a
product as an indication of source. Product features are more likely to be seen merely as
utilitarian or ornamental aspects of the goods.").
132. DC Comics, 689 F.2d at 1051 (Nies, J., concurring).
133. See Krueger Int'l, Inc. v. Nightingale Inc., 915 F. Supp. 595, 601 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)
("[T]he Abercrombie classifications do not translate easily to the trade dress context. The
problem is not severe when the trade dress involves product packages and labels .... [But
t]he problem is often daunting... when it comes to product designs." (citation omitted));
Hanig & Co. v. Fisher & Co., No. 92 C 1779, 1994 WL 97758, at *4 (N.D. I11. Mar. 24,
1994) ("These terms are best used to classify words used as trademarks. They can be, and
are, extended to labeling and packaging.... But difficulties arise when these categories
are applied to the design of a physical object."); see also DC Comics, 689 F.2d at 1051
(Nies, J. concurring) ("The semantics, in referring to a design as 'distinctive,' impedes
clarity in analysis."); Brown, supra note 8, at 1380 ("To say that the overall design of a
useful article is 'inherently distinctive' of a particular source just be examining it and per-
haps dissecting it, seems to me an impermissible exercise in intuitive judging."); Dratler,
supra note 8, at 903 ("At first glance, the distinctiveness spectrum may appear to have
little to do with industrial designs. Unlike verbal marks, industrial designs do not describe
anything; they just are."). But see Opderbeck, supra note 110, at 38 ("The standard
[Abercrombie] taxonomy should not be much more difficult to apply in product configura-
tion cases than in other trade dress or trademark cases.").
134. The difference lies in the fact that where the trade dress involves product pack-
ages, words or labels, the symbols that convey information about the product are
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crombie analysis requires the design feature to serve a schizophrenic
existence, both as the product and the identifier, rendering analysis
more complex.
Our inability to find any relation between the mark and the
product, to be used in guiding our distinctiveness inquiry, should not
necessarily lead to the conclusion that no reliable predictor of likely
consumer association can be found.136 As discussed below, alternative
indicia of likely consumer response are available for consideration,
forestalling the need to ask always for evidence of actual association
in the form of secondary meaning.'37 Yet, the observation that the
Abercrombie test is stretched further by product design than by
packaging clearly has some merit. In addition to the lack of a rela-
tion by which to evaluate a product's configuration,- packaging is
more frequently considered arbitrary (in the vocabulary of Aber-
crombie) in relation to the product. It can be wholly incongruous in
relation to the product, with less severe commercial consequences
than would flow from a feature of the product itself being incongru-
ous. As a consequence, packaging can more easily avoid the murky
suggestive/descriptive line (a line which is most intimately connected
independent of the product. See Krueger, 915 F. Supp. at 601; see also Duraco Prods. v.
Joy Plastic Enters., 40 F.3d 1431, 1441 n.8 (3d Cir. 1994) ("We do not suggest that the
same [Abercrombie] taxonomy might not be efficacious in the context of product pack-
aging.") (rejecting Abercrombie as applied to product configuration).
135. See Stuart Hall Co. v. Ampad Corp., 51 F.3d 780, 786 (8th Cir. 1995) ("These
definitions [of the Abercrombie categories] address the relation between the product and
the trade dress .... "). If the relation (such as it existed) had to be explained in terms of
classical distinctiveness analysis, critics contended that it could at best be placed at the
level of descriptiveness. This provided a further argument against permitting inherently
distinctive product configuration trade dress. See DC Comics, 689 F.2d at 1051 (Nies, J.,
concurring) ("[A] product design or a representation of a product is manifestly equivalent
to words which describe its appearance and must be given the same treatment as inher-
ently descriptive words."); see also Tesco Chemicals, Inc., 181 U.S.P.Q. 59, 60 (T.T.A.B.
1973) (explaining that product configuration is registerable only if it has acquired secon-
dary meaning because such a shape is "necessarily merely descriptive."); cf. Blau
Plumbing, Inc. v. S.O.S. Fix-It, Inc., 781 F.2d 604, 608 (7th Cir. 1986) ("[T]hese holdings
may just reflect the fact that trade dress may be undistinctive without being descriptive.").
In Qualitex Co. v. Jacobsen Products Co., 115 S. Ct. 1300, 1303 (1995), the Supreme Court
employed a similar analytical device, analogizing consumer association of color to de-
scriptive terms. In essence, this creates a presumption that color cannot rise above
descriptive on the Abercrombie scale and thus requires secondary meaning to be pro-
tected. See infra notes 150-51.
136. The lack of a relation between the mark and product is often seized on by critics
of inherently distinctive product designs to justify a requirement of secondary meaning.
That argument presupposes, however, that the lack of a relation prevents there being any
reliable predictors of association. As I demonstrate below, see infra Part IV(E), those
predictors exist.
137. See infra Part IV(E)(2).
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to linguistic meaning) around which most trademark disputes are
fought, and to which most significance is attached by courts under the
traditional analysis.138
For example, packaging for diapers in the shape of the Eiffel
Tower would almost certainly be considered arbitrary and inherently
distinctive; '39 and much packaging can be, and is, of that nature with-
out having adverse affects on the product's market share. If the
diapers themselves were sold in the form of the Eiffel Tower, how-
ever, the product design-while it likely would be considered
arbitrary and inherently distinctive-would most probably be unsale-
able. Many products with a wholly incongruous design would
probably be less marketable, and thus the cases coming before courts
do not involve designs that are clearly arbitrary in Abercrombie
terms.' 4° It is with respect to product design trade dress that the defi-
ciencies of Abercrombie are most thoroughly exposed; the task of
applying Abercrombie to product design has thus precipitated judicial
reassessment of its usefulness.
138. See Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 10-11 (2d Cir.
1976) (noting difficulty drawing the line between descriptive and suggestive marks); Estee
Lauder, Inc. v. Gap, Inc., 932 F. Supp. 595, 608 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) ("Differentiation be-
tween suggestive and descriptive marks is not always easy."); Franklin Knitting Mills, Inc.
v. Fashionit Sweater Mills, Inc., 297 F. 247,248 (S.D.N.Y. 1923) ("It is quite impossible to
get any rule out of the cases beyond this: That the validity of the mark ends where sug-
gestion ends and description begins."); cf. Watson, supra note 112, at 283-85 (arguing for
the elimination of the categories of suggestive and descriptive as applied to graphic user
interfaces, and noting that "[t]hese categories are the most difficult to differentiate be-
tween and they are better suited to determining the distinctiveness of word marks").
139. See International Playtex Corp., 153 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 377, 378 (T.T.A.B. 1967)
(finding that cone shaped packaging for baby pants inherently distinctive).
140. There is a distinction to be drawn here between features of a product where the
manufacturer seeks to integrate form and function (most kitchen appliances, for exam-
ple), and features of a product that are intentionally superfluous (novelty items, for
example). The Abercrombie/Chevron formulation is particularly hostile toward function-
alist design (i.e., design integrating form and function) rather than the supplementary
application of ornament to a functional product. See Dinwoodie, supra note 78, at 23
(describing evolution of industrial design in conformance with ethos that "form and func-
tion blend inseparably into one"). Under the classical categories, the strength, and
inherent distinctiveness, of verbal marks is often shown by demonstrating the degree of
arbitrariness in mark selection, or by how incongruous the mark is with respect to the
product upon which it is affixed. See, e.g., Sands, Taylor & Wood Co. v. Quaker Oats Co.,
978 F.2d 947, 953 (7th Cir. 1992) (explaining that the test for suggestive marks asks
whether imagination is necessary to connect a name that is incongruous or figurative with
the product); Blisscraft of Hollywood v. United Plastics Co., 294 F.2d 694, 700 (2d Cir.
1961) (holding a mark to be inherently distinctive where incongruous).
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2. Effect of Two Pesos on Secondary Meaning Requirement for
Product Designs
In Two Pesos, the trade dress at issue comprised the decor of a
restaurant. Arguably, that decision does not foreclose the possibility
of drawing a distinction between product shape and other forms of
trade dress, such as packaging (or restaurant decor).'41 The precise
issue of an inherently distinctive product configuration clearly was
not before the Supreme Court, although neither can restaurant decor
be considered an archetypal packaging case. If characterization were
necessary, we might develop a separate category called "service
dress," to describe the get-up of a service rather than a product.42
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has explicitly recog-
nized this more limited scope of the Supreme Court's decision.
Characterizing Two Pesos as a packaging case, in two recent cases the
Third Circuit has accorded significance to the distinction between
product packaging trade dress and product configuration trade
dress.'43 The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, after an initial
141. See Bradley K. Groff, Bare-Fisted Competition or Palming Off.? Protection of
Product Design as Trade Dress under the Lanham Act, 23 AM. INTELL. PROP. L. ASS'N
Q.J. 65, 96 (1996) (suggesting that a continued secondary meaning requirement for prod-
uct configurations can be squared with the holding in Two Pesos).
142. See infra text accompanying notes 301-04; infra note 337.
143. See Duraco Prods. v. Joy Plastics Enters., 40 F.3d 1431, 1439 (3d Cir. 1994); see
also Versa Prods. Co. v. Bifold Co., 50 F.3d 189, 197-200 (3d Cir. 1995). The Third Circuit
has forged its distinction between packaging and product configuration for the purpose of
analyzing (1) inherent distinctiveness; (2) secondary meaning; and (3) likelihood of confu-
sion. The Third Circuit's analysis of inherent distinctiveness is discussed in Part
IV(D)(2)(a) of this Article. The Versa case, in which the court drew the line between
product configuration and packaging in determining likelihood of confusion, is discussed
in Dinwoodie, supra note 17, at 42-59. The incorporation of the distinction into the
court's analysis of secondary meaning has taken two forms. First, whereas the mere fact
of commercial success ordinarily favors a trademark plaintiff in establishing secondary
meaning, the Third Circuit has indicated a reluctance to infer secondary meaning from
sales success in the case of product configurations, because such success may be attribut-
able merely to the appealing design of the product rather than its source-designating
capacity. See, e.g., Duraco, 40 F.3d at 1453 ("[P]roduct configuration again differs dra-
matically from trademark and from product packaging, since the success of the particular
product--especially if similar competing products exist-does not readily lead to the in-
ference of source identification and consumer interest in the source; it may well be that
the product, inclusive of the product configuration, is itself inherently desirable, in a way
that product packaging and trademarks are not."); see also Thomas & Betts Corp. v. Pan-
duit Corp., 65 F.3d 654, 663 (7th Cir. 1995) (same), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1044 (1996);
Devan Designs Inc. v. Palliser Furniture Corp., 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1991, 1997
(M.D.N.C. 1992) (same), affd, 998 F.2d 1008 (4th Cir. 1993) (per curiam). But see Aro-
matique, Inc. v. Gold Seal, Inc., 28 F.3d 863, 872-73 (8th Cir. 1994) (applying similar
reasoning to justify non-protection of packaging).
Second, the Third Circuit has demonstrated an unwillingness to permit product con-
figuration trade dress plaintiffs to avail themselves of evidentiary presumptions that can
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reluctance to partition different types of trade dress, has drawn the
same distinction as the Third Circuit without characterizing the na-
ture of the trade dress at issue in Two Pesos.1'4 The drafters of the
normally be relied upon to assist in establishing that a trade dress is imbued with secon-
dary meaning. For example, many courts hold that intentional copying gives rise to a
rebuttable presumption of secondary meaning, see, e.g., Ferrari S.P.A. Esercizio v. Rob-
erts, 944 F.2d 1235, 1239 (6th Cir. 1991) (noting that secondary meaning can be presumed
from admission of intentional copying); Osem Food Indus. v. Sherwood Foods, Inc., 917
F.2d 161, 163 (4th Cir. 1990) (rebuttable presumption of secondary meaning arises from
evidence of intentional copying), or at least is a factor to be considered in support of sec-
ondary meaning. See, e.g., Vision Sports, Inc. v. Melville Corp., 888 F.2d 609, 615 (9th
Cir. 1989) ("[Pjroof of copying strongly supports an inference of secondary meaning.");
Schwinn Bicycle Co. v. Ross Bicycles, Inc., 870 F.2d 1176, 1182 n.13 (7th Cir. 1989)
(explaining that intentional copying is probative evidence of secondary meaning but de-
clining to create presumption); Brooks Shoe Mfg. Co. v. Suave Shoe Corp., 716 F.2d 854,
859-60 (11th Cir. 1983) (same). The rationale behind these various levels of evidentiary
preference is that when a defendant copies the trademark of a competitor it is likely (and
thus can be inferred or presumed) that it intended to appropriate the commercial advan-
tage attaching to that trademark (i.e., the goodwill of the consumers) which must
therefore exist. See Osem Foods Indus., 917 F.2d at 165; Audio Fidelity, Inc. v. High Fi-
delity Recordings, Inc., 283 F.2d 551, 558 (9th Cir. 1960) ("There is no logical reason for
the precise copying save an attempt to realize upon a secondary meaning that is in exis-
tence.").
Regardless of the merit of these inferences as generally applied (and some courts
have questioned the correctness of such presumptions generally, citing both false prem-
ises and circularity), the Third Circuit has indicated that, in a product design trade dress
action, it will attach lesser weight to evidence of intentional copying in assessing secon-
dary meaning. See Duraco, 40 F.3d at 1453; see also Cicena Ltd. v. Columbia Telecomms.
Group, 900 F.2d 1546, 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1990) ("Attempting to capitalize on a market de-
mand for a type of product does not always indicate secondary meaning."); Thomas &
Betts Corp., 65 F.3d at 663 (holding that the copying of a product design does not neces-
sarily support a conclusion of secondary meaning); Devan Designs, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
at 2000 ("Especially in product design cases, there may be an even more likely reason why
one might copy another's trade dress such as to capitalize on a particularly attractive or
saleable product design." (emphasis added)). Indeed, the Duraco court noted, in support
of a finding of no secondary meaning, that "Joy emulated Duraco's design because Joy
believed it to be a superior one, not to trade on Duraco's non-existent goodwill." Duraco,
40 F.3d at 1453.
In the last year, the Supreme Court received three petitions for certiorari requesting
it to consider whether a distinction is to be drawn between product configurations and
packaging in trade dress analysis. One of those petitions addressed the distinction be-
tween packaging and product configuration in the context of analyzing secondary
meaning. See Thomas & Betts, 65 F.3d 654 (7th Cir. 1995), petition for cert. filed, 64
U.S.L.W. 3518 (U.S. Jan. 22, 1996) (No. 95-1169), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1044 (1996); see
also infra note 256 (discussing petition in Thomas & Betts). The other two petitions asked
whether the distinction is relevant in conducting an assessment of the likelihood of confu-
sion. See Versa Prods. Co. v. Bifold Co., 50 F.3d 189 (3d Cir. 1995), petition for cert. filed,
63 U.S.L.W. 3834 (U.S. May 12, 1995) (No. 94-1863), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 54 (1995);
Chums, Ltd. v. SnugzfUSA, Inc., 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1125 (10th Cir. 1995), petition for
cert. filed, 64 U.S.L.W. 3417 (U.S. Nov. 27, 1995) (No. 95-689), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 914
(1996).
144. See Knitwaves, Inc. v. Lollytogs Ltd., 71 F.3d 996, 1007-08 (2d Cir. 1995). The
ambiguities of the Knitwaves decision are discussed further infra at text accompanying
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recently revised Restatement also appear to read Two Pesos restric-
tively, apparently viewing product configuration as largely untouched
by the Supreme Court's decision.145
Some courts have suggested a broader scope for Two Pesos and
a more direct application to product design. The Eighth Circuit, for
example, has expressly rejected the Third Circuit's reading of Two
Pesos: "[W]e view Two Pesos as a case that involves product con-
figuration, ... its holding leads directly to the conclusion that product
configuration, like packaging, can be inherently distinctive, and if it
is, no showing of secondary meaning is required."'4 Other courts, by
their action, have endorsed the concept of inherently distinctive
product configuration trade dress." And the influential Court of
notes 210-41. One district court in the Second Circuit, in an opinion handed down two
months after Knitwaves, suggested that Two Pesos was "clearly a case of product design."
See Krueger Int'l, Inc. v. Nightingale Inc., 915 F. Supp. 595, 602 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
145. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 16 cmt. b ("At least with respect to packaging
and related features ... it is now recognized that trade dress can be inherently distinc-
tive .... Product designs are ... not ordinarily considered inherently distinctive and are
thus normally protected only upon proof of secondary meaning."). The language of the
adopted Restatement does, however, admit of the possibility of inherently distinctive
product designs; the previous draft (which was published prior to Two Pesos) did not.
Compare id. (recognizing the possibility of inherently distinctive product designs), with
RESTATEMENT TENT. DRAFT No. 2, supra note 127, § 16 cmt. b ("Product designs
are.., not considered inherently distinctive; such designs are protectable only upon proof
of secondary meaning.").
146. Stuart Hall Co. v. Ampad Corp., 51 F.3d 780, 788 (8th Cir. 1995); see also In-
sty*Bit, Inc. v. Poly-Tech Indus., Inc., 95 F.3d 663, 672-73 (8th Cir. 1996) (finding that a
genuine issue existed as to whether design of plaintiff's drill products was inherently dis-
tinctive); Krueger, 915 F. Supp. at 602 (Two Pesos was "clearly a case of product design");
Reese Prods. v. Valley Indus., 50 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) 228,229 (D. Ind.
May 15, 1995) ("Two Pesos not only conceptually but also actually covered product con-
figuration trade dress, and it is that standard... which must and will be applied in this
case."); Devan Designs, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1996 n.2 (stating that Supreme Court in
Two Pesos indicated that protection via inherent distinctiveness applied to designs as well
as packaging).
147. See, e.g., Krueger, 915 F. Supp. at 607 (design of metal-frame stacking chairs in-
herently distinctive); Callaway Golf Co. v. Golf Clean, Inc., 915 F. Supp 1206, 1212 (M.D.
Fla. 1995) (design of "Big Bertha" golf clubs inherently distinctive); Kompan A.S. v. Park
Structures, Inc., 890 F. Supp. 1167, 1183-84 (N.D.N.Y. 1995) (granting preliminary injunc-
tion on basis of inherently distinctive trade dress of playground equipment); Banff Ltd. v.
Limited, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 1103, 1116 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (denying defendant's motion for
summary judgment on whether design of sweater inherently distinctive), later proceeding,
Banff Ltd. v. Express, Inc., 921 F. Supp. 1065 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (granting defendant's re-
newed motion for judgment as a matter of law on question of inherent distinctiveness in
light of intervening Second Circuit decision establishing distinction between packaging
and product features); Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc. v. Duracraft Corp., 92-1543-
WEB, Memorandum and Order at 29 (D. Kan. Mar. 4, 1994) (appearance of household
fan grill inherently distinctive), rev'd on other grounds, 58 F.3d 1498 (10th Cir. 1995), cert.
denied, 116 S. Ct. 753 (1996); see also Fun-Damental Too, Ltd. v. Gemmy Indus., No. 96
Civ. 1103, 1996 WL 125641, at *8-9 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 21, 1996) (concluding that trade dress
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Appeals for the Federal Circuit appears ready to equate product
packaging and product configuration for this purpose.'48
of novelty bank, consisting of the overall impression conveyed by the product's features
and its packaging, was inherently distinctive); Fundex Inc. v. Imperial Toy Corp., 26
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1061, 1063-64 (S.D. Ind. 1992) (finding that plaintiff presented suffi-
cient evidence to support claim that overall appearance of jump rope, including its color
scheme, padded handles, nylon weave, and corrugated packaging, was inherently distinc-
tive trade dress) (denying defendant's motion for judgment as a matter of law). Decisions
of district courts in the Second Circuit must, however, now be read in light of the Court of
Appeals' decision in Knitwaves. Every court applying the test outlined in Knitwaves to
product configuration has found the trade dress at issue not to be inherently distinctive.
See, e.g., EFS Mktg. v. Russ Berrie & Co., 76 F.3d 487, 491 (2d Cir. 1996) (toy dolls);
Grupke v. Linda Lori Sportswear, Inc., 921 F. Supp. 987, 996 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (tee-shirt
design); Herbko Int'l, Inc. v. Gemmy Indus., 916 F. Supp. 322, 328 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)
(design of game board); Judith Ripka Designs, Ltd. v. Preville, 935 F. Supp. 237, 257-58
(S.D.N.Y. 1996) (jewelry); Banff Ltd. v. Express, Inc., 921 F. Supp. 1065, 1071 (S.D.N.Y
1995) (sweaters); see also New York Racing Ass'n, Inc. v. Perlmutter Publ'g, Inc., No. 95
Civ. 994, 1996 WL 465298, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. July 19, 1996) (finding trade dress consisting
of images on souvenir merchandise not inherently distinctive under Knitwaves). Deci-
sions in the wake of Two Pesos suggest that the Ninth Circuit would treat the Supreme
Court's endorsement of inherently distinctive trade dress as extending to product configu-
ration and not limited to packaging or packaging-type claims. See, e.g., Locomotor
U.S.A., Inc. v. Korus Co., 46 F.3d 1142 (9th Cir. 1995) (Table decision, opinion published
at 1995 WL 7489, at *7 (remanding trade dress claim to district court in light of Two Pesos
to determine inherent distinctiveness of elements of trade dress that included luggage
design)).
148. See Imagineering, Inc. v. Van Klassens, Inc., 53 F.3d 1260, 1263-64 (Fed. Cir.)
(involving product design and citing Two Pesos for the proposition that "trade dress is
inherently distinctive when, by its 'intrinsic nature,' it identifies the particular source of a
product") (affirming jury finding of inherently distinctive furniture), cert. denied, 116 S.
Ct. 277 (1995); Alan Tracy, Inc. v. Trans Globe Imports, Inc., Nos. 94-1205, 94-1381, 1995
WL 331109, at *5 (Fed. Cir. June 2, 1995) (affirming trial court finding of inherently dis-
tinctive feature of lighting fixture lens because physical configuration is uncommon and
creates a distinctive visual impression) (applying the law of the Eleventh Circuit); see also
Braun, Inc. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 975 F.2d 815, 825 & nn.18-19 (Fed. Cir. 1992)
(noting tests in Abercrombie and Chevron and remanding to district court to apply to
determine inherent distinctiveness of blender design). In Imagineering, the court was
applying the law of the Second Circuit. See 53 F.3d at 1263 (because trade dress issues
not unique to the court's exclusive jurisdiction, the Federal Circuit defers to the law of the
regional circuit in which district court sits). However, it reached its conclusion without
reference to any specific legal standard of distinctiveness other than Two Pesos.
The response of the Seventh Circuit, which had accepted the possibility of inherently
distinctive shapes prior to Two Pesos, see Vaughan Mfg. Co. v. Brikam Int'l, Inc., 814 F.2d
346, 348 (7th Cir. 1987), has been somewhat ambiguous. In Kohler Co. v. Moen Inc., a
decision of otherwise high protection principles, the court expressed the view that product
configuration trade dress can never be inherently distinctive, but acknowledged that it
was not necessary for the court to decide that issue because secondary meaning was con-
ceded. 12 F.3d 632, 641 n.11 (7th Cir. 1993) ("The only distinction courts make between
trade dress generally and product configuration cases in particular is to require plaintiffs
asserting a claim for infringement of trade dress in product configuration under § 43(a) of
the Lanham Act to prove secondary meaning because a product's shape is never inher-
ently distinctive."); see also Nelson/Weather-Rite, Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc.,
No. 93 C 2274, 1995 WL 669091, at *10 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 8, 1995) (describing Kohler as
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The sole trademark decision of the United States Supreme Court
since Two Pesos does not clearly resolve the issue of whether the
Court intended to extend the assimilation of trade dress to verbal
marks it announced in Two Pesos to all trade dress, including product
design. Language in the Court's opinion in Qualitex Co. v. Jacobsen
Products Co.49 fosters the notion that, despite Two Pesos, certain
non-verbal marks-such as the color per se claimed as a mark in that
case-might require secondary meaning to establish distinctiveness.'
having noted held that "the distinction between trade dress generally and product con-
figuration is such that a proponent of trade dress protection for product configuration
must almost certainly prove secondary meaning because a product's shape is never inher-
ently distinctive"); cf. Waldmann Lighting Co. v. Halogen Lighting Sys., Inc., 28
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1682, 1684 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (noting courts' reluctance to find "a prod-
uct's design, as opposed to its packaging," inherently distinctive (citation omitted)). Most
courts in that circuit have, however, subsequently declined to interpret Kohler as sug-
gesting that the Seventh Circuit had adopted an absolute requirement of secondary
meaning for product configurations, see, e.g., Sassafras Enters., Inc. v. Roshco, Inc., 915 F.
Supp. 1, 4-5 (N.D. Ill. 1996) ("Although... inherent distinctiveness is less likely to be
present where the appearance of the product itself is at issue ... it is obviously not impos-
sible for a product's configuration to be inherently distinctive."); Dorr-Oliver Inc. v.
Fluid-Quip, Inc., 894 F. Supp. 1190, 1198 n.10 (N.D. Ill. 1995) (arguing that to read Kohler
otherwise would contradict Two Pesos), rev'd on other grounds, 94 F.3d 376 (7th Cir.
1996); Health 0 Meter, Inc. v. Terraillon Corp., 873 F. Supp. 1160, 1170 (N.D. Ill. 1995),
and a different panel of the Seventh Circuit has upheld the protectability of a product
design that had been based on inherent distinctiveness (although in an opinion otherwise
less protective than Kohler, providing limited relief and without comment on inherent
distinctiveness). See Badger Meter, Inc. v. Grinnell Corp., 13 F.3d 1145, 1151 (7th Cir.
1994); see also Computer Care v. Service Sys. Enters., 982 F.2d 1063, 1069 (7th Cir. 1992)
(affirming finding of inherent distinctiveness of two-dimensional product features); Fun-
dex Inc., 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1063-64 (holding that trade dress comprising composite
of the product features and its packaging could be inherently distinctive, and denying
defendant's motion for judgment as a matter of law). Recent Seventh Circuit decisions
suggest that the court of appeals is seeking to rein in product design trade dress protec-
tion, but the court has sought to do so in its analysis of secondary meaning, likelihood of
confusion, and the potential conflict of trade dress protection with patent law. See infra
note 292. The only mild expression of dissatisfaction with more liberal district court in-
terpretations of inherent distinctiveness can be discerned in dicta in Dorr-Oliver. See 94
F.3d 376, 380 n.6 (7th Cir. 1996). There, the district court had found that a clamshell-
shaped starch washer used in processing corn was an inherently distinctive design. See
Dorr-Oliver Inc. v. Fluid-Quip, Inc., 894 F. Supp. 1190, 1198-99 (N.D. Ill. 1995) (not
clearly identifying the test applied). The court of appeals reversed the district court's
grant of an injunction on the ground that plaintiff had failed to establish likelihood of
confusion. Although the court did not reach the distinctiveness question, it noted that the
defendant had presented "a number of compelling arguments for reversal," and made a
point of referencing the lower court's finding of inherent distinctiveness. See Dorr-Oliver,
94 F.3d at 380; id. at 380 n.6.
149. 115 S. Ct. 1300 (1995) (holding that the color of a product per se may be regis-
tered as a trademark upon proof of secondary meaning and nonfunctionality).
150. See Knitwaves, Inc. v. Lollytogs Ltd., 71 F.3d 996, 1008 (2d Cir. 1995) ("[The
Qualitex] Court concluded [that] a product's color is... eligible for trademark protection
only when it acquires secondary meaning.... "); Mana Prods. v. Columbia Cosmetics
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Although Justice Breyer's opinion does not explicitly discuss the sec-
ondary meaning requirement, the Court contrasted marks consisting
of color per se with inherently distinctive marks and compared them
with descriptive terms.' In other sections of the opinion, however,
the Supreme Court appears to be proceeding on the premise that
"designs" can be inherently distinctive (although that term need not
be construed as a reference to product designs).
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Mfg., 65 F.3d 1063, 1071 (2d Cir. 1995) ("In light of the Supreme Court's decision in
Qualitex, color is capable of obtaining trademark status in the same manner [as] a descrip-
tive mark.., by attaining secondary meaning."); Fabrication Enters., Inc. v. Hygenic
Corp., 64 F.3d 53, 58 n.3 (2d Cir. 1995) ("Pursuant to Qualitex, Lanham Act protection for
a single color may be garnered only upon a showing of secondary meaning."); see also
Kevin M. Jordan & Lynn M. Jordan, Qualitex Co. v. Jacobsen Prods. Co.: The Unan-
swered Question-Can Color Ever be Inherently Distinctive?, 85 TRADEMARK REP. 371,
392 (1995) ("Justice Breyer may have intended to preclude color from ever being consid-
ered inherently distinctive."); Jeffrey M. Samuels & Linda B. Samuels, Protection For
Color Under U.S. Trademark Law, 23 AM. INTELL. PROP. L. ASS'N Q.J. 129, 136 n.30
(1996) ("Justice Breyer's decision in Qualitex seems to assume that secondary meaning
will always have to be established before color alone will be protected."); Michael
Schwarz, Registration of Colours as Trade Marks, 17 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 393, 394
(1995) ("[I]n view of the Owens-Corning case and the reasoning in the Qualitex case, it is
unlikely that a colour-only trade mark will ever be registered on the Principal Register in
the absence of a showing of secondary meaning."); Daniel R. Schechter, Comment,
Qualitex Co. v. Jacobsen Prods., Inc.: The Supreme Court "Goes for the Gold" and Al-
lows Trademark Protection for Color Per Se, 5 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT.
L.J. 481, 505 (1995) ("Importantly, the [Qualitex] court indicated that a product's color
can not be considered a 'fanciful,' 'arbitrary' or 'suggestive' mark. In practical terms, this
means that product color will not be able to be registered without acquiring secondary
meaning."). But see Sunbeam Prods. Inc. v. West Bend Co., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1545,
1548 (S.D. Miss. 1996) ("[In Qualitex], the Court held that color alone in certain instances
can be inherently distinctive .... "). For a discussion of the competing interpretations of
Qualitex on this point, see Michael B. Landau, Reconciling Qualitex with Two Pesos:
Ambiguity and Inconsistency from the Supreme Court, 3 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 219, 248-53
(1996).
151. See Qualitex Co., 115 S. Ct. at 1303 (noting that "a product's color is unlike
'fanciful,' 'arbitrary,' or 'suggestive' words or designs, which almost automatically tell a
customer that they refer to a brand"); id. (analogizing consumer association with color to
descriptive terms, and stating that lack of objection to protection existed with respect to
color that has attained secondary meaning); id. at 1307 (reasoning that logic of protecting
descriptive marks that have acquired secondary meaning applies also to color per se).
152. See id at 1303. If, as Qualitex hints, evidence of secondary meaning is required of
marks that are less likely automatically to identify source, it is arguable that that rule
should also have applied in Two Pesos or should apply with product configurations. Al-
ternatively, of course, the policy considerations that mandate inherently distinctive shapes
should permit the same argument with respect to color. See Jonathan Hudis, Removing
the Boundaries of Color, 86 TRADEMARK REP. 1, 7 (1996) ("If, under [Two Pesos], inher-
ently distinctive trade dress is capable of Lanham Act protection, so too should be color
arbitrarily or suggestively applied to a product or service."); Jordan & Jordan, supra note
150, at 397 ("Surely in a decision so clearly holding that color is no different than any
other mark capable of being trademarked, the logical conclusion must be that the entire
test for distinctiveness-secondary meaning or inherently distinctive-applies to color.").
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The majority of courts directly addressing the issue, however,
appear inclined to extend the teachings of Two Pesos to product con-
figurations, which can therefore constitute inherently distinctive
trade dress. Even the Third Circuit, which asserted that Two Pesos
did not decide whether a product configuration can ever be inher-
ently distinctive,153 has drawn back from retaining an absolute
secondary meaning requirement for product configuration."s  The
court reached that conclusion based upon the independent belief that
the policy concerns surrounding an absolute secondary meaning re-
quirement (which the Supreme Court had expressed in Two Pesos)
applied with as much force to product configurations as to other
trade dress."' Instead, the Third Circuit has held that the traditional
method of trade dress analysis does not apply to a claim under sec-
tion 43(a) that a product configuration has been infringed, thus
establishing a schism of a different sort-an analytical methodology
schism-between product packaging and product configuration.156
The distinction drawn by the Third Circuit does not give rise to an
absolute refusal to countenance inherently distinctive product con-
figurations, but rather to a different formulation of the test for
153. See Duraco Prods. v. Joy Plastic Enters.. 40 F.3d 1431, 1445 (3d Cir. 1994).
154. See il at 1445-46 ("[W]e do read Two Pesos as giving an imprimatur to finding
trade dress in a product configuration to be inherently distinctive under certain narrow
circumstances."); see also Versa Prods. Co. v. Bifold Co., 50 F.3d 189, 203 n.10 (3d Cir.
1995) (acknowledging that product configuration may be inherently distinctive). The
Duraco court appeared to recognize a conceptually valid (if factually unsubstantiated)
basis upon which to differentiate between product and packaging design in considering
inherent distinctiveness, reciting that "a product configuration can not generally give rise
to a similar presumption [of achieving customer association immediately upon use], as
consumers usually appreciate a product's configuration for its contribution to the inherent
appeal of the product, not (in the absence of secondary meaning) its signifying function."
40 F.3d at 1441.
155. See Duraco, 40 F.3d at 1446 (concluding that policy concerns of hindering the pro-
competitive capacity of product demarcation, leaving trademark owners vulnerable in the
early stages of product marketing and placing burdens disproportionately on small start-
up businesses seemed equally applicable to product configuration trade dress).
156. Other courts have refused to establish such a schism. See, e.g., Stuart Hall Co. v.
Ampad Corp., 51 F.3d 780, 788 (8th Cir. 1995) ("[W]e decline to create a distinction be-
tween protection of packaging and protection of product configuration, as such a
distinction would run contrary to the holding of Two Pesos."); id. at 787 ("We... read
Two Pesos as resting on a presumption that 'trade dress' is a single concept that encom-
passes both product configuration and packaging, and find that its holding applies to trade
dress as a whole, not merely to packaging."); Krueger Int'l, Inc. v. Nightingale Inc., 915 F.
Supp. 595, 602 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) ("[T]he entire thrust of Two Pesos was to unify the stan-
dards for trademark and trade dress, not to balkanize this complex field into yet more
subcategories. I agree with the Eighth Circuit's conclusion that the Supreme Court envi-
sions trade dress as a 'single concept' with trademark law requiring a single test for
inherent distinctiveness.").
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inherent distinctiveness.
A similar result has been reached in the Second Circuit. In the
aftermath of Two Pesos, the Second Circuit initially declined liti-
gants' invitations to consider drawing a distinction between
packaging and product design."i 7 Lacking guidance, several district
courts in the Second Circuit assimilated the treatment of product de-
sign and packaging and found inherently distinctive product
configurations, largely under the Abercrombie test.'58 Indeed, seven
of the seventeen159 post-Two Pesos decisions finding inherently dis-
tinctive product configurations emanated from the Second Circuit.6 '
Five of those seven decisions preceded the decision of that court in
Knitwaves, Inc. v. Lollytogs Ltd.,6' however, in which it reversed the
district court's finding of an inherently distinctive sweater design, and
followed the Third Circuit in concluding that the test for inherently
distinctive product configurations must diverge from that used to as-
157. See Tough Traveler, Ltd. v. Outbound Prods., 60 F.3d 964, 968 (2d Cir. 1995); id.
at 970 n.1 (Jacobs, J., concurring); see also Mulberry Thai Silks, Inc. v. K & K Neckwear,
Inc., 897 F. Supp. 789, 793 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) ("Subsequent to Two Pesos, [the Second Cir-
cuit] has applied the Abercrombie typology to the determination of inherent
distinctiveness in a packaging trade dress case, but it has not yet considered the issue in
the context of a product design or configuration case." (citations omitted)).
158. See supra note 147; infra note 162.
159. For an explanation of the basis for this calculation, and some possible additions to
the list, see infra note 276.
160. See Gasser Chair Co. v. Infanti Chair Mfg. Corp., No. 88 Civ. 3931, 1996 WL
370162, at *12 (E.D.N.Y. June 28, 1996) (design of chair), vacated, 1996 WL 455579 (Fed.
Cir. Aug, 1, 1996) (vacating judgment and remanding to the district court because the
terms of the injunction did not adequately identify the enjoined products); Krueger Int'l,
Inc. v. Nightingale Inc., 915 F. Supp. 595, 612 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (design of metal-frame
stacking chair); Adler, Inc. v. World Bazaars, Inc., 897 F. Supp. 92, 96-97 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)
(appearance of Christmas tree ornament); Kompan A.S. v. Park Structures, Inc., 890 F.
Supp. 1167, 1174 (N.D.N.Y. 1995) (configuration of playground equipment); Tough Trav-
eler, Inc. v. Outbound Prods., No. 94-CV-449, Memorandum Decision and Order at 4
(N.D.N.Y. Sept. 23, 1994) (overall appearance of child carrier) (on file with author), rev'd
on other grounds, 60 F.3d 964 (2d Cir. 1995); see also Banff Ltd. v. Limited, Inc., 869 F.
Supp. 1103, 1116 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (denying defendant's motion for summary judgment on
question of whether sweater design inherently distinctive), later proceeding, Banff Ltd. v.
Express, Inc., 921 F. Supp. 1065, 1071 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (setting aside jury verdict in favor
of plaintiff and granting defendant's renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law on
question of inherent distinctiveness in light of Knitwaves); Knitwaves, Inc. v. Lollytogs
Ltd., 92 Civ. 6285 (JSM), Ruling from the Bench (Sept. 1, 1992) (design of sweater) (copy
of transcript on file with author), rev'd, 71 F.3d 996 (2d Cir. 1995). In addition, one dis-
trict court in the Second Circuit has found an inherently distinctive trade dress where that
trade dress consisted of the composite impression conveyed by the product design and its
packaging. See Fun-Damental Too, Ltd. v. Gemmy Indus., No. 96 Civ. 1103, 1996 WL
125641, at *7-9 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 21, 1996) (assessing distinctiveness of novelty bank trade
dress under Abercrombie).
161. 71 F.3d 996 (2d Cir. 1995).
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sess the inherent distinctiveness of packaging.162
D. A Distinction between the Test Used for Product Design and That
Used for Packaging
1. Distinction Justified
The first Third Circuit case to address the distinction between
product design and product packaging, Duraco Products v. Joy Plas-
tic Enterprises,"' involved a claim of trade dress infringement by
manufacturers of plastic planters in the shape of Grecian urns. The
plaintiff had failed to prove secondary meaning and thus relied on a
claim of inherent distinctiveness to pursue its trade dress cause of ac-
tion. 4 The Third Circuit, while accepting Two Pesos as an
162. See id at 1007-09, 1012-13; see also Herbko Int'l, Inc. v. Gemmy Indus., 916 F.
Supp. 322,328 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) ("In a product design claim, the traditional trademark and
trade dress analysis (which requires determining whether the mark or dress is generic,
descriptive, suggestive, or arbitrary or fanciful) does not apply."). The two cases decided
after Knitwaves are Krueger and Gasser. In Krueger, the District Court for the Southern
District of New York declined to apply Knitwaves and found an inherently distinctive
product configuration under the Seabrook test. See Krueger, 915 F. Supp. at 607; infra
note 241 (discussing Krueger opinion). In Gasser, the court did not identify which test it
was applying. See Gasser, 1996 WL 370162, at *12. The five pre-Knitwaves decisions
include the district court decisions in Knitwaves (reversed by the Second Circuit) and in
Banff (where the jury verdict in favor of plaintiff was set aside after the Knitwaves opin-
ion was handed down by the Second Circuit). The first indication of real analysis in the
Second Circuit of the continuing usefulness of Abercrombie came in a district court deci-
sion of Judge Kaplan, see Mulberry Thai Silks, Inc. v. K & K Neckwear, Inc., 897 F. Supp.
789, 793 (S.D.N.Y. 1995), where he noted that "subsequent to Two Pesos, [the Second
Circuit] has applied the Abercrombie typology to the determination of inherent distinct-
iveness in a packaging trade dress case, but it has not yet considered the issue in the
context of a product design or configuration case." See Paddington Corp. v. Attiki Im-
porters & Distribs., Inc., 996 F.2d 577, 583-84 (2d Cir. 1993) (applying Abercrombie to
packaging). Eventually, having declined to consider the question in Tough Traveler, and
applying Abercrombie without extended discussion in Milstein, see Mulberry Thai Silks,
897 F. Supp at 796, the Second Circuit, in Knitwaves, accepted that "Abercrombie [made]
little sense when applied to product features." Knitwaves, 71 F.3d at 1007. The Second
Circuit has drawn the distinction between packaging and product configuration without
explicitly questioning the general applicability of Two Pesos to product configurations,
and has implicitly accepted the possibility of inherently distinctive product configurations.
See infra text accompanying note 249.
163. 40 F.3d 1431 (3d Cir. 1994).
164. See id. at 1437. The district court had rejected the claim not only on the grounds
of lack of distinctiveness (finding the dress descriptive under Abercrombie), but also on
the grounds of functionality (despite evidence of several other designs that could compete
effectively in the market) and lack of likelihood of confusion (because "consumers are
disinterested in the identity of the manufacturer" and there was "no evidence of actual
consumer confusion"). See id. On the last point, a trade dress claim extends beyond con-
fusion as to the identity of the manufacturer. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1994); supra note
18. And lack of actual confusion, while tending in the defendant's favor, should not be
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endorsement of inherently distinctive product configurations, felt
free to distinguish between product packaging and product configura-
tion because the Supreme Court did not define what makes a trade
dress inherently distinctive."' In Knitwaves, the Second Circuit
adopted the same reading of Two Pesos, namely, that Two Pesos
merely decided that if a trade dress is inherently distinctive, it will be
protected without secondary meaning.66
Both the Second and Third Circuits built the distinction between
the test for packaging and that for product design on a variety of ra-
tionales already canvassed by those supporting an absolute secondary
meaning requirement for all product configurations.167 In particular,
neither court found the generic-descriptive-suggestive-arbitrary-
fanciful categories outlined in Abercrombie, which the Fifth Circuit
had applied to the trade dress of the packaging for garden products in
Chevron, helpful in product configuration cases. In product configu-
ration cases, unlike those involving product packaging,1 there could
be no relationship between the mark and the product which com-
prised the mark.169 Nor did they feel constrained by Two Pesos to
determinative of a claim for injunctive relief. See Allied Mktg. Group, Inc. v. CDL Mktg.,
Inc., 878 F.2d 806, 813 (5th Cir. 1989) ("Although evidence of actual confusion on the
part of consumers 'is patently the best evidence of likelihood of confusion,' it is not neces-
sary to demonstrate actual confusion in order to prevail on a trade dress infringement
claim." (quoting Chevron Chem. Co. v. Voluntary Purchasing Group, Inc., 659 F.2d 695,
704 (Former 5th Cir. 1981)). The Third Circuit did not, however, reach any of these is-
sues and rested its decision on a lack of distinctiveness.
165. See Duraco, 40 F.3d at 1445.
166. See Knitwaves, 71 F.3d at 1007 ("The Two Pesos decision left this circuit with the
task of determining what it means for trade dress to be 'inherently distinctive.' ").
167. See supra Part IV(C)(1).
168. Both courts stressed that the traditional analysis was capable of efficacious appli-
cation to product packaging. See Knitwaves, 71 F.3d at 1007; Duraco, 40 F.3d at 1441 n.8.
A court in the Third Circuit has since applied Abercrombie to a packaging trade dress
claim. See Sweetzel, Inc. v. Hawk Hill Cookies, Inc., No. Civ. A 95-2632, 1995 WL
550585, at *7 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 14, 1995).
169. See Duraco, 40 F.3d at 1441 ("The very basis for the trademark taxonomy-the
descriptive relationship between the mark and the product, along with the degree to
which the mark describes the product-is unsuited for application to the product itself.");
id. at 1434 ("[T]raditional trade dress doctrine does not 'fit' a product configuration case
because unlike product packaging, a product configuration differs fundamentally from a
product's trademark, insofar as it is not a symbol according to which one can relate the
signifier (the trademark, or perhaps the packaging) to the signified (the product)."); id. at
1440-41 ("Being constitutive of the product itself and thus having no such dialectical rela-
tionship to the product, the product's configuration cannot be said to be 'suggestive' or
'descriptive' of the product, or 'arbitrary' or 'fanciful' in relation to it."); Knitvaves, 71
F.3d at 1007-08 (2d Cir. 1995) (citing Duraco); see also Versa Prods. Co. v. Bifold Co., 50
F.3d 189, 198 (3d Cir. 1995) (noting that Abercrombie standard is improper for product
configuration trade dress cases). The Stuart Hall court rejected this analysis, arguing that
"because a product's trade dress is not the entire product itself, but specific features of
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find otherwise. As the Duraco court explained:
Although Two Pesos made extensive reference to the dis-
crete trademark categories [outlined in Abercrombie], that
decision does not foreclose our refusal to embrace the
trademark distinctiveness taxonomy in product configura-
tion cases. In Two Pesos the Supreme Court specifically
stated that the sole issue before it was whether secondary
meaning must be proven for an inherently distinctive trade
dress vel non, and hence the applicability of the Abercrom-
bie & Fitch classifications to trade dress was not at issue."'
These courts have thus viewed the Supreme Court's endorse-
ment of Chevron as limited to the Fifth Circuit's holding that trade
dress could be inherently distinctive, and not the particular test
adopted in Chevron for what constitutes inherently distinctive trade
dress. Moreover, both Chevron and Two Pesos concerned product
packaging as opposed to product design.
In addition to arguments challenging the workability of the
ChevronlAbercrombie test, the Duraco court supported its distinction
the product... we find no difficulty in looking at a specific feature of a product and de-
termining whether and to what degree that feature is dictated by the nature of the
product." Stuart Hall Co. v. Ampad Corp., 51 F.3d 780,788 (8th Cir. 1995). This defense
of Abercrombie appears both to infuse functionality thinking into the distinctiveness
analysis, and to ignore the truism that trade dress is the overall appearance of an article.
See infra note 334.
170. Duraco, 40 F.3d at 1442 (internal citations omitted). The interpretation of Two
Pesos by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Knitwaves has not met with uni-
versal acceptance by the district courts in that circuit. In Krueger International, Inc. v.
Nightingale Inc., 915 F. Supp. 595, 602 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), Judge Sotomayor concluded that
"Two Pesos was clearly a case of product design and it expressly approved the application
of the Abercrombie classifications to the design of a Mexican restaurant chain." Id.; cf. id.
at 603 (suggesting that "the Supreme Court explicitly approved the application of the
Chevron test to product designs in its decision in Two Pesos"). Although Judge So-
tomayor had expressed doubts about the efficacy of applying Abercrombie to product
design, she acknowledged the force of the argument advanced by the Eighth Circuit that
"the Supreme Court has not authorized us to abandon Abercrombie, no matter how much
difficulty it causes." Id. at 602; see also Pebble Beach Co. v. Tour 18 I, Ltd., 936 F. Supp.
1299, 1343 n.39 (S.D. Tex. 1996) (finding merit in Duraco's distinction between packaging
and product design, but applying Abercrombie to product design because reading Two
Pesos to endorse that approach). The Second Circuit's interpretation appears more con-
sistent both with the question presented to the Supreme Court in Two Pesos and with the
Supreme Court's opinion itself. Indeed, Judge Sotomayor eventually applied Seabrook to
the trade dress at issue. She did, however, reject the line drawn by the Court of Appeals
in Knitwaves between product packaging and product design as "not clearly address[ing]
the standards in this area as set by the Supreme Court." Krueger, 915 F. Supp. at 601; see
also id. at 602 ("[T]he entire thrust of Two Pesos was to unify the standards for trademark
and trade dress, not to balkanize this complex field into yet more subcategories. I agree
with the Eighth Circuit's conclusion that the Supreme Court envisions trade dress as a
'single concept' with trademark law requiring a single test for inherent distinctiveness.").
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with other arguments reminiscent of those advanced by proponents
of an absolute secondary meaning requirement: First, the Duraco
court suggested that, if compelled to apply the classic trademark tax-
onomy, it would view product configurations as no more than
descriptive of the product because they are identical with it.17' Sec-
ond, the range of alternative product configurations was finite, as
opposed to the limitless range of possibilities with packaging."
Third, the relative likelihood that a product configuration, as op-
posed to packaging, would serve as a source-identifier for consumers
was small.73
The Second Circuit alluded to many of the same arguments as
did the Duraco court.'74 In addition, it concluded that the Chev-
171. See Duraco, 40 F.3d at 1441.
172. See id at 1448 ("Product packaging designs, like trademarks, often share mem-
bership in a practically inexhaustible set of distinct but approximately equivalent
variations .... A product configuration, contrariwise, commonly has finite competitive
variations that, on the whole, are equally acceptable to consumers."); see also Paddington
Corp. v. Attiki Importers & Distribs., Inc., 996 F.2d 577, 583 (2d Cir. 1993) ("Since the
choices that a producer has for packaging its products are.., almost unlimited, typically a
trade dress will be arbitrary or fanciful, and thus inherently distinctive."); Banff Ltd. v.
Limited, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 1103, 1115 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (citing Paddington), later proceed-
ing, Banff Ltd. v. Express, Inc., 921 F. Supp. 1065 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). The Duraco court
drew the descriptiveness conclusion and the analysis of alternatives together by attempt-
ing to recraft the entire distinctiveness spectrum in terms of the competitive effect of the
number of alternatives left from a finite number of possibilities. See Duraco, 40 F.3d at
1442; cf. Dratler, supra note 8, at 951-52 (proposing alternatives-based test for distinct-
iveness).
173. See Duraco, 40 F.3d at 1448 ("[A] consumer is substantially more likely to trust a
product's packaging rather than its configuration as an indicium of source."); see also
Devan Designs Inc. v. Palliser Furniture Corp., 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1991, 1996
(M.D.N.C. 1992) ("As a practical matter... it is less common for consumers to recognize
the design of a product as an indication of source. Product features are more likely to be
seen merely as utilitarian or ornamental aspects of the goods." (citation omitted)), aff'd,
998 F.2d 1008 (4th Cir. 1993); RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 16 cmt. b (same). The Du-
raco court also characterized this consideration in terms of consumer motivation:
[I]nsofar as consumer motivation to purchase a product will much more likely be
predicated on an appreciation of a product's features than on an appreciation of
a product's name ... one cannot automatically conclude from a product feature
or configuration ... that, to a consumer, it functions primarily to denote the
product's source .... [A] product configuration can not generally give rise to
a... presumption [of consumer association] as consumers usually appreciate a
product's configuration for its contribution to the inherent appeal of the product,
not... its signifying function.
Duraco, 40 F.3d at 1441. Consumer motivation should not, however, be relevant to dis-
tinctiveness. See infra note 208.
174. See Knitwaves, Inc. v. Lollytogs Ltd., 71 F.3d 996, 1007-08 (2d Cir. 1995); see also
EFS Mktg. v. Russ Berrie & Co., 76 F.3d 487, 491 (2d Cir. 1996) ("In Knitwaves.... we
explained that product-configuration trade dresses are less likely than packaging-
configuration dresses to serve the source-identification function that is a prerequisite to
PRODUCT DESIGN TRADE DRESS
ron/Abercrombie methodology afforded broad protection without
what the court regarded as an appropriate inquiry into the intention
of the producer in adopting the product shape in question:
Not only does the classification of marks into "generic,"
"descriptive," "suggestive," or "arbitrary or fanciful" make
little sense when applied to product features, but it would
have the unwelcome, and likely unintended, result of treat-
ing a class of product features as 'inherently distinctive,' and
thus eligible for trade dress protection, even though they
were never intended to serve a source-identifying func-
tion.'73
As discussed below, the intent of the producer in adopting a
mark to identify goods is (and should be) neither sufficient nor nec-
essary to establish trademark rights. Trademark rights reflect
consumer association, not producer intent.
2. The Tests Articulated: Duraco and Knitwaves
Having justified a different test for the inherent distinctiveness
of product configurations, each court had to develop one. Existing
Second and Third Circuit law was of no assistance, because prior to
Two Pesos both courts denied the possibility of inherently distinctive
trade dress. 76 Each was working with a clean slate.
a. The Duraco Test
The Duraco court concluded that the circumstances for treating
a product configuration as inherently distinctive were
characterized by a high probability that a product configura-
tion serves a virtually exclusively identifying function for
consumers-where the concerns over "theft" of an identi-
fying feature or combination or arrangement of features and
the cost to an enterprise of gaining and proving secondary
meaning outweigh concerns over inhibiting competition,
and where consumers are especially likely to perceive a
connection between the product's configuration and its
source.1
7
Lanham Act protection.... [Consumers] are more likely to be attracted to the product
for the product's features, rather than for the source-identifying role the features might
play.").
175. Knitwaves, 71 F.3d at 1007.
176. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
177. Duraco, 40 F.3d at 1448; see also id. at 1434 (summarizing the circumstances in
which product configurations may be inherently distinctive). The focus on demonstrating
a "high probability that a product configuration serves a virtually exclusively identifying
function for consumers" can be read two ways, although either interpretation significantly
1997]
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In attempting to cast these "circumstances" in the form of a
workable test, the Third Circuit concluded that "to be inherently dis-
tinctive, a product feature or a combination or arrangement of
features, i.e., a product configuration, for which Lanham Act protec-
tion is sought must be (i) unusual and memorable, (ii) conceptually
separable from the product, and (iii) likely to serve primarily as a
designator of origin of the product. 17 .
i. Unusual and Memorable
To be inherently distinctive under Duraco, the product configu-
ration "must partake of a unique, individualized appearance, so that
a consumer informed of all the options available in the market could
reasonably rely on it to identify a source." '179 Most tests of inherent
distinctiveness consider how "unusual" a feature can be regarded.'o
narrows the scope of inherently distinctive product configurations. It may mean that the
product configuration serves that function and few others; or it may mean that only the
product configuration serves that function. The former interpretation is almost certainly
what the court had in mind (i.e., the exclusivity relates to the function, not the product
configuration). That is, however, a difficult showing to make because "[m]ost trade dress
cases involve such claimed features as shape, color, stitching, and materials, which...
usually both identify the product's source and serve some utilitarian or aesthetic pur-
pose." Interactive Network, Inc. v. NTN Communications, Inc., 875 F. Supp. 1398, 1407
(N.D. Cal. 1995). The latter interpretation, while arguably not what the court was ad-
dressing, is an important consideration for some courts in determining distinctiveness of
trade dress. In Ohio Art Co. v. Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc., 799 F. Supp. 870, 876-77 (N.D.
Ill. 1992), for example, the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois found sig-
nificant, in concluding that the product shape had not come to signify a single source of
supply, the fact that all the advertising for the product prominently exhibited the word
mark for the game. The reasoning of the Duraco court is also consistent with this analysis
and with the approach adopted in several recent cases strongly suggesting that consumers'
purchase decisions are presumptively based upon the name, the packaging and the adver-
tising (including the name) rather than the product shape. See Duraco, 40 F.3d at 1448
("[B]ecause of consumers' common abundant experience with similar goods being sold in
different packaging, a consumer is substantially more likely to trust a product's packag-
ing, rather than its configuration, as an indicium of source."); Versa Prods. Co. v. Bifold
Co., 50 F.3d 189, 209 (3rd Cir. 1995) (commenting that in a product configuration case
"the greatest weight must be given to the primary means by which consumers identify the
products' sources: packaging, trademarks, and advertising"); see also Dorr-Oliver, Inc. v.
Fluid-Quip, Inc., 94 F.3d 376, 383 (7th Cir. 1996) ("In the case of a high-priced, single-
purchase product, there is generally no likelihood of confusion when the manufacturer's
name is clearly displayed on the product."); Dinwoodie, supra note 17, at 42-48
(discussing premise); Reichman, supra note 30, at 395 (noting that courts were rediscov-
ering "the corrective power of proper labeling" to dispel any confusion that might flow
from similarities in product design).
178. Duraco, 40 F.3d at 1434; see id. at 1448-49. The Duraco court found the plaintiff's
urns not to be inherently distinctive, because they failed the second and third elements of
the test. See id. at 1452.
179. Id. at 1449.
180. Any distinctiveness test that focuses on the "unusual or memorable" aspect of the
[Vol. 75
1997] PROD UCT DESIGN TRADE DRESS 535
Seabrook, which mandates consideration of whether a shape or fea-
ture is "unique or unusual in a particular field," does so by its very
terms, but even courts purporting to apply Chei'ron/Abercrombie
routinely consider this factor.'81 It is under this rubric that designs
dress brings to mind a threshold measure of creativity lying somewhere between copy-
right originality and design patent novelty/non-obviousness. Indeed, several copyright
decisions post-Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991),
have adverted to the unusual or unique nature of works of authorship claimed to be pro-
tected by copyright. See, e.g., BellSouth Adver. & Publ'g Corp. v. Donnelley Info. Publ'g,
Inc., 999 F.2d 1436, 1442 n.13 (11th Cir. 1993) (noting that plaintiff did not deviate from
typical arrangement). The evidence used to establish the "unusual" nature of the design
may approximate that used in demonstrating novelty and non-obviousness in a design
patent application. See infra note 356. An assessment of the "unusual" nature of the
design in the trademark context is, however, intended to appraise likely consumer re-
sponse, not the level of authorial creativity. Distinctiveness for trade dress purposes will
not be negated merely because the development of such a design could have been antici-
pated by other producers or because it had previously been used by others. See, e.g.,
Manhattan Indus. v. Sweater Bee by Banff, Ltd., 627 F.2d 628, 630-31 (2d Cir. 1980)
(recognizing trademark rights in mark abandoned by one company and immediately
adopted for same goods by unrelated company); see also supra note 35 (discussing adop-
tion of public domain designs). But cf. L. & J.G. Stickley, Inc. v. Canal Dover Furniture
Co., 892 F. Supp. 413, 423 n.14 (N.D.N.Y. 1995) (recognizing trade dress rights in design
of furniture line notwithstanding that designs had at one time been in the public domain),
rev'd, 79 F.3d 258, 263 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding that product features of exact reproduc-
tions of historical designs not distinctive because not clear that consumers associated
design with plaintiff, rather than with maker of the originals). Applicants for a design
patent, on the other hand, must show that the design was novel; the design cannot previ-
ously have been known to or used by others in the United States. See 35 U.S.C. § 102
(1994) (setting out novelty standard). The nonobviousness requirement also imposes
upon design patent applicants the obligation to show that the design was not obvious, at
the time it was made, to a designer of ordinary skill. See id. § 103; In re Nalbandian, 661
F.2d 1214, 1216 (C.C.P.A. 1981) (deciding that design patent's obviousness should be
determined from vantage point of designer of ordinary capability who designs articles of
the type presented in application). Copyright protection for design features that borrow
from pre-existing designs is also constrained. See 17 U.S.C. § 103(a) (voiding copyright
protection for any part of a work that unlawfully uses pre-existing material); id. § 103(b)
(extending protection only to designer's incremental original contribution); see also supra
note 35 (discussing distinctiveness of adopted public domain designs).
181. See, e.g., Mana Prods. v. Columbia Cosmetics Mfg., 858 F. Supp. 361, 367
(E.D.N.Y. 1994) (finding that colors or color combinations of plaintiff's compacts do not
appear sufficiently unusual to produce a distinct association in the minds of consumers),
affd, 65 F.3d 1063,1070 (2d Cir. 1995) ("In the compact industry, nothing about a rectan-
gular or square shape or black color is 'striking, unusual, or otherwise likely to
differentiate the products of a particular producer ..... '" (quoting RESTATEMENT, supra
note 1, § 13 cmt. d)); see also Aromatique, Inc. v. Gold Seal, Inc., 28 F.3d 863, 869-70 (8th
Cir. 1994) (plaintiffs pillow-shaped cellophane packages were not inherently distinctive
because commonplace); Computer Care v. Service Sys. Enters.. 982 F.2d 1063, 1069 (7th
Cir. 1992) ("[E]vidence of uniqueness supports a finding that a trade dress is inherently
distinctive." (citation omitted)); Fundex Inc. v. Imperial Toy Corp., 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1061, 1063-64 (S.D. Ind. 1992) (evidence that, apart from the defendant's product, plain-
tiff's trade dress was unique in the jump rope market supported a finding of inherent
distinctiveness). Thus, in Krueger Internationa4 Inc. v. Nightingale Inc., 915 F. Supp. 595,
603-04 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), Judge Sotomayor was able to reconcile Abercrombie-based case
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customary in the industry cannot be inherently distinctive.
Although the "memorable" nature of the feature would not ap-
pear to add very much to the analysis, in predicting whether a shape
or feature is likely to operate as a source identifier with consumers it
surely is relevant that the shape is likely to register with the con-
sumer1 2 By any standard and in any context, a mark failing to do so
is unlikely to be considered distinctive.
The Eighth Circuit, however, in rejecting what it characterized as
the Duraco test of "memorability," has since argued that the focus of
the Duraco court's analysis appears to be on a nexus central to ac-
quired distinctiveness rather than inherent distinctiveness." In
particular, the Eighth Circuit asserted that courts do not look at the
impact of a feature on consumers under either Seabrook or Chevron,
or in assessing word marks.'" Rather, under the Abercrombie test, a
court focuses "on the arbitrariness of the trade dress and its rele-
vance to the product," and under the Seabrook test "on a comparison
law in the Second Circuit with the Seabrook test by reference to this common inquiry.
Courts also look to the unusual nature of the mark in assessing the distinctiveness of word
marks. See, e.g., W.W.W. Pharm. Co. v. Gillette Co., 984 F.2d 567, 572 (2d Cir. 1993)
(" 'Sportstick' is not so distinct and unusual to be fanciful, nor does it sufficiently evoke
the characteristics of the product to be descriptive."); cf. Fisons Horticulture, Inc. v. Vig-
oro Indus., 30 F.3d 466, 478-79 (3d Cir. 1994) (" 'The significant factor is not whether the
word itself is common, but whether the way the word is used in a particular context is
unique enough to warrant trademark protection.' " (quoting Wynn Oil Co. v. Thomas, 839
F.2d 1183, 1190 n.4 (6th Cir. 1988))).
182. See Stuart Hall Co. v. Ampad Corp., 31 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1468, 1470 (W.D. Mo.
1994) (to be inherently distinctive, the "trade dress must have sufficient strength of visual
impact to impress itself on the mind of a consumer, and thus be subject to recall when the
consumer next enters the market"), rev'd, 51 F.3d 780, 784 (8th Cir. 1995). The district
court cited as examples: "Durante's nose, Holmes' mustache, Chief Judge Arnold's bow
ties, and Congressman Leach's sweaters." Stuart Hall, 31 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1470 n.1.
Nor was the Duraco court the first to consider the "eye-catching" or memorable nature of
trade dress while conducting an analysis of inherent distinctiveness. See, e.g., Days-Ease
Home Prods., 197 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 566, 568 (T.T.A.B. 1977) (finding that shape of con-
tainer of liquid drain cleaner inherently distinctive when, in addition to being "unique" or
"different," it was "extremely eye-catching").
183. See Stuart Hall, 51 F.3d at 786-88.
184. See id. at 786 ("The question [under Abercrombie is] not... whether consumers
associate the design with its source."); id. (noting "Abercrombie's emphasis on the rela-
tion of the product's trademark or trade dress to the product, rather than on the relation
of the consumer to the product"); id. at 786-87 ("The Seabrook test focuses on a compari-
son of plaintiff's trade dress to others in the same class of goods, not on the trade dress's
impact on consumers."); id. at 787 ("None of these tests [Chevron or Seabrook] in any
combination examines the trade dress's impact on consumers."); see also Reese Prods. v.
Valley Indus., 50 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) 228 (D. Ind. May 15, 1995)
("[W]hen deciding whether trade dress is inherently distinctive, the court must compare
the item with others in the same field, not its impact on consumers.").
PROD UCT DESIGN TRADE DRESS
of the trade dress with others in the same field." 1 ,
To restrict any consideration of the effect on consumers to an
analysis of secondary meaning is flawed in two ways. First, a refusal
to consider the feature-consumer nexus ignores the long-term pur-
pose of product comparison, namely, to assist in predicting impact on
consumers. The Abercrombie and Seabrook tests of distinctiveness
seek not to ascertain a level of abstract novelty, but through examina-
tion of the "feature-product" or "product-other product" relationship
to estimate the degree of differentiation that the product feature can
be expected to provide. These tests of distinctiveness are merely ve-
hicles in the attempt to predict the likelihood of source-
identification.1" Contrary to the assertions of the Eighth Circuit,
courts ultimately do inquire of the trade dress's impact on consumers,
but do so indirectly and for a predictive purpose, by considering these
series of other subsidiary relations."
Second, the Stuart Hall court suggested that proving inherent
distinctiveness and proving secondary meaning are unrelated en-
185. Stuart Hall, 51 F.3d at 787.
186. See Days-Ease Home Prods., 197 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 568 ("The question of
'inherently distinctive' obviously must be determined in relation to the goods for which
registration is sought, the uniqueness of the container's configuration in this field, which
would condition the reaction of purchasers to the shape, and what would be the anticipated
reaction of the average purchaser to this shape." (emphasis added)); see also RE-
STATEMENT, supra note 1, § 13 cmt. c (analyzing categories of distinctiveness by
reference to whether consumers are more or less likely to perceive a term in its ordinary
lexicographic sense rather than as a symbol of identification); id. § 13 cmt. d ("A symbol
or graphic design is not inherently distinctive unless the nature of the designation and the
manner of its use make it likely that prospective purchasers will perceive the designation
as an indication of source."); 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 8.02[4], at 8-23 (suggesting
that Seabrook represents "ways to ask whether the design, shape, or combination of ele-
ments is so unique, unusual or unexpected in this market that one can assume without
proof that it will automatically be perceived by customers as an indicia [sic] of origin"
(emphasis added)). Indeed, even the test of inherent distinctiveness developed by the
Duraco court, and criticized by this Article, is soundly based on likely consumer response.
See Duraco Prods. v. Joy Plastic Enters., 40 F.3d 1431, 1448 (3d Cir. 1994) (restricting
inherent distinctiveness of product configurations because as a result of "consumers'
common abundant experience with similar goods being sold in different packaging, a con-
sumer is substantially more likely to trust a product's packaging, rather than its
configuration, as an indicium of source").
187. Juxtaposing the alternative term of acquired distinctiveness with that of inherent
distinctiveness reveals this role more clearly, as might conceiving of inherent distinctive-
ness as presumed distinctiveness. See 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 15.01[1], at 15-4 ("In
a sense, [inherently distinctive marks] are irrebuttably presumed to have achieved cus-
tomer recognition and association immediately upon adoption and use."); cf. Romm Art
Creations Ltd. v. Simcha Int'l, Inc., 786 F. Supp. 1126, 1136 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) ("An inher-
ently distinctive trade dress is proof of secondary meaning." (citations omitted)).
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deavors, and that source-identification is relevant only to the latter.' s
This is incorrect. Rather, I would argue that they represent two evi-
dentiary routes to the same conclusion, one based upon measured
performance and the other on anticipated or predicted perform-
ance. '89 The Eighth Circuit accurately identified the change effected
by Two Pesos (a change acknowledged by Duraco) as one from ac-
tual consumer recognition (i.e., a requirement of secondary meaning)
to likely or actual consumer recognition.' This change in the means
of measuring distinctiveness is what the Supreme Court's elimination
188. See Stuart Hall, 51 F.3d at 787 ("The requirement of source-identification applies
not to whether a trade dress is inherently distinctive, but to whether it has secondary
meaning."); see also Ark Plas Prods. v. Value Plastics, 913 F. Supp. 1246, 1252 (W.D. Ark.
1996) (defining inherent distinctiveness by reference to tenuousness of design to nature of
product, and secondary meaning by reference to consumer association); cf. Winning
Ways, Inc. v. Holloway Sportswear, Inc., 913 F. Supp. 1454, 1463 n.5 (D. Kan. 1996)
(noting that the language of the Duraco and Knitwaves tests closely resembles the stan-
dard for secondary meaning). Such a distinction has no basis in trademark or unfair
competition law, and miscomprehends the respective roles of inherent distinctiveness and
secondary meaning. Nor does the Lanham Act provide support for the distinction the
Eighth Circuit suggests. Whether to be registered as inherently distinctive or, under sec-
tion 2(f) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f) (1994), by virtue of having acquired
distinctiveness (i.e., achieved secondary meaning), the word or symbol must "identify and
distinguish" goods from those manufactured or sold by others "and indicate the source of
the goods." Id. § 1127 (definition of "trademark"). These same standards for registrabil-
ity govern protectability under section 43(a). See Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc.,
505 U.S. 763, 768,784 (1992) (Stevens, J., concurring); supra note 17.
189. See Duraco, 40 F.3d at 1439 ("[T]he Supreme Court in Two Pesos used
'distinctive' in a dual sense, meaning either inherently distinctive or having acquired dis-
tinctiveness through secondary meaning." (citations omitted)).
190. See Stuart Hall, 51 F.3d at 788. Contrary to the claims of the Stuart Hall court,
according protection on the basis of likely consumer recognition does not undermine Two
Pesos. It more fully articulates the scope of Two Pesos's liberalization of the proof of
distinctiveness. However, although the likely consumer recognition at the root of inher-
ent distinctiveness is less burdensome as a means of establishing distinctiveness, any
infringement analysis will also consider the commercial strength of the mark in the mar-
ketplace (i.e., secondary meaning). Categorization as arbitrary, fanciful or suggestive is
sufficient to establish protection for a mark; the strength of a mark and the scope of its
protection will depend not only upon conceptual distinctiveness, but also upon its dis-
tinctiveness in the marketplace. See AmBrit, Inc. v. Kraft, Inc., 812 F.2d 1531, 1539 (11th
Cir. 1986) ("A finding of inherent distinctiveness indicates that the.., trade dress will be
protected, but the appropriate degree of protection is determined by examining a number
of factors that establish the standing of the trade dress in the marketplace .... "); McGre-
gor-Doniger, Inc. v. Drizzle, Inc., 599 F.2d 1126, 1131 (2d Cir. 1979). Nor should the
question of whether a design is likely to identify a source be mistaken with the lesser
standard of whether it is "capable" of distinguishing goods from those of others, which
provides the basis for registration of a mark on the Supplemental Register. Cf. In re Min-
nesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 335 F.2d 836, 840 (C.C.P.A. 1964) (noting difference between
what a mark is likely to do to a purchaser and what it is capable of doing). For the advan-
tages of registration on the Supplemental Register, see 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 1,
§ 19.09[1][d].
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of a secondary meaning requirement should achieve. 9'
ii. Conceptual Separability
This second factor of the Duraco analysis may by its terms evoke
copyright analysis,' 9 but the Third Circuit's explanation reveals
nothing more than a modified version of the doctrine of mere orna-
mentality.93 Under this rule, if a design is perceived by the
purchasing public as solely or merely ornamental, it cannot be a
trademark, although incidental ornamentality does not exclude the
mark from protection. '94 The court may have been suggesting that
the requirement of conceptual separability is not satisfied by features
that are recognizable to the consumer not as an indicium of source,
but rather as a mere component of the product. The rule (of which
the mere ornamentality rule is itself a particularized application) that
to be protectable the dress or mark must function as a dress or mark,
however, already addresses that possibility.195 And this is a wholly
191. See Duraco, 40 F.3d at 1450 ("The inquiry here does not duplicate that employed
for secondary meaning; instead of focusing on consumers' actually acquired mental asso-
ciations, the inquiry focuses on whether a consumer would likely perceive the feature or
combination or arrangement of features as something that renders the product more de-
sirable regardless of the source of the product, or primarily as a signifier of the product's
source.").
192. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994) (defining "pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works");
H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 55 (1976) ("Unless the shape of... [the] industrial product
contains some element that, physically or conceptually, can be identified as separable
from the utilitarian aspects of that article, the design would not be copyrighted .... ).
See generally Shira Perlmutter, Conceptual Separability and Copyright in the Designs of
Useful Articles, 37 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y 339 (1990) (analyzing the copyright test of con-
ceptual separability).
193. See Duraco, 40 F.3d at 1449 ("To be conceptually separable, the product configu-
ration must be recognizable by the consumer as an indicium of source, rather than a
decorative symbol or pattern .... " (citation omitted)).
194. See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 7.06, at 7-33; see also Dratler, supra note 8, at
950 (explaining doctrine). "If customers perceive a design as not only attractive, but as an
indicator of source, then it is a trademark." 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 7.06, at 7-34.
As with the first Duraco factor (the "unusual" nature of a symbol or design), the Restate-
ment includes consideration of whether a design is likely to be viewed as "mere
ornamentation" rather than as a symbol of identification as part of the inherent distinct-
iveness analysis. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 13 cmt. d.
195. In analyzing the urns at issue, the court found a lack of conceptual separability
based upon the fact that "[t]he features of the Grecian Classics for which Duraco [sought]
protection [were] designed to achieve the goal of having the planter appear as if con-
structed of marble or stone, and thus constitute[d] part and parcel of the overall product."
Duraco, 40 F.3d at 1452. That reasoning is reminiscent of early case law which suggested
that a product configuration could not itself be the product's trade dress indicating the
source of the product. Indeed, the case cited by the court, Davis v. Davis, 27 F. 490, 492
(C.C. Mass. 1886), stands for that proposition. Exactly how close the parallel is depends
upon how the product, from which the design features must be separable, is defined. See
1997]
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appropriate consideration, focusing as it does on likely consumer re-
sponse to the product design. Duraco appears to go further,
however, stating that "the configuration for which protection is
sought must not appear to the consumer as a mere component, or the
essence of the product gestalt, but rather must appear as something
attached (in a conceptual sense) to function in actuality as a source
designator." '196
This is a requirement that has no basis in modem trademark
law.1 For over two decades, federal courts have acknowledged the
capacity of product features both to comprise the product and to
identify the source.198 A feature that is a component of the product
Duraco, 40 F.3d at 1452 n.13. However, if (as was the case in Duraco) the court defines
the product category to be analyzed as the particular product itself, no design will ever be
found to be inherently distinctive. Cf. In re DC Comics, Inc., 689 F.2d 1042, 1045
(C.C.P.A. 1982) ("[Applicant] cannot be considered to have created a new product cate-
gory .... simply by having originated and promoted certain unique characters and
products related to them."); id. at 1053 (Nies, J., concurring) ("Competing products in our
economy need not be precisely identical."). The Seabrook test also requires a court to
identify the relevant product category for the purpose of product comparison. See, e.g.,
Turtle Wax, Inc. v. First Brands Corp., 781 F. Supp. 1314, 1343 (N.D. Ill. 1991) (adopting
Magistrate's Report) (explaining that before applying the Seabrook test, the court must
"decide how to define the 'field' or 'class of goods' to which [plaintiff's product] be-
longs"). As the distinctiveness analysis focuses upon consumer association, any product
market to be considered should be comprised of those products with which the relevant
product is likely to be compared by the consumer. See id. (concluding that because con-
sumer will be comparing the package to a wide variety of packages of polishes and other
automotive products it is the category of automotive products which comprises the field
of goods to which the product belongs and to which court must look in deciding whether
trade dress is inherently distinctive).
196. Duraco, 40 F.3d at 1449-50.
197. In addition, it would appear to contain a bias against functionalist design in pro-
tecting supplementary attached identifying features rather than those integrated within
the product gestalt. Indeed, the court's example of a design feature that would be con-
ceptually separable under the court's analysis-an "arbitrary carving etched into the back
of a chair to identify the source"-reveals just that. See id. at 1452. This is precisely what
has bedeviled the parallel copyright test, namely a concentration on physical separability
to the detriment of integrated design. See Perlmutter, supra note 192, at 340-41. Courts
have been careful, in applying the functionality exclusion, not to deny trade dress protec-
tion merely because a feature is de facto functional. See In re Morton-Norwich Prods.,
Inc., 671 F.2d 1332, 1337 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (noting that although the design of a product is
de facto functional if directed to performance of a function, it is not thereby de jure func-
tional and may be legally recognized as an indicator of source). The same thoughtfulness
needs to be displayed in assessing distinctiveness.
198. 'See Fabrication Enters., Inc. v. Hygenic Corp., 64 F.3d 53, 55 (2d Cir. 1995) ("The
design of a product may serve at least two purposes. It may identify the source of the
product, and it can serve a utilitarian purpose."); WSM, Inc. v. Tennessee Sales Co., 709
F.2d 1084, 1087 (6th Cir. 1983) ("That an item serves or performs a function does not
mean, however, that it may not at the same time be capable of indicating sponsorship or
origin where aspects of the item are nonfunctional." (citation omitted)). Despite this
acknowledgment that a product feature may serve two or more roles, one author has re-
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may also serve to identify the source of the product,'99 and accord-
ingly this factor should not be used to prevent fact-specific
consideration of the peculiarities of each individual case.' The man-
ner in which consumers perceive product features is as varied as the
number of products themselves, and the test for inherent distinctive-
ness should reflect that fact.
iii. Primarily a Source-Designator
Finally, under Duraco, a product configuration for which Lan-
ham Act protection is sought must be "likely to serve primarily as a
designator of origin of the product."' '  This consideration cannot be
applied too strictly because "most trade dress cases involve such
claimed features as shape, color, stitching, and materials, which ...
usually both identify the product's source and serve some utilitarian
or aesthetic purpose."2' The court again clearly intended to be un-
compromising in applying this requirement, however, declaring that
"if the configuration itself, separate from the product, is likely to
serve some substantial purpose other than as a designation of ori-
gin-that is, besides to set it apart from other sources' products in
sponded to recent developments by suggesting that product design should be protected
under the Lanham Act only if it serves an exclusively source-identifying function. See
Groff, supra note 141, at 68 (arguing that trade dress protection should be extended to
product design only in the "rare instances where the design serves only source-identifying
purposes"); cf. Duraco, 40 F.3d at 1434 (suggesting that the circumstances where a prod-
uct configuration might be inherently distinctive are "characterized by a high probability
that a product configuration serves a virtually exclusive identifying function" (emphasis
added)).
199. See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 7.26[5], at 7-152.5 ("The 'merely ornamental'
rule is simply a facet of the basic trademark question: is the disputed feature in fact per-
ceived by customers as a trademark or not? Do customers perceive this feature as mere
attractive ornamentation or also as a symbol that identifies and distinguishes a single
source?" (emphasis added)).
200. Cf. In re Swift & Co., 223 F.2d 950, 954 (C.C.P.A. 1955) ("Since the line distin-
guishing between mere ornamentation and ornamentation which is merely an incidental
quality of a trade-mark is not always clearly ascertainable, the application of legal princi-
ples to fit one situation or the other requires proper reflection upon the impression likely
to govern the ordinary purchaser in the market place. For that reason, the merits of each
case ... must be individually and accordingly adjudged.").
201. Duraco, 40 F.3d at 1434. Again, the Restatement suggests this factor is relevant to
the question of inherently distinctive shapes. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 13
cmt. d.
202. Interactive Networks, Inc. v. NTN Communications, Inc., 875 F. Supp. 1398, 1407
(N.D. Cal. 1995). This dual function can be true both of two-dimensional decoration and
three-dimensional product shape. See, e.g., Three Blind Mice Designs Co. v. Cyrk, Inc.,
892 F. Supp. 303, 311 (D. Mass. 1995) ("Despite its decorative function, the imprint of
plaintiff's trademark ... is widely understood as a designation of source ....").
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consumers' minds-then it cannot be inherently distinctive.,23
The Duraco court did not state that such a feature would be less
likely to be inherently distinctive, but rather that it cannot be inher-
ently distinctive.' The former would have been a largely
unobjectionable assertion. The Duraco court was probably correct
that, in most cases, a feature's role as something other than source-
identifier may give rise to a greater possibility that the same design
feature will not operate as a source-identifier. Consumer association
will most easily arise or be presumed when a mark carries but a single
meaning, or where a descriptive primary meaning is wholly displaced.
There is no need, however, for that to be an absolute barrier to in-
herent distinctiveness. A shape can serve both purposes without
diminution in the value of either. As with the court's articulation of
its second consideration, this analysis represents a gross over-
simplification of the complexity of consumers' purchase decisions."'
In assessing this factor, the court placed great stress on the intent
of the product designer in adopting the features at issue, as well as on
the motivation for the purchasing decision of consumers (for aes-
thetic advantages)."6 The focus on the producer's intent was used by
the Duraco court to affirm the judgment against the plaintiff pro-
ducer: "Abundant and uncontroverted testimony established that
Duraco adopted its features to create the appearance of a marble,
stone, or cement Grecian or classical-style urn, not to identify itself as
the source."2' The intent of the producer is not, however, generally
relevant to whether a feature operates as a source-identifier,28 and,
203. Duraco, 40 F.3d at 1450.
204. See id. ("[I]f the feature.., is likely to be notably desirable to consumers for
some reason other than its function as a source-designator, it cannot be considered inher-
ently distinctive.").
205. See Unikel, supra note 20, at 335-36:
Consumers generally purchase a particular product for a variety of interrelated
reasons .... It is thus naive to assume that a product's significant features and
overall design can serve only one of two polar opposite goals-indication of
source or important ingredient in the product's commercial success .... [I]f indi-
cation of source or affiliation is a significant (though not exclusive) feature of a
product's design or configuration... affording trade dress protection to that de-
sign or configuration is necessary to guard against consumers being...
misled ....
206. See Duraco, 40 F.3d at 1450 (with respect to whether a mark serves primarily as
designator of source, "a source's intent in adopting the particular configuration is highly
probative"); cf. Joan L. Dillon, Two Pesos: More Interesting for What it Does Not Decide,
83 TRADEMARK REP. 77,85 (1993) (defining protectable trade dress as "a combination of
elements selected to identify origin, rather than to serve as mere decor").
207. Duraco, 40 F.3d at 1452.
208. See infra text accompanying notes 220-30. Nor is the motivation of the purchaser
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for the reasons outlined below in discussing the "primary intent" test
of the Knitwaves court,2 consideration of such intent should be
avoided in fashioning a test of inherent distinctiveness for product
design.
b. The Knitwaves Test
While the Second Circuit embraced the reasoning of Duraco in
support of a distinction between product features and product pack-
aging, it declined to adopt in full the three-part test formulated by the
Third Circuit because such a test was "not rooted in the language of
the Lanham Act., 210 Instead, the Second Circuit in Knitwaves con-
cluded that to be inherently distinctive a product feature must be
"likely to serve primarily as a designator of origin of the product.,
211
The Court augmented this general standard by excluding from the
class of inherently distinctive marks "product features or designs
whose primary purposes are likely to be functional or aesthetic.,
12
Applying this test, the court decided that the plaintiff's sweater de-
signs were not inherently distinctive: "As Knitwaves' objective in the
two sweater designs was primarily aesthetic, the designs were not
relevant as such to the determination of distinctiveness. As Congress recognized in en-
acting the Trademark Clarification Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-620, § 102, 98 Stat. 3335
(1984), consumer motivation should not be relevant to distinctiveness considerations. See
15 U.S.C. § 1064(3) (1994) ("The primary significance of the registered mark to the rele-
vant public rather than purchaser motivation shall be the test for determining whether the
registered mark has become... generic .... ). The question is consumer association, not
motivation. See In re DC Comics, Inc., 689 F.2d 1042, 1054 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (Nies, J.,
concurring). To the extent that consumer motivation reveals likely consumer association,
however, it may act as a minor predictor in answering the question of inherent distinct-
iveness.
209. See infra Part IV(D)(2)(b).
210. Knitwaves, Inc. v. Lollytogs Ltd., 71 F.3d 996, 1009 n.6 (2d Cir. 1995).
211. Id. at 1008 (citing Duraco, 40 F.3d at 1449); see also EFS Mktg. v. Russ Berrie &
Co., 76 F.3d 487, 491 (2d Cir. 1996) ("[Knitwaves articulated the] standard for an inher-
ently distinctive, product-configuration trade dress; Le., when assessing the distinctiveness
of such a dress, a court should consider 'whether it is likely to serve primarily as a desig-
nator of origin of the product.'" (citations omitted)). Under this general standard alone,
the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has since noted that the design of exact re-
productions of original Gustav Stickley furniture "by definition" cannot primarily
designate the manufacturer of the reproduction, and thus cannot be inherently distinctive
trade dress. See L. & J.G. Stickley, Inc. v. Canal Dover Furniture Co., 79 F.3d 258, 263
(2d Cir. 1996).
212. Knitwaves, 71 F.3d at 1008; see also Herbko Int'l, Inc. v. Gemmy Indus., 916 F.
Supp. 322, 328 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) ("[T]he test to determine whether a product qualifies for
protection for trade dress inherent in the product's design is whether the trade dress is
'likely to serve primarily as a designator of origin of the product,' as opposed to serving
primarily aesthetic purposes.").
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primarily intended as source identification. 2 13 Thus, in the Second
Circuit "a plaintiff must do more than demonstrate that the appear-
ance of its product serves some source identifying function. It must
demonstrate that the primary purpose behind the design was to iden-
tify its product's source. 214
The Second Circuit's test of primary intent corresponds loosely
to the third element of the Duraco test. As such, the same criticisms
that can be levelled at that element are also applicable to the Knit-
waves test: a product design can carry both aesthetic and source-
identifying meaning;21 and, distinctiveness is a measure of the de-
sign's effect on consumers. 6 Indeed, despite its reproach of the
Third Circuit test, the Second Circuit also failed to adhere to the text
of the Lanham Act, and departed from well-established conceptions
of distinctiveness, by transforming a test of consumer association into
one of producer intent.217 The statutory language protects as trade-
213. Knitwaves, Inc., 71 F.3d at 1009; see also Grupke v. Linda Lori Sportswear, Inc.,
921 F. Supp. 987, 996 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (applying Knitwaves, and granting defendant's
motion for summary judgment on question of inherent distinctiveness where tee-shirt
design held to be "primarily aesthetic" and there was "no evidence that plaintiffs in-
tended their design to identify the source of the tee-shirts"); Judith Ripka Designs, Ltd. v.
Preville, 935 F. Supp. 237, 257 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (applying Knitwaves and finding jewelry
designs not inherently distinctive because primary purpose of design is aesthetic, not
source-identifying); Banff Ltd. v. Express, Inc., 921 F. Supp. 1065, 1071 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)
(granting defendant's renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law on question of
inherent distinctiveness because plaintiff "chose its design primarily for aesthetic rea-
sons" and there was "absolutely no evidence that [plaintiff] chose its design primarily to
identify the source of its product"). In both Knitwaves and Banff, the plaintiff's claim for
infringement of copyright in the design of the sweater succeeded. See Knitwaves, 71 F.3d
at 1005; Banff, 921 F. Supp. at 1067. The plaintiff in Grupke brought a claim for in-
fringement of the copyright in its tee-shirt design. See Grupke, 921 F. Supp. at 990-91
(copyright cause of action not challenged by the primary defendant in its successful mo-
tion for summary judgment on the trade dress claim).
214. Banff, 921 F. Supp. at 1071 (applying Knitwaves) (citation omitted); see Herbko,
916 F. Supp. at 328 (citation omitted); see also Grupke, 921 F. Supp. at 996 ("[In Knit-
waves,] the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that trade dress inherent in
clothing designs receives protection under the Lanham Act only if 'primarily intended as
[a] source identifier.'" (citation omitted)). The district court in Krueger International,
Inc. v. Nightingale Inc., 915 F. Supp. 595 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), characterized the Knitwaves
test as "whether the manufacturer 'used' or 'intended to use' the design to identify the
source and distinguish his or her goods." Id. at 601-02 (citation omitted). The Krueger
formulation represents only part, however, of the analysis suggested by the Second Cir-
cuit.
215. See supra text accompanying notes 197-205.
216. See supra text accompanying note 208.
217. Consideration of the intent of the defendant does enter into trademark infringe-
ment analysis at several points. First, many courts hold that intentional copying gives rise
to a rebuttable presumption (or, at least, an inference) of secondary meaning. See supra
note 143. Second, while intent to confuse is not essential to a finding of infringement, the
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marks any symbols or devices that operate as source identifiers. It is
restricted neither to devices that operate primarily to identify source
nor to features that are intended to act as source designators.218 It is
perfectly possible that a design adopted primarily for aesthetic pur-
poses could be likely to identify source if the aesthetic at issue is
particularly distinctive.19
i. Producer's Intent
An intent-based test (let alone one founded on the "primary" in-
tent of the producer) is inconsistent with both the purpose of the
distinctiveness requirement and the language of the Lanham Act, and
intent or good faith of the defendant in copying the claimed trade dress is one of several
factors considered in determining likelihood of confusion. See Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad
Elec. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961) (defendant's good faith in adopting mark
relevant to likelihood of confusion); see also RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 22 (noting
that likelihood of confusion may be inferred from defendant's adoption of the trade dress
with an intent to cause confusion or to deceive). Some courts have gone further, and will
infer likelihood of confusion from mere intentional copying, rather than from an intent to
confuse. See, e.g., Paddington Corp. v. Attiki Importers & Distribs., Inc., 996 F.2d 577,
586-87 (2d Cir. 1993) (indicating that a defendant's intentional copying gives rise to a
presumption of likely confusion); cf Schwinn Bicycle Co. v. Ross Bicycles, Inc., 870 F.2d
1176, 1184 (7th Cir. 1989) (explaining that intentional copying may tend to support likeli-
hood of confusion, but does not give rise to a presumption); American Home Prods. Corp.
v. Barr Labs., Inc., 834 F.2d 368, 371 (3d Cir. 1987) (same); Brooks Shoe Mfg. Co. v.
Suave Shoe Corp., 716 F.2d 854, 859-60 n.13 (11th Cir. 1983) (same). But cf RE-
STATEMENT, supra note 1, § 22 cmt. c (commenting that likelihood of confusion should
not be inferred from intentional copying unless lack of alternative explanation suggests an
intent to cause confusion or to deceive); Andrew C. Finch, Comment, When Imitation Is
the Sincerest Form of Flattery: Private Label Products and the Role of Intention in Deter-
mining Trade Dress Infringement, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 1243, 1244 (1996) (arguing "that
courts should not presume a likelihood of confusion from a private label manufacturer's
intentional copying of the trade dress of a brand name product").
218. The reference in the statutory definition of a trademark to the "intent" of the
trademark owner, included in the Qualitex opinion's recital of the definition and quoted
by the Second Circuit in Knitwaves, is simply a reflection of the expanded grounds upon
which a trademark registration application may be based after the Trademark Law Revi-
sion Act of 1988. See 15 U.S.C. § 1051(b) (1994) (registration application can be based
upon intent to use the mark as well as past use); Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988,
Pub. L. No. 100-667, § 134, 102 Stat. 3935, 3946-48 (amending definition of "trademark");
S. REP. No. 100-515, at 44 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5577, 5607 (noting
amendment of definition of "trademark" to reflect legislation's provision for an intent-to-
use application system). It is not clear whether the Second Circuit attached any weight to
that term in this context, but given this limited purpose for which it is included in the
definition, none should be given. Cf. Krueger, 915 F. Supp. at 602-03 ("[A] close reading
of Qualitex does not support the notion that the 'use or intended use' language of the
Lanham Act provides a definition of inherent distinctiveness.").
219. Clearly, certain aesthetic designs do in fact identify source. See, e.g., Three Blind
Mice Designs Co. v. Cyrk, Inc., 892 F. Supp. 303, 311 (D. Mass. 1995) ("Despite its deco-
rative function, the imprint of plaintiff's trademark.., is widely understood as a
designation of source .... ).
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is likely in practice to preclude the possibility of inherently distinctive
product design (other than in cases of consciously-superfluous prod-
uct appendages). m As the Supreme Court recognized over a century
ago, trademarks are "often the result of accident, rather than de-
sign." 2" Assessment of the intent of the producer thus misconstrues
the concept of a trademark.' Similarly, and not surprisingly in light
of the Supreme Court's observation, the definition provided by the
Lanham Act has at its core merely that the mark "identify and distin-
guish" particular goods, and the Restatement inquires as to the
perception (actual or likely) of consumers.m A trademark is defined
220. In articulating its primary intent test, and concentrating on the mental processes
of the producer, the Second Circuit repeated the conceptual error into which it has been
drawn in determining the scope of copyright protection for the design of useful articles.
In that context, the court has conditioned copyright protection upon whether design ele-
ments can be identified "as reflecting the designer's artistic judgement exercised
independently of functional influences." Brandir Int'l v. Cascade Pac. Lumber Co., 834
F.2d 1142, 1145 (2d Cir. 1987) (adopting test suggested in Robert C. Denicola, Applied
Art and Industrial Design: A Suggested Approach to Copyright in Useful Articles, 67
MINN. L. REv. 707, 741 (1983)). The influences that guided the creation of a useful arti-
cle do not, however, answer the question posed by the relevant provision (section 101) of
the copyright statute-can the artistic features of the work be identified separately from
and exist independently of the utilitarian aspects? See Brandir, 834 F.2d at 1152 (Winter,
J., dissenting) (concluding that statute requires examination of the article not the process
that created it); see also Perlmutter, supra note 192, at 372 ("The test's reliance on the
creative process rather than the result of that process can be found nowhere in the statu-
tory language, legislative history or judicial interpretation"). Similarly, the intention of
the producer is unresponsive to the heart of the Lanham Act's distinctiveness inquiry,
namely whether the mark identifies goods and distinguishes them from the goods of oth-
ers. The Lanham Act requires examination of how a mark does behave, or is likely to
behave, not of how the producer hopes it will behave. Cf. International Jensen, Inc. v.
Metrosound U.S.A., Inc., 4 F.3d 819, 824 (9th Cir. 1993) ("While evidence of a manufac-
turer's sales, advertising and promotional activities may be relevant in determining
secondary meaning, the true test of secondary meaning is the effectiveness of this effort
to create it.").
221. The Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82,94 (1879).
222. See Seabrook Foods, Inc. v. Bar-Well Foods Ltd., 568 F.2d 1342, 1345 (C.C.P.A.
1977) ("[R]egardless of the [mark owner's] intentions, it is the association, by the con-
sumer, of the... design with the [mark owner] as the source that is determinative.");
Plastilite Corp. v. Kassnar Imports, 508 F.2d 824, 827 (C.C.P.A. 1975) (holding that in
determining distinctiveness, "it is the association of the mark with a particular source by
the ultimate consumers which is to be measured-not [applicant's] intent" in adopting the
mark); Estee Lauder, Inc. v. Gap, Inc., 932 F. Supp. 595,599 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (noting that
whether a term is protected as a trademark does not depend upon the plaintiff producer's
intentions); see also Christopher D. Keirs, Protecting Today's Products: Selected Trade-
mark and Trade Dress Issues, 6 J. PROPRIETARY RTS. 14, 15 (Nov. 1994) ("[Y]our
trademark is not what you think it is; it's what consumers think it is.").
223. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 13(a) (inherent distinctiveness reflects
whether prospective purchasers are likely to perceive mark as source-identifier); id.
§ 13(b) (acquired distinctiveness reflects whether prospective purchasers have come to
perceive mark as a source-identifier).
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by its marketplace operation, not by the process through which it was
adopted. Goodwill is created by public association, not private aspi-
ration.
Intent is also an unreliable predictor of likely consumer associa-
tion for evidentiary reasons. 4 More than any other indicium that we
might seek to scrutinize, it is unnecessarily subjective and minimizes
the weight attached to external evidence of likely association. Ac-
cording any weight to intent begets self-serving testimony, typically
attaching most significance to the testimony of those who in all likeli-
hood have a personal stake in the outcome of the proceedings.'
These fears have been borne out in cases where courts, incorrectly,
have paid heed to the intent of the producer.'
224. Arguably, reference to whether a design was intended to identify a product's
source might inform, to some extent, a determination of whether it is likely to do so (i.e.,
there might be some degree of correlation between intent and achievement). Cf. Estee
Lauder, 932 F. Supp. at 599 ("[T]he question whether '100%,' standing alone, is a trade-
mark or used in a trademark sense does not depend upon [plaintiff's] intentions, which
are no more than circumstantial evidence of likely consumer perception."). The minimal
nature of that correlation and of the guidance it can afford, and the risk that intent might
come to determine rather than to inform a court's analysis, cautions against even minor
reference to intent as a predictive factor. Intent stocks the potential to distort the dis-
tinctiveness inquiry, and thus, for the reasons stated in the text, consideration of a
producer's intent should be avoided.
225. See Judith Ripka Designs, Ltd. v. Preville, 935 F. Supp. 237, 245 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)
("The Court is dubious that testimony as to source of inspiration of design can usually be
effectively weighed at trial."). In jurisdictions, such as the Second Circuit, that focus on
the producer's intent, failure to produce such evidence can prove fatal to a plaintiff's
claim notwithstanding its intrinsic unreliability. See, e.g., New York Racing Ass'n, Inc. v.
Perlmutter Publ'g, Inc., No. 95 Civ. 994, 1996 WL 465298, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. July 19, 1996)
(finding trade dress not inherently distinctive under Knitwaves where no evidence that
plaintiff's objective in using the trade dress was primarily source-identification); Banff
Ltd. v. Express, Inc., 921 F. Supp. 1065, 1071 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (setting aside jury ver-
dict for the plaintiff and explaining that "[a]s [plaintiff] offered no evidence that it
designed its sweater primarily to identify its product's source, the jury's trade dress ver-
dict is clearly against the 'weight of evidence'" (citations omitted)). For an appropriate
refusal to accord weight to the designer's intent in determining inherent distinctiveness,
see Ergotron, Inc. v. Hergo Ergonomic Support Sys., Inc., No. 94 Civ. 2732, 1996 WL
143903, at *6-7 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 1996) (disregarding affidavit of president of plaintiff
that product "was developed to be unique" where trade dress was in fact composed of
common designs which had been adopted by others in the field) (applying Seabrook); see
also Estee Lauder, 932 F. Supp. at 599 (noting that "no definitive conclusion need be
reached as to [plaintiffs] intention, if indeed [plaintiff] may be said to have had any,"
because distinctiveness does not depend upon plaintiff's intent).
226. For example, in Casa Editrice Bonechi S.R.L. v. Irving Weisdorf & Co., 37
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1417, 1422 (S.D.N.Y. 1995), the district court regarded evidence of the
intent of the manufacturer in adopting the claimed trade dress highly probative. The
evidence on the issue was provided in the form of testimony of the president of the plain-
tiff producer, and not surprisingly it was that the color design in which trade dress was
claimed was "selected purely arbitrarily." Id.; cf. Herbko Int'l, Inc. v. Gemmy Indus., 916
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Reliance by the Knitwaves court on the producer's intent runs
counter to these generally unquestioned observations about the na-
ture of trademarks and the realities of eliciting evidence. 7 It vill
also operate to exclude protection for product features because
therem unlike with word marks or packaging, an intent other than
exclusive source-identification can easily be attributed to the pro-
ducer. 9  Finally, the court's emphasis on "primary intent"
F. Supp. 322, 328 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (assessing inherent distinctiveness in large part by con-
struing the deposition testimony of the president of the plaintiff producer regarding the
purpose for which product feature was designed, and finding trade dress not inherently
distinctive, notwithstanding president's testimony that it "took a lot of time and effort to
make it so that it stood by itself alone in the marketplace").
227. Recent decisions in other courts also reflect increased consideration of intent.
See, e.g., Callaway Golf Co. v. Golf Clean, Inc., 915 F. Supp. 1206, 1212 (M.D. Fla. 1995)
(noting that the design of "Big Bertha" golf clubs deliberately chosen to produce an
unique image in finding product design inherently distinctive under Seabrook). The
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has not yet followed the Second or Third Cir-
cuits in adopting a more stringent test for inherently distinctive product shapes. See
Sassafras Enters., Inc. v. Roshco, Inc., 915 F. Supp. 1, 5 (N.D. Ill. 1996); see also supra
note 148 (discussing Seventh Circuit case law). Absent the adoption of an explicit test by
the court of appeals, however, district courts in that circuit are beginning to cite the Du-
raco test, see, e.g., FASA Corp. v. Playmates Toys, Inc., 912 F. Supp. 1124, 1149 (N.D. I11.
1996), and to base inherent distinctiveness decisions on evidence of intent that was found
to be probative in Duraco and determinative in Knitwaves. See, e.g., Sassafras, 915 F.
Supp. at 5-6 & n.9.
228. There are some instances where consideration of intent has not defeated the in-
herent distinctiveness claim. See, e.g., Callaway Golf, 915 F. Supp. at 1212 (design of "Big
Bertha" golf clubs inherently distinctive); Casa Editrice Bonechi, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at
1422 (design of covers for guide books inherently distinctive); see also Fundex Inc. v. Im-
perial Toy Corp., 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1061, 1062, 1063-64 (S.D. Ind. 1992) (noting, but
apparently not relying on, testimony of president of plaintiff that trade dress chosen out
of a desire to "make something that would stand out" and because it "gave a nice... ap-
pearance" to the product) (applying Abercrombie).
229. See New York Racing Ass'n, 1996 WL 465298, at *2 (finding trade dress not in-
herently distinctive under Knitwaves where no evidence that plaintiff's objective in using
the trade dress was primarily source-identification); Judith Ripka Designs, 935 F. Supp. at
257-58 (applying Knitwaves and finding jewelry design not inherently distinctive); Banff,
921 F. Supp. at 1070-71 (setting aside jury verdict in favor of plaintiff and granting defen-
dant's renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law on question of inherent
distinctiveness); Grupke v. Linda Lori Sportswear, Inc., 921 F. Supp. 987, 996 (E.D.N.Y.
1996) (applying Knitwaves, and granting defendant's motion for summary judgment on
question of inherent distinctiveness where tee-shirt design held to be "primarily aes-
thetic" and there was "no evidence that plaintiffs intended their design to identify the
source of the tee-shirts"); Herbko, 916 F. Supp. at 328 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (applying Knit-
waves and finding design of game not inherently distinctive notwithstanding evidence that
plaintiff's design was intended to identify source, because plaintiff's statements "could
also suggest that [plaintiff] designed the 'Crossword Companion' [(plaintiff's product)] in
order to make it aesthetically pleasing"). The district court in Krueger International, Inc.
v. Nightingale Inc., 915 F. Supp. 595 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), rejected the Knitwaves test because,
among other things:
[It] confuses the analytical requirements for inherent distinctiveness with those
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presupposes a unity or predominance of purpose that does not neces-
sarily accord with the decision-making process of manufacturers. As
Judge Sotomayor remarked in Krueger:
[The Knitwaves] approach is neither helpful nor logical. In
the instant case, it would force me to determine whether the
plaintiff chose its chair design because it was attractive or
because it was meant to serve as a trademark (i.e., a source
identifier). The likely answer is, both.... [E]very producer
hopes to create a design that is more pleasing than not and
that that design will be associated with it. 3
of secondary meaning. Inherent distinctiveness cannot hinge on how a producer
intends to promote a design. If such were the case, the evidentiary requirements
for inherent distinctiveness would be almost identical to those for secondary
meaning, and there would be no point in having two categories.
Id. at 602. The Krueger court is correct that intent is irrelevant to inherent distinctive-
ness, but it is no more relevant to an analysis of secondary meaning. See Winning Ways,
Inc. v. Holloway Sportswear, Inc., 913 F. Supp. 1454, 1464 n.8 (D. Kan. 1996) ("As the
definition of secondary meaning makes clear, what [plaintiff] intended is irrelevant; what
counts is the purchaser's perceptions."); see also Co-Rect Prods., Inc. v. Marvy! Adver.
Photography, Inc., 780 F.2d 1324, 1332 (8th Cir. 1985) ("[D]esires or intentions of the
creator.., are irrelevant. Instead, it is the attitude of the consumer that is important.");
Ohio Art Co. v. Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc., 799 F. Supp. 870, 883 (N.D. Ill. 1992) (stating
that it is irrelevant to secondary meaning analysis that plaintiff intended the product con-
figuration to be a source-identifier). The most probative advertising for the purposes of
secondary meaning is, however, typically that which emphasizes the supposedly distinc-
tive feature and which does so as an overt symbol of identification rather than one with
decorative or functional benefits. See In re Owens-Coming Fiberglass Corp., 774 F.2d
1116, 1126-27 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (advertising that emphasized the color pink as primary
theme cut in favor of secondary meaning attaching to color pink for fiberglass insulation);
Devan Designs Inc. v. Palliser Furniture Corp., 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1991, 1997
(M.D.N.C. 1992) ("When advertisements promote the functional and decorative features
of a product without promoting an association between good and producer, it is not help-
ful in establishing secondary meaning." (citation omitted)), aff'd, 998 F.2d 1008 (4th Cir.
1993).
[Indeed], advertising that touts a product feature for its desirable qualities and
not primarily as a way to distinguish the producer's brand is not only not evi-
dence that the feature has acquired secondary meaning, it directly undermines
such a finding. It supports instead the inference that consumers consider the
claimed trade dress a desirable feature of the product and not primarily a signi-
fier of source.
Thomas & Betts Corp. v. Panduit Corp., 65 F.3d 654,662 (7th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116
S. Ct. 1044 (1996). Such rules-which focus on the conscious separation of functional
features and their source identifying capacity, whether in designing or marketing the
product-naturally invite a focus on the designer's intent. See, e.g., Devan Designs, 25
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1999 (distinguishing protection of other lamps on the ground that,
unlike the plaintiff in those cases, plaintiffs never intended the product to act as the signa-
ture for their company). It is unsurprising, therefore, that the Krueger court equated the
usual evidence of secondary meaning with proof of designer's intent. See Krueger, 915 F.
Supp at 602.
230. See Krueger, 915 F. Supp. at 606. (Judge Sotomayor also rejected the Duraco
test, noting that it left much to be desired. See id. at 602.) The district court in Krueger
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ii. Primarily a Designator of Origin
Inherent distinctiveness is a measure of the likelihood that a
mark will identify its source,"1 not the likelihood of the mark primar-
ily identifying its source (as the Second Circuit would have it)."
2
Certainly, an increased number of roles played by a product feature
reduces the likelihood that it will serve to identify source; this is par-
ticularly true if its non-source-identifying roles are perceived by the
consumer as prominent purposes of the featureY3 Subject to ex-
pressly stated exceptions, however, the Lanham Act permits marks
conveying two or more meanings to be treated as distinctive even
where their source-identification meaning is not exclusive.' The Act
tried to rehabilitate the Knitwaves test by suggesting that "Knitwaves's [sic] emphasis on
the producer's 'intent' may be analogous to asking, 'What is the custom in this industry?'
Or: 'How does this industry, including this claimant, use designs?'" Id. at 604. The
Knitwaves test, however, requires wholesale reconsideration, not mere rehabilitation. If
industry custom is what the Knitwaves test seeks to ascertain (which is itself difficult to
accept), that is the subject about which it should inquire. The district court in Herbko
recently endorsed this strained connection of intent and industry custom. The Herbko
court went further, however, and in a rather startling inversion of the analytical inquiry,
suggested that reference to industry custom-and thus whether a design would automati-
cally be perceived by consumers as an indicium of origin-was relevant in order to
determine the producer's intent. See Herbko, 916 F. Supp. at 328.
231. Various formulations of the test for secondary meaning, although not that found
in section 2(f) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f) (1994), refer to the "primary sig-
nificance" of the mark or product feature in the minds of consumers. See supra note 51.
But these expressions arguably reflect the context of marks already determined to be
merely descriptive, and thus viewed as wholly unable to identify source (e.g., by virtue of
undivided lexicographic significance), and requiring in practice to overcome any such
descriptive significance in order to distinguish the producer's goods from those of others.
Cf. Winning Ways, 913 F. Supp. at 1464 ("Trade dress has secondary meaning if 'its pri-
mary significance in the minds of potential consumers is no longer as an indicator of
something about the product itself but as an indicator of its source or brand.'" (citing
Vornado) (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added)). As noted below, see infra text accom-
panying note 238, marks that are not merely descriptive are not required to demonstrate
secondary meaning if they are also likely to identify source. The "primary significance"
language in these formulations of the secondary meaning test has also been challenged
generally. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Thomas & Betts Corp. v. Panduit Corp.,
(No. 95-1169) (Jan. 22, 1996), at 10-11 (on file with author) (arguing that the "primary
significance" standard for secondary meaning has never been endorsed by the Supreme
Court), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1044 (1996).
232. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, §13(a). The Second Circuit's requirement that
the product design be likely to serve primarily as a designator of origin of the product is a
clear deviation from established understandings of inherent distinctiveness. See Herbko,
916 F. Supp. at 328 ("Under [the Knitwaves] test, it is no longer enough for a plaintiff to
'demonstrate that the appearance of its product serves some source identifying function';
rather, the plaintiff must show that 'the primary purpose behind the design was to identify
its product's source.'" (emphasis added) (quoting Banff Ltd. v. Express Inc., 921 F. Supp.
1065, 1071 (S.D.N.Y. 1995))).
233. See supra notes 203-05 and accompanying text.
234. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(1) (1994) (excluding from registration marks that
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requires only that the mark is one by which the goods of the mark
owner can be distinguished from the goods of others."' And courts
have long recognized that product shapes may simultaneously serve
many different functions, including that of source-identification."6
The import of the Second Circuit's deviation from these stan-
dards-a movement also effected by the Duraco court via the third
leg of its announced test-is particularly apparent in considering the
treatment of descriptive marks (to which both the Knitwaves and Du-
raco court analogized product configuration trade dress). Section
2(e)(1) of the Lanham Act excludes from registration (without proof
of secondary meaning) marks that are "merely descriptive," not
marks that are "primarily descriptive."'' Courts applying this statu-
tory test in the context of word marks have construed the
descriptiveness exclusion to oust from the category of inherently dis-
tinctive marks only those marks that contain solely descriptive
matter."  Where word marks function both descriptively and sugges-
are "merely descriptive" (emphasis added)), with id. § 1052(e)(2)-(4) (excluding from
registration marks that are "primarily geographically descriptive," "primarily geographi-
cally deceptively misdescriptive," or "primarily merely a surname" (emphasis added)),
and id. § 1064(3) (a petition to cancel on basis that mark has become generic to be deter-
mined by "primary significance of the registered mark to the relevant public" (emphasis
added)).
235. See id. § 1052; id. § 1127 (definition of "trademark"); cf. L. & J.G. Stickley, Inc. v.
Canal Dover Furniture Co., 79 F.3d 258, 263 (2d Cir. 1996) ("Secondary meaning refers
to 'a subsequent significance added to the original meaning' of the trade dress due to a
producer's use of it" (quoting RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 13 cmt. e) (emphasis
added)).
236. See supra notes 198,202.
237. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(1).
238. See, e.g., Eastman Kodak Co. v. Bell & Howell Document Management Prods.
Co., 994 F.2d 1569, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1993) ("In order for [applicant's] marks to be found
merely descriptive, they must be used solely as model designators and not in any source-
indicating function."); In re Abcor Dev. Corp., 588 F.2d 811, 813 (C.C.P.A. 1978)
("Although a mark may be generally descriptive, if it also functions as an indication of
origin, it is not 'merely descriptive' "); In re Majestic Distilling Co., 420 F.2d 1086, 1087
(C.C.P.A. 1970) ("A mark may be 'merely descriptive' and not registerable if it only de-
scribes a characteristic of the goods." (emphasis added)); In re Colonial Stores Inc., 394
F.2d 549, 552-53 (C.C.P.A. 1968) (finding word mark suggestive rather than merely de-
scriptive because it did not tell the potential purchaser only the characteristics of the
goods but also had a suggestive sense); Estee Lauder, Inc. v. Gap, Inc., 932 F. Supp. 595,
609 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (answering in the affirmative the question "whether a mark that
consists of a double or triple entendre, at least one meaning of which is suggestive, is pro-
tectible without proof of secondary meaning") (collecting cases); Neapco Inc. v. Dana
Corp., 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1746, 1748 (T.T.A.B. 1989) (an alphanumeric designation
that functions only in part in a descriptive sense to designate model or grade may be in-
herently distinctive and not require proof of secondary meaning to be protected as a
trademark); see also WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICrIONARY 1413 (1986)
("mere-ly adv... 1 ... PURELY, 2... ENTIRELY,.. WHOLLY, 3 ... no more than,...
ONLY, SIMPLY, SOLELY").
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tively, they are protected as inherently distinctive. Product configu-
rations that both serve aesthetic or utilitarian functions, and are
likely to identify source, are similarly situated: the equal protection
mandate of Two Pesos requires that they be accorded similar treat-
ment.
Any test that defines distinctiveness of a useful product's con-
figuration in terms of a primary purpose will drift toward the
establishment of false dichotomies among aesthetics, function and
source-identification."9 The Knitwaves test exemplifies this ten-
dency.24° It sets up a false choice between aesthetics and source-
identification, although the option of choosing between utilitarian
and source-identification considerations may be the more common,
but equally unnecessary, dilemma that confronts courts determining
the protection of consumer products under a primary intent test.
241
239. See Krueger Int'l, Inc. v. Nightingale Inc., 915 F. Supp. 595, 606 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)
("The approach in Knitwaves... revives a false dichotomy between aesthetics and source
identification. Knitwaves seems to instruct that a design can serve only one primary pur-
pose: either aesthetic or source-identifying, but not both. This approach is neither
helpful nor logical."); cf. Herbko Int'l, Inc. v. Gemmy Indus., 916 F. Supp. 322, 328
(S.D.N.Y. 1996) (analyzing the alleged roles of the product configuration in mutually
exclusive terms: "the product configuration... appears to enhance the product's aes-
thetic value, rather than identify the source of the product" (emphasis added)).
240. See Knitwaves, Inc. v. Lollytogs Ltd., 71 F.3d 996, 1006 (2d Cir. 1995) ("[S]ince
the primary purpose of Knitwaves' sweater designs is aesthetic rather than source-
identifying, Knitwaves' sweater designs do not meet [the requirement of distinctive-
ness]."). Consideration of whether the design of the sweaters was primarily aesthetic
arguably stiffens the mere ornamentality rule and creates instead for product design a
"primary ornamentality" exclusion from protection. Cf. 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 1,
§ 7.06, at 7-33 ("If customers perceive a design as not only attractive, but as an indicator
of source, then it is a trademark."); 1 id. § 7.26[5], at 7-146 ("The 'merely ornamental'
rule is simply a facet of the basic trademark question: is the disputed feature in fact per-
ceived by customers as a trademark or not? Do customers perceive this feature as mere
attractive ornamentation or also as a symbol that identifies and distinguishes a single
source?" (emphasis added)).
241. Although each court applying Knitwaves has found that the product design at
issue was not inherently distinctive, see infra note 281 and accompanying text, some dis-
trict courts in the Second Circuit have not fully embraced the Knitwaves test. One district
court has expressly refused to apply the test formulated by the Second Circuit. See
Krueger, 915 F. Supp. at 606. The Krueger court's rejection of the Knitwaves test rested
on three grounds: (1) failure of Knitwaves to address the standards set out by the Su-
preme Court in Two Pesos, which envisioned a single test for inherent distinctiveness
rather than a further balkanization of the applicable rules; (2) reliance on the intent of the
producer confused the standard with that for secondary meaning; and (3) the revival of a
false dichotomy between aesthetics and source-identification. See id. at 601-02, 606. The
first and third of these criticisms are well-based, as is the Krueger court's refusal to con-
sider the intent of the producer in evaluating the inherent distinctiveness of product
design. The criticisms are discussed at various parts of this Article. See supra notes 170,
229-30,239; infra note 249 and accompanying text. Instead of applying Knitwaves, Judge
Sotomayor applied the Seabrook test and found the design of metal-frame stacking chairs
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3. Analysis of Duraco and Knitwaves Tests
The opinions rendered by the Second and Third Circuits are sig-
nificant in two fundamental ways. First, like the Seabrook court,
both courts plainly recognized the difficulties in assessing inherent
distinctiveness without reference to some standard of practical appli-
cation to product design trade dress. Abercrombie's linguistic-based
analysis is insufficient in this context. 2 Second, the Duraco and
inherently distinctive. See Krueger, 915 F. Supp. at 607. Two other district courts in the
Second Circuit have sought to limit the scope of the Knitwaves decision. Judge Scheindlin
applied a variant of the Seabrook test to determine the inherent distinctiveness of com-
puter workstation furniture in Ergotron, Inc. v. Hergo Ergonomic Support Systems, Inc.,
No. 94 Civ. 2732, 1996 WL 143903, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 1996) (holding that design of
computer workstation furniture not inherently distinctive). Although Judge Sotomayor
clearly articulated her criticisms of the Knitwaves test, the basis for Judge Scheindlin's
decision to depart from Knitwaves is less clear. Judge Scheindlin expressly acknowledged
that the Second Circuit had abandoned the classical distinctiveness analysis, and that the
Court of Appeals had "stated that the test should be whether [the trade dress] is likely to
serve primarily as a designator of origin of the product." Id. at *5 (citations omitted)
(internal quotations omitted) (alteration in original). Yet, she founded her application of
an alternative test on the statement that "neither the Second Circuit in Knitwaves nor the
Supreme Court has adopted an explicit test to determine the inherent distinctiveness of a
trade dress." Id. This is either a studious disregard of the Court of Appeals' opinion, or
an interpretation of the Knitwaves opinion as an articulation merely of the broad inquiry
underlying the inherent distinctiveness analysis rather than a test in and of itself. Judge
Scheindlin's non-application of Knitwaves is particularly baffling given her opinion in
Banff Ltd. v. Express, Inc., 921 F. Supp. 1065 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). There, she set aside a jury
verdict in favor of a trade dress plaintiff and granted a renewed motion for judgment as a
matter of law on the basis of the Second Circuit's reformulation of the test for inherent
distinctiveness in Knitwaves. See id. at 1070-71.
Finally, Judge Mukasey has read the Knitwaves formulation as limited to cases where
trade dress rights are claimed in the product, "alone and apart from its packaging." See
Fun-Damental Too, Ltd. v. Gemmy Indus., No. 96 Civ. 1103, 1996 WL 125641, at *8
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 21, 1996). In contrast, where the trade dress was claimed in the
"product... displayed as an integral part of the dress," Judge Mukasey determined dis-
tinctiveness by application of the traditional Abercrombie categories. See id. at *8-*9
(finding overall impression conveyed by the product's features and its packaging to be
inherently distinctive). See infra note 336, for a fuller discussion of Judge Mukasey's
opinion.
242. Other courts, although not fully adopting the tests articulated by the Second or
Third Circuits, have also acknowledged the deficiencies of Abercrombie with respect to
product design. See, e.g., Sassafras Enters., Inc. v. Roshco, Inc., 915 F. Supp. 1, 5 n.8
(N.D. Ill. 1996); Krueger, 915 F. Supp. at 601. Courts in the Third Circuit have recognized
the distinction drawn by the Duraco court between packaging and product configuration,
and have applied Abercrombie in the former case. In Sweetzel, Inc. v. Hawk Hill Cookies,
Inc., Civ. No. CIV.A. 95-2632, 1995 WL 550585, at *7 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 14, 1995), a district
court in the Third Circuit applied Abercrombie to a packaging trade dress claim, reason-
ing that "[a]lthough the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has rejected the
Abercrombie criteria for determining inherent distinctiveness in actions for infringement
of product configuration, it has distinguished product packaging actions such as Two Pe-
sos in doing so." Id. Similarly, the Knitwaves court appears to have endorsed the
continued application of the Abercrombie test in product packaging cases. See Knitwaves,
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Knitwaves tests signal a strong preference on the part of certain cir-
cuit courts that, despite the liberalizing influence of Two Pesos that
appears to have inspired many other courts,243 product configurations
are less likely to be inherently distinctive than other forms of trade
dress. 4
The retreat from Abercrombie is thus being sounded by two
courts which had refused to acknowledge inherently distinctive trade
dress prior to Two Pesos.245 One might speculate whether the recog-
nition by these courts of the limits of the Abercrombie test stems
from the re-examination of first principles to which they have been
forced to resort anew. It is to be hoped that the guidance of those
principles will ultimately extend also to their respective tests for in-
herent distinctiveness, for each court appears to have strayed from a
proper understanding of the concept of distinctiveness. Although
Two Pesos compelled both courts to reconceptualize a basic require-
ment of trademark law, that should not be the signal to regress to a
position where inherent distinctiveness of trade dress is effectively
denied, or where the capacity of product shapes to perform a func-
tion, evoke aesthetic pleasure in the beholder, and at the same time
identify the source of the product, is questioned once more.
Yet, that is what each court may have achieved. Despite explicit
disavowals,24 the Second Circuit's primary intent test for inherently
distinctive product configurations has effectively reimposed the sec-
ondary meaning requirement from which trade dress plaintiffs were
apparently liberated by Two Pesos.247 Indeed, that the Second Circuit
71 F.3d at 1007; see also supra notes 134, 168 (discussing the continued application of the
Abercrombie test in the packaging context); infra note 275 and accompanying text (same).
243. See infra notes 274-77 and accompanying text.
244. See Sassafras, 915 F. Supp. at 4; Tyco Indus. v. Tiny Love, Ltd., 914 F. Supp. 1068,
1082 (D.N.J. 1996) (finding design of baby product not inherently distinctive under the
"stringent" Duraco test without extended discussion); see also Pebble Beach Co. v. Tour
18 I, Ltd., 936 F. Supp. 1299, 1343 n.39 (S.D. Tex. 1996) ("The Duraco test creates a more
stringent standard of [inherent] distinctiveness."); Mitchell Zimmerman, Trade Dress
Protection for User Interfaces Revisited and Interred?, 13 COMPUTER LAW. 4, 8 (1996)
(concluding that Duraco test is likely to create "insuperable obstacles" to finding inher-
ently distinctive product configuration); infra note 281 and accompanying text (listing
cases in the Second Circuit applying Knitwaves and finding no inherent distinctiveness).
But see Health 0 Meter, Inc. v. Terraillon Corp., 873 F. Supp. 1160, 1171 (N.D. Ill. 1995)
(suggesting that if Duraco test were applicable in Seventh Circuit, the design of plaintiff's
scales would meet the test).
245. See supra notes 62-66 and accompanying text.
246. See Knitwaves, 71 F.3d at 1009 n.6.
247. The Second Circuit in Knitwaves implicitly interpreted Duraco as achieving the
same result. See id. (declining to follow Duraco test because not rooted in language of the
Lanham Act); see also Pebble Beach, 936 F. Supp. at 1343 n.39 (finding merit in Duraco
but applying Abercrombie because reading Two Pesos to endorse that approach).
[Vol. 75
PRODUCT DESIGN TRADE DRESS
intends that result can be discerned from its choice to associate prod-
uct features not with the trade dress treated by the Supreme Court in
Two Pesos but rather with the protection of color per se addressed by
the Supreme Court in Qualitex.24' The Knitwaves court was faced
with a choice between the two Supreme Court decisions: the full as-
similation of trade dress and trademarks underlying Two Pesos, and
the limited derogation from that principle suggested by the otherwise
expansionist decision in Qualitex. Was product design fully within
the scope of the Two Pesos decision or was it akin to color per se, and
thus protectable only upon proof of secondary meaning?
The Second Circuit obfuscated on this point. The very articula-
tion of a test for inherently distinctive product configuration clearly
presupposes the possibility that a product configuration can be inher-
ently distinctive. The Knitwaves court appears to incline toward
Qualitex rather than Two Pesos,49 however, citing as "equally appli-
cable to product features" the observation by the Qualitex court to
the effect that a product's color "is unlike 'fanciful,' 'arbitrary,' or
'suggestive' words." The Second Circuit's conclusion that, despite
Two Pesos, the presumption of source-identification at the root of
inherent distinctiveness "may not be made with regard to product
features or designs whose primary purposes are likely to be func-
tional or aesthetic,"' ° is thus a lopsided compromise of these
conflicting viewpoints. Although the court purported to set out a
standard that avoided imposing "additional, nontext-based require-
ments, such as the requirement of secondary meaning struck down in
Two Pesos,"2' for the reasons discussed above, that is precisely what
the Knitwaves primary intent test will likely achieve.22 It relegates
248. Duraco was decided before Qualitex, and the Third Circuit was thus steered only
by the wholly expansionist decision in Two Pesos. Viewed functionally, and less doctri-
nally, the decisions of both the Second and Third Circuits might be seen as an
implementation of the free competition mandate of Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft
Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 167 (1989), in preference to the equal protection edict of Two
Pesos. This Article argues, however, that the concerns for competition reflected in the
Bonito Boats decision should analytically be accommodated via the functionality doctrine
rather than the test for inherent distinctiveness. See supra notes 89-101 and accompany-
ing text.
249. One district court in the Second Circuit that has expressly declined to apply the
Knitwaves test founded its decision, among other things, on the failure of the Second Cir-
cuit to address clearly "the standards in this area as set by the Supreme Court" in Two
Pesos. See Krueger Int'l, Inc. v. Nightingale Inc., 915 F. Supp. 595, 601 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
250. Knitwaves, 71 F.3d at 1008.
251. Id. at 1009 n.6.
252. See supra notes 217-19, 234-38 and accompanying text. Although the Knitwaves
opinion is addressed to the question of inherent distinctiveness, Judge Oakes appears in
one passage to suggest that intention to serve a source-identifying function is relevant to
1997]
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product configuration once more to a lesser class of source-
identifiers.
Much of the articulation by the Duraco court of its test does not
suggest any radically new doctrinal framework in which to analyze
the inherent distinctiveness of product shapes,"3 and its consideration
of whether the design is unusual or merely ornamental is clearly ap-
propriate. To the extent that it mirrors the focus on intent and on
primary purpose displayed by the Knitwaves court, however, it also
distorts the traditional understanding of trademarks and suggests
more slender protection for product design.'
Thus, while both courts purport to leave open the prospect of in-
herently distinctive product design, they are clearly dubious of that
possibility, which in truth is quite chimerical under either test. The
configuration-specific tests the courts formulated may achieve the
same result sought by proponents of a secondary meaning require-
ment. In Two Pesos, the Supreme Court recognized that an absolute
requirement of secondary meaning for trade dress protection would
create a problem of piracy in the early stages of product marketing
and distribution.'5 That same vulnerability exists where secondary
meaning, though not required in every instance, is in effect the only
reliable route to trademark protection. In the Second and Third Cir-
eligibility for trade dress protection, implicating perhaps even protection by virtue of
secondary meaning. See Knitwaves, 71 F.3d at 1007. A subsequent district court decision
lends some substance to this concern by applying the Knitwaves test and granting defen-
dant's renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law on the distinctiveness question
without considering secondary meaning. See Banff Ltd. v. Express, Inc., 921 F. Supp.
1065, 1071 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); see also Judith Ripka Designs, Ltd. v. Preville, 935 F. Supp.
237, 257 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (applying Knitwaves test to jewelry design, and then turning to
analysis of inherent distinctiveness: "Plaintiff's jewelry, moreover, is not inherently dis-
tinctive" (emphasis added)). The defendant in Banff, however, had argued at the
summary judgment stage that the plaintiff had not plead secondary meaning. See Banff
Ltd. v. Express, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 1103, 1116 n.10 (S.D.N.Y. 1994)). The better reading of
Knitwaves is that it purports to deal only with the question of inherent distinctiveness.
See 71 F.3d at 1008 (articulating primary intent test as determinant of whether to presume
source identification); id. at 1009 (concluding that primary aesthetic objective of sweater
design resulted in the designs failing to "qualify for protection of trade dress inherent in
product design" (emphasis added)).
253. The Duraco test largely reflects the considerations announced in the new Re-
statement (Third) of Unfair Competition published a month after the opinion of the Third
Circuit was handed down. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 13 cmt. d.
254. See Tyco Indus. v. Tiny Love, Ltd., 914 F. Supp. 1068, 1082 (D.N.J. 1996) (finding
design of baby product not inherently distinctive under Duraco without extended discus-
sion); supra note 244; infra note 281.
255. See Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 771 (1992) (noting peti-
tioner's concession that a general requirement of secondary meaning imposes an unfair
prospect of theft or financial loss on the developer of fanciful or arbitrary trade dress at
the outset of its use).
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cuits, that may now be the case. 6 No court applying either Knit-
waves or Duraco has found a product design inherently distinctive.27
The tests the two courts announced, correctly founded on the inap-
propriateness of Abercrombie, are blatant efforts at revisionism.
256. Moreover, these courts are restricting the possibility of inherently distinctive
product configurations at the same time that a similar trend is suggesting that "secondary
meaning in a product configuration case will generally not be easy to establish." Duraco
Prods. v. Joy Plastic Enters., 40 F.3d 1431, 1453 (3d Cir. 1994); accord Sassafras Enters.,
Inc. v. Roshco, Inc., 915 F. Supp. 1, 10 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (quoting Duraco); see also Devan
Designs Inc. v. Palliser Furniture Corp., 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1991, 1998 (M.D.N.C.
1992) ("[W]here it is not a trademark but a trade dress at issue and that alleged trade
dress is in the design of the product itself,... it will usually take longer, if it is possible at
all, to achieve secondary meaning."), affd, 998 F.2d 1008 (4th Cir. 1993). The recently-
evidenced hostility of the Third Circuit towards product configuration trade dress claims
is emphasized by the fact that in Duraco the exclusive sale of the products in the shape in
question for five years was held to be "not so long a time as to raise a strong inference of
consumer association." Duraco, 40 F.3d at 1454; see also Ergotron, Inc. v. Hergo Ergo-
nomic Support Sys., Inc., No. 94 Civ. 2732, 1996 WL 143903, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29,
1996) (five years exclusive use not sufficient to withstand defendant's motion for sum-
mary judgment on issue of secondary meaning). This is a very pro-defendant observation,
particularly in light of the presumption contained in section 2(f) of the Lanham Act,
which allows the Patent and Trademark Office in registration proceedings to take five
years exclusive use as prima facie evidence of acquired distinctiveness. See 15 U.S.C.
§ 1052(f) (1994); cf. Stuart Hall Co. v. Ampad Corp., 51 F.3d 780, 790 (8th Cir. 1995)
("[Plaintiff's] exclusive and continuous use of its trade dress for the period of time that
creates a statutory presumption of secondary meaning for trademark registration weighs
in favor of a finding of secondary meaning .... ). The Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit has also articulated a more stringent standard for secondary meaning in the con-
text of product configuration trade dress. See Sassafras, 915 F. Supp. at 10-11; see also
Thomas & Betts Corp. v. Panduit Corp., 65 F.3d 654, 658 (7th Cir. 1995) (noting that with
product configuration, the issue in determining secondary meaning "is not the primary
meaning to consumers of a particular signifier, but is instead whether a product feature's
primary significance to consumers is as an identifier of source or as an element which
contributes to the inherent appeal of the product"), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1044 (1996).
This heightened standard led the Seventh Circuit to the conclusion that to prove secon-
dary meaning "[i]t is not enough that the consumers associate the form of the product
with a particular producer .... Consumers must also care that the product comes from a
particular producer (though they need not be able to identify him) and must desire the
product with the particular feature because it signifies that producer." Id. at 658-59. The
plaintiff in Thomas & Betts petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, and
asked the Supreme Court to consider whether a "more stringent" standard exists with
respect to establishing secondary meaning for product configurations. See Thomas &
Betts Corp. v. Panduit Corp., 65 F.3d 654 (7th Cir. 1995), petition for cert. filed, 64
U.S.L.W. 3518 (U.S. Jan. 22, 1996) (No. 95-1169). The Supreme Court has, however,
recently declined to hear the case. See Thomas & Betts Corp. v. Panduit Corp., 116 S. Ct.
1044 (1996) (denying certiorari).
257. For cases declining to find product design inherently distinctive trade dress under
Knitwaves, see infra note 281. See also Tyco, 914 F. Supp. at 1081-83 (finding design of
baby product not inherently distinctive under Duraco without extended discussion). But
cf. Health 0 Meter, Inc. v. Terraillon Corp., 873 F. Supp. 1160, 1171 (N.D. Ill. 1995)
(stating that if Duraco test were applicable in Seventh Circuit, the design of plaintiff's
scales would meet the test).
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They ignore the teachings of Two Pesos and effectively turn back the
clock to the days before product configurations were welcomed, on
the basis of their operation in the marketplace, into the fold of
source-identifiers." s
In the modem marketplace, however, consumers do often base
purchasing decisions on visual communication, which may flow
equally from the shape of the product itself as from supplementary
identifying decoration."9 There are many types of products and many
markets in which consumers might (or manufacturers might wish to
encourage them to) identify the product by reference to the design of
the product itself.
258. One pair of commentators has expressed a marginally more positive view of
Knitwaves, suggesting that Knitwaves at least defines the reach of the Second Circuit's
earlier decision in Paddington, where the court had extended the Abercrombie analysis to
packaging trade dress. See Barry Werbin & Darlene Fairman, "Inherently Distinctive"
Gains New Clarification, NAT. L.J., Feb. 12, 1996, at C29, C30 ("The 2d Circuit's decision
in Knitwaves is a welcome clarification of the intended scope of Paddington and provides
a more practical and realistic test for inherent distinctiveness than does the 8th Circuit in
Ampad."); supra, notes 160, 162; infra note 274 (discussing pre-Knitwaves case law in the
Second Circuit). Certainly, the rejection of Abercrombie is to be welcomed. However,
the test with which Abercrombie has been replaced is simply misconceived, as Werbin &
Fairman themselves concede, and will only rekindle rather than resolve the debate. See
Werbin & Fairman, supra at C30 ("Knitwaves likely will spawn further litigation and
analysis as courts grapple to apply the 2d Circuit's new test... to product-configuration
cases, while at the same time they struggle to avoid running afoul of the Supreme Court's
admonition in Two Pesos that trade dress can be protected if inherently distinctive with-
out proof of secondary meaning.").
259. See Excerpts from Motion for Leave to File Brief Amicus Curiae and Brief Amicus
Curiae of Int'l Trademark Ass'n in Support of Petition in Conopco, Inc. v. May Dep't
Stores Co., reprinted in 85 TRADEMARK REP. 154, 154 (1995) ("In today's marketplace,
the purchasing decision for many products and services is based on visual communication.
Trade dress serves a selection function at least as significant as that served by trade-
marks."); Keirs, supra note 222, at 16 ("Product configurations are becoming an
increasingly important indication of origin."); van Deursen, supra note 111, at 10 ("The
image your product projects depends on the language that speaks to the consumer. Rely
on your designers to create tangible and intangible product language capable of speaking
to global consumers."); cf. Braham, supra note 124, at 48 ("Many products today are be-
coming look-alike, lower-priced commodities .... For any to stand out, differentiation is
needed, and that means business for industrial designers."). Nor should there be a con-
cern that by accepting the possibility of dual-identifiers the design feature could
piggyback protection on a verbal mark that is the true source-identifier. A threshold
question for the protection of a design feature is whether it functions independently of the
word or other source-identifier, creating a commercial impression distinct from the ac-
companying words. See 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 15.02[5], at 15-17.
260. See, e.g., Versa Prods. Co. v. Bifold Co., 50 F.3d 189, 194 (3d Cir.) (noting that
plaintiff deliberately created the product's appearance, contrasting with the other prod-
ucts available on the market at the time, to identify the product in the market as plaintiff's
product), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 54 (1995). Indeed, one of the most valuable products of
the late twentieth century, the computer program, might almost entirely be identified (at
least post-sale) by its design features as embodied in its user interface. See Rhoda L.
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Such a situation might develop by necessity, as in the case of
products that are small, or the surface of which is not susceptible to
marking.!" The particular process by which a good is manufactured
may render labeling impossible. 2 Many products, for reasons of
cost, as well as marketing strategy, are left unpackaged or packaged
in a common undistinctive manner. 63 A product may be marketed to
a group of consumers whose ethnicity or diversity of ethnicity might
reduce the identifying value of words of particular language.'
Rudnick, Window Dressing: Trademark Protection for Computer Screen Displays and
Software, 80 TRADEMARK REP. 382, 382 (1990) ("The screen display design, the way the
product looks to and interacts with the user, has become the consumer's primary product
identification.").
261. For example, the dry cleaning press pads at issue in Qualitex Co. v. Jacobsen
Products Co. could not be stamped with a verbal mark or pressed clothes would have
been branded with the name. See Donna Gill, Supreme Court May Add Own Hue to
Color Depletion Theory, CHICAGO LAW., Nov. 1994, at 13; see also Qualitex Co. v. Jacob-
sen Prods. Co., 115 S. Ct. 1300, 1308 (1995) (recognizing that a firm "might find it difficult
to place a usable symbol or word on a product (say, a large industrial bolt that customers
normally see from a distance); and, that in such instances, the manufacturer might wish to
use color, pure and simple.., to identify the product"); Duraco, 40 F.3d at 1453 (noting
that consumers may identify source from product configuration "if the good is one with
some features of importance to a consumer's choice that a consumer ordinarily cannot
recognize in the market (such as the safety and efficacy of a drug) and one in which, be-
cause of the nature of the product's use or consumption, identifying source designations
might not readily be prominently displayed"); Ross-Whitney Corp. v. Smith Kline &
French Labs., 207 F.2d 190, 196 (9th Cir. 1953) (shape of pills); cf. McNeill-PPC, Inc. v.
Granutec, Inc., 919 F. Supp. 198, 202 (E.D.N.C. 1995) (discounting suggestion that let-
tered markings on the surface of Tylenol gelcaps inform person preparing to ingest the
capsule of the source of the drug); George G. Fox Co. v. Hathaway, 85 N.E. 417, 418
(Mass. 1908) (protecting shape, color and condition of bread; distinguishing low protec-
tion cases on ground that it is "not so easy to mark loaves of bread of the same size, shape
and color, in such a way that will readily be distinguished from one another").
262. See, e.g., Fabrication Enters., Inc. v. Hygenic Corp., 64 F.3d 53, 60 (2d Cir. 1995)
(product-small latex exercise bands-manufactured by a process which leaves a talc film
that cannot be stamped).
263. See Steven J. Orfield, Perception and Product Design, 43 APPLIANCE MFR. 24, 25
(Nov. 1, 1995) ("Many consumer product companies sell their products in retail environ-
ments where the product is on the shelf or floor and is unboxed."). Many goods that are
packaged when transferred to the purchaser are displayed without packaging at the point
of sale. For example, housewares, such as knives, are "usually displayed by the seller and
selected by the consumer out of their packaging." Forschner Group, Inc. v. Arrow Trad-
ing Co., 904 F. Supp. 1409, 1422 n.17 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (declining to consider packaging in
determining likelihood of confusion as to source of pocket knives); see also Aromatique,
Inc. v. Gold Seal, Inc., 28 F.3d 863, 873 (8th Cir. 1994) (noting that because consumers
want to see and smell the potpourri before they purchase it, it is wrapped in clear cello-
phane in a manner that allows the fragrance of the enclosed product to escape). Certain
consumer goods, typically more expensive electronic items, may be stocked in a packaged
form in the retail store, but with an unpackaged display model available for consumers to
use in determining whether to purchase the product.
264. See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobsen Prods. Co., 13 F.3d 1297, 1305 (9th Cir. 1994)
(plaintiff used green/gold color to identify dry cleaning pads where many in dry cleaning
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Manufacturers might seek to develop a distinctive shape for market-
ing reasons. Consistent with the functionalist credo, producers might
wish to avoid supplementary material of any kind. And consumers
might come to associate a design as a source-identifier even without a
conscious effort on the part of the manufacturer to produce such an
association or identification. Product shape will also assume en-
hanced importance in the after-sale market, where a verbal label or
distinctive packaging is no longer of significant effect. In those situa-
tions, the packaging or verbal mark that is allegedly of greater
concern than product shape at the point of initial purchase may be
discarded, separated, erased or differently presented.65 It is simply
incorrect to suggest that in all cases packaging or labeling will iden-
tify a product's source with greater certainty and immediacy than will
the product's shape.26 Indeed, the presumption of consumer empha-
sis on packaging and verbal marks appears inconsistent with the
recognition that associations and assumptions made by consumers
post-sale might also be appropriate concerns of trademark law.267
Despite this, Duraco and Knitwaves treat product configurations
as presumptively less capable of product differentiation by holding
industry in California did not speak English well), rev'd, 115 S. Ct. 1300 (1995); cf. Ocean
Garden, Inc. v. Marktrade Co., 953 F.2d 500,507 (9th Cir. 1991) (analyzing the likelihood
of confusion in packaging trade dress case, and noting that many Asian customers who do
not speak English purchase on appearance alone).
265. Consumers of so-called status products, for example, may decline to purchase
those items unless they remain distinctive when divested of packaging. See David M.
Tichane, The Maturing Trademark Doctrine of Post-Sales Confusion, 85 TRADEMARK
REP. 399, 399-400 (1995).
266. The Third Circuit in Duraco acknowledged that there may be circumstances in
which a consumer may be more likely to rely on product configuration. See Duraco, 40
F.3d at 1453. However, although recognizing that in such circumstances "a consumer may
be more likely to rely on a product configuration as a source designator," id. (emphasis
added), the court suggested that such recognition would merely make secondary meaning
easier to establish. See id. There is no reason why the fact that consumers are likely to
identify the source of a particular product type by reference to configuration should be
relevant to secondary meaning. Indeed, it should only be relevant to inherent distinctive-
ness: actual association can be measured without a calculation of that likelihood.
267. See, e.g., Ferrari S.P.A. Esercizio v. Roberts, 944 F.2d 1235, 1245 (6th Cir. 1991)
(recognizing that post-sale confusion was actionable under the Lanham Act); Lois
Sportswear, U.S.A., Inc. v. Levi Strauss & Co., 799 F.2d 867, 871 (2d Cir. 1986) (same);
see also McNeill-PPC, Inc. v. Granutec, Inc., 919 F. Supp. 198, 204 (E.D.N.C. 1995)
("Granted, the packaging is different, but if the consumer receives the pill from a friend,
or places the pill in another container, it is likely that the consumer will assume he or she
is taking a Tylenol product when in fact it could be Granutec's generic counterpart.")
(finding actionable post-sale confusion). See generally Michael J. Allen, The Scope of
Confusion Actionable Under Federal Trademark Law: Who Must Be Confused and
When?, 26 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 321 (1991) (discussing development of doctrine of
post-sale confusion, under which likelihood of confusion of consumers in the aftermarket
may still be actionable).
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them to a higher standard if they crave immediate protection. The
consequent restriction of trade dress protection for product configu-
rations could snowball by eroding the basis for consumer reliance
upon product configurations as indicia of source, which in turn could
further reduce the basis for offering designs protection." This will
almost certainly cause manufacturers to reduce the use of distinctive
product shapes as source-identifiers. If producers receive the strong-
est protection for appended supplemental marks or packaging, they
can be expected to tailor their products and packaging accordingly.
Protecting appended marks more fully than integrated product
features effectively restricts producers' options, and ultimately the
consumers' choice of the most worthy and varied designs. Encour-
aging the identification of products only by supplemental markers
rather than integrated features is born, in part, of wrong-headed pa-
ternalism.269  A lesser degree of protection for product design also
restricts the informational role of trade dress. Consumers benefit
from the greatest number of indicia by which to distinguish products:
some may focus more strongly on words, while others on shapes.
There is no reason to dissuade consumers from exercising their pur-
chasing decisions on the basis of additional valuable information.2 It
268. See Duraco, 40 F.3d at 1451 ("If product configurations are easily protected, con-
sumers might learn to rely on configurations as source designators; if protection is rare,
consumers will disregard product configurations as source designators, and no confusion
will result."). The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit has engaged in a similar analy-
sis with equal awareness of the "self-fulfilling" nature of its action. See Vornado Air
Circulation Sys., Inc. v. Duracraft Corp., 58 F.3d 1498, 1509 (10th Cir. 1995)
("[Clonsumer confusion resulting from the copying of product features is, in some meas-
ure, a self-fulfilling prophecy. To the degree that useful product configurations are
protected as identifiers, consumers will come to rely on them for that purpose, but if
copying is allowed, they will depend less on product shapes and more on labels and pack-
aging."), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 753 (1996).
269. One author, for example, has suggested that to allow either product design or (in
apparent distinction) a trademark to serve as a source-identifier "could engender confu-
sion among consumers rather than prevent it." Gregory L. Pehlman, Note, Unfair
Competition-Infringement Claims Under the Lanham Act-Relaxed Standards for Pro-
tection of Distinctive Trade Dress: Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2753
(1992), 60 TENN. L. REV. 449,465 (1993); see also Duraco, 40 F.3d at 1451 ("But partial
protection, if not carefully circumscribed, may eventually cause even greater consumer
confusion, as consumers will face difficulties determining what features are legitimate
source designators (because inherently distinctive) and which are not."). Mr. Pehlman
appears particularly concerned that the availability of (at least) two forms of source-
identification would confuse the witless consumer. See Pehlman, supra, at 465 n.137. This
rather ignores the possibility that consumers will be better informed and thus more capa-
ble of making more educated purchase decisions. Such a scenario is wholly consistent
with the pro-competitive purposes of trademark law.
270. But see John B. Pegram, Trademark Protection of Product and Container Con-
figurations, 81 TRADEMARK REP. 1, 27 (1990) ("The solution to the confusion problem is
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is not for the courts to shape the ways in which manufacturers create
product-source associations, or the ways in which consumers develop
those associations.27' Inducement for producers to recoil from what is
regarded as the primary challenge of modem industrial design seems
counter-productive, and unfortunately has been followed by other
courts.273
4. Faith in the Old
Immediately following Two Pesos, courts in the Second Circuit,
including panels of the Court of Appeals, applied Abercrombie with-
out much discussion of its fit to trade dress.' Despite the
public education. If the public understands that copying is likely, the public will come to
rely upon labeling and will not assume that all products of a similar configuration come
from the same source.").
271. Cf. Qualitex Co. v. Jacobsen Prods. Co., 115 S. Ct. 1300, 1302-03 (1995)
("[H]uman beings might use as a 'symbol' or 'device' almost anything at all that is capable
of carrying meaning .... ).
272. Compare In re DC Comics, Inc., 689 F.2d 1042, 1053 (1982) (Nies, J., concurring)
("No principle of trademark law requires the imposition of penalties for originality, crea-
tiveness, attractiveness, or uniqueness of one's product or requires a holding that... a
unique product design of a product, cannot also function as an identification of source."),
with Duraco, 40 F.3d at 1451 (noting that the test adopted by the court "encourages con-
sumers to rely on a product's configuration as a source designator only when it rather
plainly serves an identifying function").
273. This egregious disregard of the designer's aim is evident in, and indeed paraded
by, the Tenth Circuit in Vornado. There, the court recognized that "a producer may find
efficiencies in combining the brand-identifying function with a product's utilitarian func-
tion by using a useful product feature as a trademark or trade dress," but despite this
decided to "accord this type of efficiency little weight. Although the efficient combining
of form and function is at the heart of good industrial design, promoting it is not a Lan-
ham Act objective." Vornado, 58 F.3d at 1510 n.20.
274. See, e.g., Innovative Networks, Inc. v. Satellite Airlines Ticketing Ctrs., Inc., 871
F. Supp. 709, 723-24 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (evaluating distinctiveness of airline business center
under Abercrombie); EFS Mktg. v. Russ Berrie & Co., 836 F. Supp. 128, 135 (S.D.N.Y.
1993) (toy dolls) (citing Two Pesos and Paddington), affd, 76 F.3d 487, 491 (2d Cir. 1996)
(applying Knitwaves); see also Mana Prods. v. Columbia Cosmetics Mfg., 65 F.3d 1063,
1069-70 (2d Cir. 1995) (applying Abercrombie analysis to determine inherent distinctive-
ness of design of cosmetic compacts, reasoning that trade dress had "embraced" these
classifications) (considered by court to be packaging); Jeffrey Milstein, Inc. v. Greger,
Lawlor, Roth, Inc., 58 F.3d 27, 31-32 (2d Cir. 1995) (applying Abercrombie to determine
the distinctiveness of greeting card designs); Paddington Corp. v. Attiki Importers & Dis-
tribs., Inc., 996 F.2d 577, 583 (2d Cir. 1993) ("While the applicability of the Abercrombie
classifications to trade dress was not at issue in Two Pesos, the Court noted that the Fifth
Circuit below had applied the Abercrombie classifications to the trade dress at issue and
discussed them without disapproval. While the Court... stopped just short of expressly
ruling on whether the Abercrombie classifications apply to trade dress, we agree with the
Fifth Circuit... that they do." (citations omitted)) (applying Abercrombie/Chevron test
to product packaging); Banff Ltd. v. Limited, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 1103, 1115 (S.D.N.Y.
1994) ("While the [Abercrombie] test originated in the context of trademarks, the Second
Circuit has held it applicable to trade dress claims as well."), later proceeding, Banff Ltd.
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developments in the Third Circuit, other courts moved in step with
the Second Circuit and continued to engage in the classical analysis
and, following Chevron, continued to apply Abercrombie as the test
of inherent distinctiveness for all trade dress.25 Indeed, most of the
seventeen courts that have made findings of inherently distinctive
product configurations in infringement actions in the wake of Two
Pesos and have identified the basis for their conclusion, have done so
after application of AbercrombielChevron rather than Seabrook or
Duraco" Several of the courts have made no attempt to articulate a
v. Express, Inc., 921 F. Supp. 1065 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
275. See, e.g., Insty*Bit, Inc. v. Poly-Tech Indus., Inc., 95 F.3d 663, 672-73 (8th Cir.
1996) (applying Abercrombie to product design); Stuart Hall Co. v. Ampad Corp., 51 F.3d
780, 788 (8th Cir. 1995) ("This Circuit has followed Abercrombie in the past, and, in light
of Two Pesos' approval, we see no reason to abandon the classic test now."); Braun Inc. v.
Dynamics Corp. of Am., 975 F.2d 815, 825 nn.18-19 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (noting tests in Aber-
crombie and Chevron and remanding to district court to determine whether design of
blender inherently distinctive); Pebble Beach Co. v. Tour 18 I, Ltd., 936 F. Supp. 1299,
1343 n.39 (S.D. Tex. 1996) (applying Abercrombie to product design based on Supreme
Court discussion in Two Pesos); Reese Prods. v. Valley Indus., 50 Pat. Trademark &
Copyright J. (BNA) 228 (N.D. Ind. May 15, 1995) (applying Abercrombie but finding
shape of trailer hitch not inherently distinctive); Rubbermaid Commercial Prods. v. Con-
tico Int'l, 836 F. Supp. 1247, 1260-61 (W.D. Va. 1993) (applying Abercrombie to
determine distinctiveness of trash bin designs). The Abercrombie component of the test is
still applied in the packaging context (but not in product design cases) in the Second and
Third Circuits. See, e.g., Fun-Damental Too, Ltd. v. Gemmy Indus., No. 96 Civ. 1103,
1996 WL 125641, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 21, 1996) (applying Abercrombie to determine
distinctiveness of trade dress consisting of packaging and design features); Sweetzel, Inc.
v. Hawk Hill Cookies. Inc., No. Civ. A-2632, 1995 WL 550585, at *7 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 14,
1995); supra note 168 (discussing continued application of Abercrombie to determine
distinctiveness of packaging in Second and Third Circuits).
276. Several of these courts have expressly applied Abercrombie or Chevron. See, e.g.,
Body Support Sys., Inc. v. Blue Ridge Tables, Inc., No. 1:96CV161-D-D, 1996 WL 403943,
at *6 (N. D. Miss. July 17, 1996) (concluding that plaintiff was likely to prove design of
therapeutic cushion to be inherently distinctive and granting motion for preliminary in-
junction); Adler, Inc. v. World Bazaars, Inc., 897 F. Supp. 92, 96-97 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)
(finding the trade dress of a Christmas tree ornament to be inherently distinctive because
arbitrary or fanciful); Health 0 Meter, Inc. v. Terraillon Corp., 873 F. Supp. 1160, 1171
(N.D. Il. 1995) (design of plaintiff's scales inherently distinctive); Banff Ltd. v. Limited,
Inc., 869 F. Supp. 1103, 1116 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (denying defendant's motion for summary
judgment on whether sweater design inherently distinctive, and sending to trial), later
proceeding, Banff Ltd. v. Express, Inc., 921 F. Supp. 1065, 1070-71 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)
(setting aside jury verdict in favor of plaintiff and granting defendant's renewed motion
for judgment as a matter of law on question of inherent distinctiveness granted); Tough
Traveler, Ltd. v. Outbound Prods., No. 94-CV-449, Memorandum Decision and Order at
4 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 23, 1994) (overall appearance of child carrier inherently distinctive)
(on file with author), rev'd on other grounds, 60 F.3d 964 (2d Cir. 1995); Vomado Air
Circulation Sys., Inc. v. Duracraft Corp., No. 92-1543-WEB, Memorandum and Order at
27-29 (D. Kan. Mar 4, 1994) (on file with author) (appearance of household fan grill in-
herently distinctive), rev'd on other grounds, 58 F.3d 1498 (10th Cir. 1995), cert. denied,
116 S. Ct. 753 (1996); see also Kompan A.S. v. Park Structures, Inc., 890 F. Supp. 1167,
1174 (N.D.N.Y. 1995) (finding the configuration of playground equipment to be inher-
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basis for their conclusion.2' A minority of others, most notably in the
ently distinctive) (relying on Paddington, which had adopted Abercrombie test); cf. In-
sty*Bit, Inc., 95 F.3d at 672-73 (concluding that genuine issue exists as to whether design
of plaintiff's quick-change drill was inherently distinctive under Abercrombie). Others
have simply cited to the language of Two Pesos, in which the Supreme Court declared
that trade dress in the "suggestive," "arbitrary" or "fanciful" categories of Abercrombie is
inherently distinctive because by "its intrinsic nature" it identifies the particular source of
the product. See Imagineering, Inc. v. Van Klassens, Inc., 53 F.3d 1260, 1263-64 (Fed.
Cir.) (but noting the "new look" of the product design at issue), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct.
277 (1995).
My calculation of the number of inherently distinctive product configurations is
premised on the definition of "product configuration" provided supra note 12. An ex-
panded definition of "product design" would increase the number of product designs that
have been recognized as inherently distinctive since Two Pesos (and such recognition has
almost entirely been accorded after application of the Abercrombie/Chevron test, if a test
has been identified). For example, if two-dimensional product design is also considered,
the total of seventeen inherently distinctive product configurations would require to be
increased to at least twenty. Courts have found two-dimensional product design to be
inherently distinctive trade dress under Abercrombie. See Computer Care v. Service Sys.
Enters., Inc., 982 F.2d 1063, 1068-69 (7th Cir. 1992) (affirming finding of inherent dis-
tinctiveness of reminder letters, sales brochures and monthly reports provided as part of
auto service "reminder letter" business); Casa Editrice Bonechi S.R.L. v. Irving Weisdorf
& Co., 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1417, 1422 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (applying Abercrombie and
finding cover design of guidebooks inherently distinctive); Lisa Frank, Inc. v. Impact Int'l,
Inc., 799 F. Supp. 980, 988-89 (D. Ariz. 1992) (applying Seabrook standard in finding
group of two and three-dimensional novelty stationery items inherently distinctive, but
also finding Chevron satisfied); see also Letica Corp. v. Sweetheart Cup Co., 805 F. Supp.
482, 487-88 (W.D. Mich. 1992) (genuine issue as to whether pattern on disposable cups
inherently distinctive, but granting alleged infringer's motion for summary judgment be-
cause no likelihood of confusion) (applying Abercrombie). Nor does my initial calculation
include trade dress consisting of the overall impression conveyed by a composite of the
product's features and its packaging. See Fun-Damental Too, Ltd. v. Gemmy Indus., No.
96 Civ. 1103, 1996 WL 125641, at *8-9 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 21, 1996) (trade dress of novelty
bank inherently distinctive) (applying Abercrombie); see also Fundex Inc. v. Imperial Toy
Corp., 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1061, 1063-64 (S.D. Ind. 1992) (holding that plaintiff pre-
sented sufficient evidence to suggest that product/packaging composite could be
inherently distinctive trade dress) (applying Abercrombie categories). Similarly, the
number would rise further if the features of a golf course hole or the exterior design of a
museum were considered a product design. See Pebble Beach Co. v. Tour 18 I, Ltd., 936
F. Supp. 1299, 1342-43 & n.39 (S.D. Tex. 1996) (finding design of golf course hole inher-
ently distinctive because it contains "arbitrary source-identifying features," and in light of
the "uniqueness" of its appearance) (applying Abercrombie); Rock & Roll Hall of Fame
& Museum Inc. v. Gentile Prods., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1140, 1142-43 (N.D. Ohio 1996)
(finding the shape of the Rock and Roll Hall of Fame to be inherently distinctive because
"unique" and "fanciful" but not identifying applicable test of distinctiveness; enjoining
sale of unauthorized posters depicting the building).
277. See Alan Tracy, Inc. v. Trans Globe Imports, Inc., 60 F.3d 840 (Fed. Cir. 1995)
(Table decision, opinion published at 1995 WL 331109, at *2) (without identifying test,
affirming trial court finding of inherently distinctive feature of lighting fixture lens be-
cause "physical configuration is uncommon and creates a distinctive visual impression");
Gasser Chair Co. v. Infanti Chair Mfg. Corp., No. 88 Civ. 3931, 1996 WL 370162, at *12
(E.D.N.Y. June 28, 1996) (finding design of chair to be inherently distinctive without
identification of test applied, but apparently by reference to evidence of actual consumer
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Eleventh Circuit, have continued to apply Seabrook, although find-
ings of inherently distinctive product configurations under Seabrook
have been more rare.27
The Duraco court suggested, with some degree of accuracy, that
courts applying Abercrombie have done so nonchalantly, without in-
quiring whether it makes sense to do so or articulating fully why they
have done so. 9 Moreover, four of the decisions finding inherently
association, and declaring that a "trade dress is inherently distinctive when its 'gestalt'
identifies the product as coming from an identified source."), vacated, No. 96-1448, 1996
WL 455579, at *2 (Fed. Cir. Aug 1, 1996) (vacating judgment and remanding to district
court because terms of injunction did not adequately identify enjoined products); Sun-
beam Prods. Inc. v. West Bend Co., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1545, 1551 (S.D. Miss. 1996)
(design of household mixer inherently distinctive, without identifying test but citing to
decision of the Fifth Circuit in Two Pesos); Dorr-Oliver Inc. v. Fluid-Quip, Inc., 894 F.
Supp. 1190, 1198-99 (N.D. Ill. 1995) (finding clamshell-shaped starch washer used in
processing corn inherently distinctive shape without adopting a specific test but noting
that design is not functional and is unique), rev'd on other grounds, 94 F.3d 376 (7th Cir.
1996); Black & Decker Corp. v. Int'l Sales & Mktg., 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1851, 1853
(C.D. Cal. 1995) (trade dress of "Snakelight" flashlight inherently distinctive) (without
identifying test applied, but basing decision on lack of prior similar design in marketplace
and departure from previous flashlight designs in the marketplace); Knitwaves, Inc. v.
Lollytogs Ltd., 92 Civ. 6285 (JSM), Ruling from the Bench (Sept. 1, 1992) ("[I]t seems to
me clear that we have a design that is inherently distinctive.") (sweater design) (copy of
transcript on file with author), rev'd, 71 F.3d 996 (2d Cir. 1995); see also Badger Meter,
Inc. v. Grinnell Corp., 13 F.3d 1145, 1151 (7th Cir. 1994) (identifying no test because jury
finding of inherent distinctiveness not challenged by defendant on appeal).
278. See, e.g., Callaway Golf Co. v. Golf Clean, Inc., 915 F. Supp. 1206, 1212 (M.D.
Fla. 1995) (determining that design of "Big Bertha" golf clubs inherently distinctive under
Seabrook); Taylor Made Golf Co. v. Trend Precision Golf, Inc., 903 F. Supp. 1506, 1507
(M.D. Fla. 1995) (applying Seabrook/AmBrit in determining that claimed trade dress of
golf club-placement of colors on club-was not inherently distinctive); Jungle Rags, Inc.
v. Rainbow Graphics, Inc., 29 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1704, 1708 (M.D. Fla. 1993) (concluding
that flap in shirt in shape of animal's mouth not inherently distinctive); see also Sunburst
Prods. v. Cyrk Int'l, Nos. 95-1091, 95-1104, 1996 WL 550071, at *4 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 30,
1996) (applying Seabrook and finding design of waist pouch not inherently distinctive);
Ergotron, Inc. v. Hergo Ergonomic Support Sys., Inc., No. 94 Civ. 2732, 1996 WL 143903,
at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 1996) (deciding that design of computer workstation furniture
not inherently distinctive under Seabrook); Swisher Mower & Machine Co. v. Haban
Mfg., Inc., 931 F. Supp. 645, 649-50 (W.D. Mo. 1996) (design of mower not inherently
distinctive under Seabrook); Devan Designs Inc. v. Palliser Furniture Corp., 25
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1991, 1996 n. 2 (M.D.N.C. 1992) (applying Seabrook to furniture line
and rejecting claim of inherent distinctiveness), aff'd, 998 F.2d 1008 (table decision,
opinion published at 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1339 (4th Cir. 1993) (citing, without analysis,
Abercrombie rather than Seabrook)). There have been two cases finding inherently dis-
tinctive product configurations under Seabrook. See Callaway Golf Co., 915 F. Supp. at
1212 (design of "Big Bertha" golf clubs inherently distinctive under Seabrook); Krueger
Int'l, Inc. v. Nightingale Inc., 915 F. Supp. 595, 607 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (design of metal-
frame stacking chairs inherently distinctive); see also Lisa Frank, Inc. v. Impact Int'l., Inc.,
799 F. Supp. 980, 988-89 (D. Ariz. 1992) (applying Seabrook standard in finding two- and
three-dimensional novelty stationery items inherently distinctive, but also finding Chev-
ron satisfied).
279. See Duraco, 40 F.3d at 1440; see also Oratz, supra note 112, at 4 (observing that
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distinctive product configurations under Abercrombie emanated from
the Second Circuit, and must now be reconsidered in light of the de-
cision of the Court of Appeals in Knitwaves accepting that
"Abercrombie [made] little sense when applied to product fea-
tures."m  Indeed, in the wake of Knitwaves, one district court in the
Southern District of New York that had previously applied Aber-
crombie in denying defendant's motion for summary judgment on the
question of inherent distinctiveness, has set aside a jury verdict in fa-
vor of the plaintiff and granted a renewed motion for judgment as a
matter of law on the basis of the Second Circuit's reformulation of
the test for inherent distinctiveness in Knitwaves.281
Despite the developments in the Third and (belatedly) Second
Circuits, courts applying AbercrombielChevron have found product
configuration trade dress to be inherently distinctive with increasing
frequency since Two Pesos. This increase may be attributable in part
to the general liberalizing trend endorsed by Two Pesos. It has also
been suggested, however, that it might be attributable to some loose
language found in that Supreme Court opinion.' The Court, in its
courts applying Abercrombie to trade dress "either do not bother to explain what it means
for a trade dress to be 'descriptive' or they simply rely on the traditional definitions,
which only make sense in the context of standard trademarks (Le., words and pictures)").
280. Knitivaves, 71 F.3d at 1007. In addition, the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit has expressed its disagreement with the conclusion of inherent distinctiveness
reached by the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit-applying Second Circuit law-
in Imagineering, Inc. v. Van Klassens, Inc., 53 F.3d 1260 (Fed. Cir. 1995). See L. & J.G.
Stickley, Inc. v. Canal Dover Furniture Co., 79 F.3d 258, 263 n.3 (2d Cir. 1996) ("We be-
lieve that the Imagineering case does not present a correct analysis of inherent
distinctiveness .... ).
281. See Banff Ltd. v. Express,, Inc., 921 F. Supp. 1065, 1070-71 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). No
court applying Knitwaves has found a product design trade dress to be inherently distinc-
tive. See id; accord EFS Mktg. v. Russ Berrie & Co., 76 F.3d 487, 490-91 (2d Cir. 1996)
(applying Knitwaves and affirming District Court decision, which was based on Aber-
crombie, that toy dolls not inherently distinctive); Grupke v. Linda Lori Sportswear, Inc.,
921 F. Supp. 987, 996 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (applying Knitwaves, and granting defendant's
motion for summary judgment on question of inherent distinctiveness where tee-shirt
design held to be "primarily aesthetic" and there was "no evidence that plaintiffs in-
tended their design to identify the source of the tee-shirts"); Herbko Int'l, Inc. v. Gemmy
Indus., 916 F. Supp. 322, 328 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (applying Knitwaves and finding design of
game board not inherently distinctive where product configuration "appears to enhance
the product's aesthetic value, rather than identify the source of the product"); New York
Racing Ass'n, Inc. v. Perlmutter Publ'g, Inc., No. 95 Civ. 994, 1996 WL 465298 at *2
(N.D.N.Y. July 19, 1996) (finding trade dress consisting of images on souvenir merchan-
dising not inherently distinctive under Knitwaves where no evidence that plaintiff's
objective in using the trade dress was primarily source-identification); Judith Ripka De-
signs, Ltd. v. Preville, 935 F. Supp. 237, 257 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (applying Knitwaves and
finding jewelry design not inherently distinctive because primary purpose of design was
aesthetic).
282. See, e.g., Nancy D. Chapman, Trade Dress Protection in the United States After the
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discussion of inherent distinctiveness, referred to whether a mark is
"capable" of distinguishing goods from those of others,' which is the
basis for registration on the Supplemental Register.2 Registration
on the Supplemental Register is, however, premised on inchoate dis-
tinctiveness; inherent distinctiveness is a presumption of the
existence of distinctiveness.
One observer has postulated that post-Two Pesos courts have
confused the two standards, holding trade dress to be inherently dis-
tinctive on the basis of an incorrect lower standard.' Since Two
Pesos, there has been a significant increase in the number of product
configurations found to be inherently distinctive, and many of these
opinions recite the "capability" language from the Supreme Court
opinion.' It is difficult to evaluate, however, whether courts are
Supreme Court Decision in Two Pesos, 387 P.L.I./PAT. 7, 14-15 (1994) (criticizing use of
"capability" language in Two Pesos and Paddington).
283. See Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763,773 (1992).
284. See 15 U.S.C. § 1091 (1994). Marks that are insufficiently distinctive to obtain
registration upon the Principal Register, but which are capable of becoming distinctive,
may be registered on the Supplemental Register. See id. Marks that are merely descrip-
tive are commonly registered on the Supplemental Register until such time as they
acquire distinctiveness in the form of secondary meaning and can thus be registered on
the Principal Register. See JAMES E. HAWES, TRADEMARK REGISTRATION PRACrICE,
§ 3.01 at 3-3 to 3-4 (1996). For the advantages of registration on the Supplemental Regis-
ter, see 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 19.09[1][d].
285. See Chapman, supra note 282, at 13-16.
286. See, e.g., Tough Traveler, Ltd. v. Outbound Prods., No. 94-CV-449, Memorandum
Decision and Order at 4 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 23, 1994) (on file with author) ("The critical
issue 'is not whether a trade dress has in fact come to identify a specific producer, but
whether it is "capable of identifying a particular source of the product."' " (quoting Pad-
dington, 996 F.2d at 582-83 (quoting Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 770))), rev'd on other
grounds, 60 F.3d 964 (2d Cir. 1995); Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc. v. Duracraft Corp.,
92-1543-WEB, Memorandum and Order at 4 (D. Kan. Mar. 4, 1994) ("To be entitled to
protection, a mark must be capable of distinguishing the applicant's goods from those of
others"), rev'd on other grounds, 58 F.3d 1498 (10th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 753
(1996); see also Aromatique, Inc. v. Gold Seal, Inc., 28 F.3d 863, 869 (8th Cir. 1994) ("A
distinctive trademark is one that is capable of identifying the source of goods because it is
either inherently distinctive or, if not inherently distinctive, has acquired distinctiveness
by acquiring secondary meaning"); Paddington Corp. v. Attiki Importers & Distribs., Inc.,
996 F.2d 577, 582-83 (2d Cir. 1993) (interpreting Two Pesos as requiring a court to con-
sider "not whether a trade dress has in fact come to identify a specific producer, but
whether 'it is capable of identifying a particular source of the product.'" (quoting Two
Pesos, 505 U.S. at 771)); Hanig & Co. v. Fisher & Co., Civ. No. 92 C 1779, 1994 WL
97758, at *3 (N.D. Ill. 1994) ("Fanciful, arbitrary, and suggestive marks are considered to
be inherently distinctive, in the sense that they are capable of functioning immediately as
a designation of origin."); Life Indus. Corp. v. Ocean Bio-Chem, Inc., 827 F. Supp. 926,
931 (E.D.N.Y. 1993) ("The focus of the 'inherently distinctive' inquiry is not whether a
trade dress has come to identify a specific producer, but rather whether the dress is
'capable of identifying a particular source of the product.' " (quoting Two Pesos, 505 U.S.
at 770)), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Life Indus. Corp. v. Star Brite Distribs., Inc., 31
F.3d 42,46 (2d Cir. 1994) (affirming district court on issue of distinctiveness).
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holding trade dress to the lower standard, since the Chev-
ron/Abercrombie analysis in which they purport to engage reveals
nothing of their reasoning. The capability test is incorrect and is not
the appropriate standard by which to assess inherent distinctiveness.
The opinions in which it is cited are, however, equally as indicative of
the unworkability of the ChevronlAbercrombie analysis as of any
lower standard the courts might be applying. Recitation of the capa-
bility language appears to perform in much the same way as does the
mantra of Abercrombie in trade dress cases: to provide a useless ve-
neer to intuitive judgments of protectability. The solution to these
problems lies in articulating a concrete test for predicting likely con-
sumer association; in so doing, it should be made clear that there is a
substantial difference between likely association and any inchoate
association that is "capable" of developing.8
E. Some Suggested Analytical Modifications
In the wake of Two Pesos, two schools of judicial thought have
developed with respect to the inherent distinctiveness of product de-
signs. The first school, which has found full voice only since late 1994
and is largely (although not exclusively) confined to the Third and
Second Circuits,m has not fully embraced the spirit of Two Pesos.1
9
287. See In re Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 142 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 366, 369 (C.C.P.A.
1964) (noting difference between what a mark is likely to do to a purchaser and what it is
capable of doing). Nancy Chapman suggests that, ironically, protection based on a
"capability" standard presents the same problems and deficiencies as does the doctrine of
secondary meaning in the making that was expressly rejected by the Two Pesos Court.
See Chapman, supra note 282, at 15; supra note 73. Professor McLean has suggested that
the Supreme Court's opinion revived the doctrine under a different guise. See Willa-
jeanne F. McLean, The Birth, Death and Renaissance of the Doctrine of Secondary
Meaning in the Making, 42 AM. U. L. REv. 737, 771 (1993) ("The court has resurrected
the secondary meaning in the making doctrine as the 'inherently distinctive' test."). Cer-
tainly, the Supreme Court's endorsement of the statement (made by the court of appeals)
that a producer has a proprietary interest in a mark it has developed regardless of actual
market response, appears to emphasize the prevention of piracy without regard to
whether confusion is likely or goodwill exists to be appropriated. If that endorsement is
taken too literally, there is a potential circumvention of the distinctiveness requirement
that parallels the secondary meaning in the making doctrine. However, the Court's
holding was not quite so broad, and merely decided that protectability could be based
upon a likelihood of consumer association (inherent distinctiveness) as well as actually
demonstrated association (secondary meaning). Read in this light, the concerns ex-
pressed by Professor McLean appear unjustified.
288. The Tenth Circuit has also indicated a recent willingness to restrict protection for
product configuration trade dress, but its most notable efforts in this regard have been in
refereeing the alleged conflict between patent and trade dress rights. See Vornado Air
Circulation Sys., Inc. v. Duracraft Corp., 58 F.3d 1498, 1510 (10th Cir. 1995), cert. denied,
116 S. Ct. 753 (1996); see also Dinwoodie, supra note 17, at 95-102. In Vornado, the
Tenth Circuit reversed the grant of an injunction by the district court, which had found
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Having failed to establish a border between verbal marks and non-
verbal dress, these courts have regrouped by drawing a line between
product packaging and product configurations. By formulating a
stricter test for product configurations, and indicating a general revi-
sionist suspicion regarding the capacity of product configurations to
act as source-identifiers, they have hampered the capacity of trade-
mark law to offer effective protection to product designs.
Other courts appear drunk on the liberalizing draught of Two
Pesos. This group included the Second Circuit until the Knitwaves
decision,"' and remains exemplified by the Eighth,29' (although in-
the design of plaintiff's household fan grill to be inherently distinctive under Abercrom-
bie. See Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc. v. Duracraft Corp., 92-1543-WEB,
Memorandum and Order at 29 (D. Kan. Mar 4, 1994) (on file with author) (appearance of
household fan grill inherently distinctive), rev'd on other grounds, 58 F.3d 1498 (10th Cir.
1995). The Court of Appeals reversed on the ground that
where a product configuration is a significant inventive component of an inven-
tion covered by a utility patent, so that without it the invention cannot fairly be
said to be the same invention, patent policy dictates that it enter into the public
domain when the utility patents on the fans expire. To ensure that result, it can-
not receive trade dress protection under section 43(a).
Vornado, 58 F.3d at 1500. Although the court did not address inherent distinctiveness, it
noted (quoting Two Pesos) that "trade dress features (or feature) are inherently distinc-
tive because their intrinsic nature is such as to 'almost automatically tell a customer that
they refer to a brand.'" Id. at 1502 (citation omitted). Although this is merely a general
statement, found in Two Pesos, of the meaning of inherent distinctiveness, one district
court in the Tenth Circuit has declined to decide whether this amounts to a new test for
inherent distinctiveness in that circuit, or whether Vornado impliedly adopts Abercrombie
for product configuration trade dress. See Winning Ways, Inc. v. Holloway Sportswear,
Inc., 913 F. Supp. 1454, 1463-64 (D. Kan. 1996) (trade dress of jackets not inherently dis-
tinctive under either Abercrombie or new standard).
289. The Duraco court, in particular, appeared influenced more by the earlier Su-
preme Court decision in Bonito Boats and by the principles of free competition and
judicial restraint to which the Supreme Court gave prominence in that case. See D.uraco
Prods. v. Joy Plastic Enters., 40 F.3d 1431, 1445-47 (3d Cir. 1994). Professor Reichman, in
1993, noted the early signs of Two Pesos having (ironically) breathed new life into Bonito
Boats. See Reichman, supra note 30, at 394 (noting "amount of resistance to the protec-
tion of product configurations [Two Pesos] may paradoxically have stirred up, at least at
the appellate level, as one panel after another seems to rediscover the virtues of free
competition and the limits on judicial activism implicit in Bonito Boats").
290. Two district courts in the Second Circuit have found product designs to be inher-
ently distinctive since Knitwaves, but have reached that conclusion by refusing to apply
the test announced by the Second Circuit. See Gasser Chair Co. v. Infanti Chair Mfg.
Corp., No. 88 Civ. 3931, 1996 WL 370162, at *12 (E.D.N.Y. June 28, 1996) (finding that
design of chair was inherently distinctive), vacated, No. 96-1448, 1996 WL 455579, at *2
(Fed. Cir. Aug 1, 1996) (vacating judgment and remanding to District Court because
terms of injunction did not adequately identify enjoined products); Krueger Int'l, Inc. v.
Nightingale Inc., 915 F. Supp. 595, 607 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (design of metal-frame stacking
chairs inherently distinctive) (applying Seabrook). One other court has found a compos-
ite of product design and packaging inherently distinctive. See Fun-Damental Too, Ltd. v.
Gemmy Indus., No. 96 Civ. 1103, 1996 WL 125641, at *8-*9 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 21, 1996)
(trade dress of novelty bank inherently distinctive) (applying Abercrombie).
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creasingly more ambivalent) Seventh2 and Federal2 Circuits. These
291. Although the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit strongly endorsed the
Abercrombie test in Stuart Hall Co. v. Ampad Corp., 51 F.3d 780,788 (8th Cir. 1995), and
applied it again in Insty*Bit, Inc. v. Poly-Tech, Indus., Inc., 95 F.3d 663, 672-73 (8th Cir.
1996), other language in the Stuart Hall opinion has been relied upon by district courts in
that circuit as an alternative test for the inherent distinctiveness of product configuration.
For example, the court in Ark Plas Products v. Value Plastics, Inc., 913 F. Supp. 1246,
1252 (W.D. Ark. 1996) has summarized its understanding of distinctiveness as follows:
Trade dress is inherently distinctive if the design of the trade dress is "only
tenuously connected with the nature of the product," and "secondary meaning,
which requires a showing that consumers attached significance to the trade dress
as a source signifier, need not be proven." If the design of the trade dress is
"dictated by the nature of the product then secondary meaning must be proven."
Id. (citing Stuart Hall, 51 F.3d at 786). This approach rests on the false premise, see supra
notes 183-91 and accompanying text, that consumer association is relevant only to secon-
dary meaning, and confuses a test of functionality with that of inherent distinctiveness.
See Krueger Int'l, Inc. v. Nightingale Inc., 915 F. Supp. 595, 603 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (Eighth
Circuit approach quoted emphasizes functionality); see also Versa Prods. Co. v. Bifold
Co., 50 F.3d 189, 197 n.5 (3d Cir. 1995) (suggesting that standard of whether design dic-
tated by functional considerations was same standard as that for functionality); cf Empi v.
lomed, 923 F. Supp. 1159, 1163-64 (D. Minn. 1996) (attempting to separate those state-
ments in the Stuart Hall opinion that refer to a "prior test for the inherent distinctiveness
component rather than the functionality component of the trade dress analysis"). Moreo-
ver, the Ark Plas court's conclusion that the design of the piping at issue was dictated by
the nature of the product because it was the product, see Ark Plas, 913 F. Supp. at 1252,
would prevent any product configuration from being inherently distinctive under this test.
It is by no means clear, however, that the Stuart Hall court intended any test other than
Abercrombie to apply to product configuration claims. But cf. Swisher Mower & Machine
Co. v. Haban Mfg., Inc., 931 F. Supp. 645, 649-50 (W.D. Mo. 1996) (applying Seabrook in
finding that design of mower was not inherently distinctive).
292. One district court in the Seventh Circuit has recently sought to apply a different
test to product design than to product packaging, but its efforts simply resulted in a non-
test. See Nelson/Weather-Rite, Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., No. 93 C 2274, 1995
WL 669091, at *10 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 8, 1995) (noting that both Chevron and Seabrook were
packaging cases, and deciding that the appropriate test for the design of the product itself
was that found in Accurate Leather & Novelty Co. v. LTD Commodities, Inc., 18
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1327 (N.D. Ill. 1990)). That so-called "test" amounts to no more than
the generally accepted definition of trade dress. See id. Thus, perhaps not surprisingly,
the court concluded that "merely articulating this test shows that it is a subjective test
which should not be determined as a matter of [summary judgment]." See Nel-
son/Weather-Rite, 1995 WL 669091, at *10. Generally, for the purpose of determining
inherent distinctiveness, courts in the Seventh Circuit (including the court of appeals) ap-
pear to be treating product design and packaging alike, although acknowledging the
deficiencies of Abercrombie and recognizing the lesser likelihood that product configura-
tions (as opposed to packaging) will be inherently distinctive. See supra notes 148, 227,
242, and cases cited therein.
Efforts in the Seventh Circuit to restrict product design trade dress protection have
found expression in other developments. First, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit has articulated a more stringent secondary meaning standard for product configu-
ration trade dress than is applicable in the packaging trade dress context. See Thomas &
Betts Corp. v. Panduit Corp., 65 F.3d 654, 658-59 (7th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct.
1044 (1996); see also supra note 256 (discussing the heightened standard). Second, sev-
eral courts have suggested potential restrictions on product design protection not
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courts are clearly more receptive to the possibility of inherently dis-
tinctive product configurations.294  One study of trade dress
infringement actions concluded that only two product configurations
were found to be inherently distinctive in the thirty-year period prior
to Two Pesos.295 Yet, at least seventeen have been endowed with that
dissimilar to that announced by the Tenth Circuit in Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc. v.
Duracraft Corp., 58 F.3d 1498, 1500 (10th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 753 (1996)
(discussed supra notes 82,288). The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit first hinted
at a Vornado-like restriction in Thomas & Betts, see 65 F.3d at 659, and the issue has since
been taken up by two district courts in the Northern District of Illinois, including the
Thomas & Betts court on remand. See Thomas & Betts Corp. v. Panduit Corp., 935 F.
Supp. 1399, 1409 (N.D. Ill. 1996) ("[T]he subject of an expired utility patent which is dis-
closed as the 'best mode' in the patent cannot be the subject of trademark protection with
respect to the invention disclosed to the public."); Zip Dee, Inc. v. Dometic Corp., 931 F.
Supp. 602, 611-12 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (concluding that trade dress protection should not be
available for a product configuration that has been claimed as part of a utility patent if the
product configuration is functional within the context of the patent in which it was
claimed or is functional in the trademark sense). Finally, the Seventh Circuit has applied
the likelihood of confusion requirement strictly in the context of product configurations,
modifying its usual infringement analysis to take account of the "undeniable tension"
between product design trade protection and patent law principles. See Dorr-Oliver, Inc.
v. Fluid-Quip, Inc., 94 F.3d 376, 383 (7th Cir. 1996) (endorsing approach of Third Circuit
in Versa to the effect that: where product configurations are at issue, substantial identity
of designs will not cut strongly in plaintiff's favor; and, there is generally no likelihood of
confusion stemming even from substantially identical designs when the manufacturer's
name is clearly displayed on the product). The theme common to each of these analytical
deviations (not just the second) is the concern of the Seventh Circuit that broad trade
dress protection for product design might conflict with patent law principles. See id. at
383; see also Thomas & Betts, 65 F.3d at 658.
293. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has indicated some movement to-
ward lesser protection for product configuration in a recent decision concerning
functionality and, with respect to trade dress generally, in the context of the test for like-
lihood of confusion. See Elmer v. ICC Fabricating, 67 F.3d 1571, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1995)
(finding claimed trade dress in vehicle-mounted advertising functional because co-
extensive with utility patent on signs) (applying Eleventh Circuit law); Conopco, Inc. v.
May Dept. Stores Co., 46 F.3d 1556, 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (finding no likelihood of confu-
sion despite similarities in packaging trade dress because of defendant's prominent
addition of its logo to packaging) (applying Eighth Circuit law); see also Dinwoodie, supra
note 17, at 59-65 (discussing Conopco). Litigants have recently-without success-asked
the Supreme Court to consider both of these issues. See, e.g., Bader's Dutch Biscuit Co. v.
Hearthside Baking Co., 64 F.3d 666 (9th Cir. 1995), petition for cert. filed, 64 U.S.L.W.
3436 (U.S. Jan. 2, 1996) (seeking resolution of conflict among circuits as to whether pres-
ence of defendant's name prominently displayed on packaging should preclude finding of
infringement), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 921 (1996); supra note 24 (citing cases seeking re-
view on alleged patent/trademark conflict).
294. For other courts that have found inherently distinctive product design, see supra
notes 276-78 (citing cases from the Second, Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh
and Federal Circuits). The list would expand to include the Sixth Circuit if the exterior
design of a museum were considered a product design. See Rock & Roll Hall of Fame &
Museum Inc. v. Gentile Prods., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1140, 1142-43 (N.D. Ohio 1996)
(finding the shape of the Rock and Roll Hall of Fame to be inherently distinctive).
295. In the survey, presented to the Patent, Trademark and Copyright Section of the
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status in the four years since the Supreme Court decision.296 Al-
though this view is more in accord with the role of product shapes in
the modem marketplace, because almost all of those decisions ap-
plied Chevron/Abercrombie in finding inherent distinctiveness (or did
not identify the standard being applied), the basis for their conclu-
sions is rarely articulated.
Although the set of inherently distinctive product designs might
American Bar Association in 1992, Lawrence Evans and Elizabeth Hoover found that in
106 reported product configuration trade dress infringement cases between 1961 and
1991, very few courts found the product configuration to be inherently distinctive and
protectable without proof of secondary meaning. See Lawrence E. Evans, Jr. & Elizabeth
A. Hoover, Protection of Product Configurations Under the Lanham Act, 1 U. BALT.
INTELL. PROP. L.J. 126, 133 (1993). Although the authors of the study suggest that two
product configurations were found to be inherently distinctive, see id. at 136, in fact the
study reveals only one such case. See Bauer Lamp Co. v. Shaffer, 941 F.2d 1165, 1170-71
(11th Cir. 1991) (concluding that sufficient evidence existed to support jury verdict based
on assertion that configuration of lamp inherently distinctive). In both of the cases cited
by the authors of the study as examples of inherently distinctive product configurations,
the court decided only that such a possibility existed but did not make any finding of in-
herent distinctiveness with respect to the product configuration before it. See Evans &
Hoover, supra, at 136 n.104 (identifying cases); see also Vaughan Mfg. Co. v. Brikam Int'l,
Inc., 814 F.2d 346, 348 (7th Cir. 1987) (recognizing that secondary meaning need not be
shown where trade dress inherently distinctive, but concluding that design in issue was not
inherently distinctive) (affirming grant of preliminary injunction on basis of sufficient
evidence of secondary meaning); Remcraft Lighting Prods., Inc. v. Maxim Lighting, Inc.,
706 F. Supp. 855, 858 (S.D. Fla. 1989) (denying defendant's motion for summary judgment
on question of inherent distinctiveness). The study was restricted to infringement actions
rather than registration proceedings: there are several decisions that uphold registration
on the basis of inherent distinctiveness. See Arthur Seidel, The Procurement of Trade-
mark Registrations for the Configuration of Three Dimensional Articles 111, 128 n.8 (ALI-
ABA Course of Study, Nov. 17, 1989) available in WESTLAW C461 ALI-ABA 109
(collecting cases); see, e.g., Schaeffer Marine Inc., 1 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1580, 1584
(T.T.A.B. 1986) (design of marine fittings and hardware). The study also excluded from
its scope various types of product, including: clothing and shoes, packaging, exterior
building features and interior decor, colors, pills, candy and foods, jewelry and watches,
dish and silver patterns, other patterns, magazine formats, scents, sounds, and dolls,
stuffed animals and figurines. See Evans & Hoover, supra, at 149 n.179; see also id. at 137
n.108 (listing cases in these categories finding inherently distinctive trade dress); see, e.g.,
Animal Fair, Inc. v. Amfesco Indus., Inc., 620 F. Supp. 175 (D. Minn. 1985), aff'd, 794
F.2d 678 (8th Cir. 1986) (slippers in shape of bear's foot). In essence, the survey only
considered product configurations in the three-dimensional sense. Other courts had
found product trade dress comprising more than mere configuration to be inherently dis-
tinctive. See, e.g., Roulo v. Russ Berrie & Co., 886 F.2d 931, 935-39 (7th Cir. 1989) (line
of greeting cards).
296. See supra notes 276-78. Five of those seventeen must be reconsidered in light of
the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Knitwaves. (At least two of
those five arguably would, in any event, have been omitted from the Evans & Hoover
study.) The trend, however, may suggest not only increased post hoc litigation of com-
mercial disputes through the vehicle of trade dress infringement claims, but also an ex
ante decision by producers to afford greater attention to product configuration as source-
identifiers after Two Pesos.
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appropriately be a small one, that does not diminish their commerical
importance. Neither treating product configurations as second-class
source-identifiers, nor failing to articulate reasons for protecting one
design but not another, represents a satisfactory solution. In this sec-
tion, I outline some of the features of an approach that seeks to avoid
both problems.
1. Significance of Classifications
Proponents of a secondary meaning requirement, and the Du-
raco and Knitwaves courts in articulating a stricter test of inherent
distinctiveness, each invoked a series of related justifications for de-
manding more of product features seeking trade dress protection
than was asked of packaging claimants. Each cited competitive con-
cerns precipitated by an allegedly lesser range of alternatives.29
Although, as discussed above, any such concern is more properly ad-
dressed as a matter of functionality,298 at least two of the other doubts
expressed regarding inherently distinctive product configurations or
features raise issues proper to the question of distinctiveness:
(1) Is the consumer likely to identify a product by its shape?
(2) Can a test be developed that provides, and properly ex-
presses, the relevant bases for a court's analysis of the first
question?
Although the latter point addresses the deficiencies of the classi-
cal trademark test rather than the relative possibility of inherently
distinctive product design itself, development of a workable test for
product design naturally occurs if attention is focused on the proper
297. See supra notes 128, 172 and accompanying text.
298. See supra text accompanying notes 89-101. One could, in any event, take issue
with the assumption that there will always be more competitive alternative packaging
than product designs. Cf. Wally Olins, Corporate Identity, in DESIGN HISTORY: PAST,
PROCESS, PRODUCT 1, 7 (Terry Bishop ed., 1979) ("What is interesting about detergent
packs, for example, is that they are all brash and blatant. They shriek in a uniform
voice."). The very fact that some packaging has been held to be functional under an al-
ternatives-based test, while many product designs have not, merely accentuates this point.
See, e.g. Aromatique, Inc. v. Gold Seal, Inc., 28 F.3d 863, 873-84 (8th Cir. 1994)
(packaging for potpourri functional); cf. Kompan A.S. v. Park Structures, Inc., 890 F.
Supp. 1167, 1173 (N.D.N.Y. 1995) (noting, in product configuration case, that "because
producers have an almost unlimited choice in design, trade dress choices will normally be
inherently distinctive" (citing Paddington Corp. v. Attiki Importers & Distribs., Inc., 996
F.2d 577,583 (2d Cir. 1993), a packaging case)). But see Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana,
Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 786 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring) (suggesting that "trade dress,
which consists not of words or symbols, but of a product's packaging (or 'image,' more
broadly), seems at common law to have been thought incapable ever of being inherently
distinctive, perhaps on the theory that the number of ways to package a product is finite"
(emphasis added)).
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rationales for denying or restricting inherently distinctive product
configurations in every instance.
Assessment of the likelihood that a design will identify the prod-
uct is clearly a proper analysis in which to engage because a
prediction of consumer association is at the heart of inherent dis-
tinctiveness. It is not clear, however, that objections interposed on
that ground require the creation of a stricter test for product configu-
rations. First, the rationale for such a test is circular. Its
promulgation is premised on the conclusion it seeks to determine,
namely, that product configurations are less likely than packaging to
identify source. Second, if a different test applies only to product
configurations, but not product packaging, difficult questions of clas-
sification would arise.299 Third, if the standard to which each category
of trade dress is held is significantly different, that classification may
become outcome-determinative, and thus prejudge the issue of likely
association.
These concerns significantly undermine the dual-standard ap-
proach based upon classification of a trade dress as product or
packaging. The Third Circuit in Duraco defined the term "product
configuration" as "trade dress alleged in the product itself, whether
in a specific feature or in some combination or arrangement of fea-
tures, and to distinguish that type of trade dress from product
packaging."' The problem lies in applying the definition, however,
not in articulating it. The conflicting responses to Two Pesos illus-
trate the difficulties. The Third Circuit has stated definitively that
restaurant decor is akin to packaging, and thus that Two Pesos was a
packaging case?" The Eighth Circuit, with equal certitude, declared
299. See infra notes 308-39 and accompanying text.
300. Duraco Prods. v. Joy Plastic Enters., 40 F.3d 1431, 1439 (3d Cir. 1994); accord
Versa Prods. Co. v. Bifold Co., 50 F.3d 189, 193 n.1 (3d Cir. 1995) (quoting Duraco). The
term "configuration" may traditionally connote three-dimensional features, see supra
note 12, but the Third Circuit's definition appears to encompass any feature of the prod-
uct's design. It is therefore interchangeable with the concept of "product feature"
identified by the Second Circuit in Knitwaves as subject to a different test of inherent
distinctiveness. See Knitwaves, Inc. v. Lollytogs Ltd., 71 F.3d 996, 1007 (2d Cir. 1995).
The boundaries of both the Third Circuit's class of "product configuration" and the Sec-
ond Circuit's concept of "product feature" are set by the dress consisting of part of the
product, as opposed to packaging which is separate from the product. See id.; Duraco, 40
F.3d at 1439. Given their common genesis in the lack of a relation between the dress and
the product (and the citation by the Second Circuit to the Duraco decision), the line
drawn by the two courts would appear to be the same notwithstanding their use of differ-
ent terminology. Cf. Herbko Int'l, Inc. v. Gemmy Indus., 916 F. Supp. 322, 328 (S.D.N.Y.
1996) (noting new test for inherently distinctive "product design" and concluding that
"product configuration" of plaintiff's product did not satisfy that test).
301. See Duraco, 40 F.3d at 1445; see also Groff, supra note 141, at 96 n.145 (arguing
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that restaurant decor is akin to product configuration.' If the
"product" is defined as the ambient experience of dining, the Eighth
Circuit's classification as product feature seems tenable: if the prod-
uct being sold by the plaintiff was the food, one could more readily
conceive of the decor as packaging."'
This highlights the difficulties of drawing categorical lines where
in fact there exists a spectrum of trade dress:
[R]estaurant decor is an ideal illustration of the fact that
there is no distinct line between protection of packaging and
product configuration; some trade dresses, like restaurant
decor, will be somewhere in between or perhaps could be
seen as both and to create a distinction between the two ar-
tificially treats things that are alike differently.'
Accommodation of the hues of the spectrum requires a much
more flexible and generally applicable legal standard, inviting a more
case-specific analysis. The test of inherent distinctiveness should not,
by resort to artificial distinctions based on an assumed empirical cer-
tainty that does not exist, foreclose the assertion of trade dress rights.
that Duraco reasoning is preferable because "it is not typically the restaurant or its decor
being sold, but rather the food and services contained within the restaurant"). On Mr.
GroWs reasoning, the exterior design of a building is ordinarily packaging. But what if
the design of the building is depicted on posters or other products of intrinsic value? See
Rock & Roll Hall of Fame & Museum Inc. v. Gentile Prods., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1140,
1142-43 (N.D. Ohio 1996) (finding the shape of the Rock and Roll Hall of Fame to be
inherently distinctive and enjoining sale of unauthorized posters depicting the building).
302. See Stuart Hall Co. v. Ampad Corp., 51 F.3d 780, 787 (8th Cir. 1995) (suggesting
that restaurant decor is akin to product configuration because it is "part of the restaurant
experience," and unlike packaging because it is "not thrown away once the product is
removed from its packaging"); see also Krueger Int'l, Inc. v. Nightingale Inc., 915 F. Supp.
595, 602 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) ("Two Pesos was clearly a case of product design."). Before
Two Pesos, the Ninth Circuit appeared to suggest that it would apply the same analysis to
restaurant decor trade dress cases as it does to trade dress cases involving product pack-
aging. See Fuddruckers, Inc. v. Doc's B.R. Others, Inc., 826 F.2d 837, 842 (9th Cir. 1987).
303. Patrons of restaurants dine at particular establishments for a variety of reasons.
These include: the quality and variety of the food; the nature of the service; the ambi-
ance; and the price. See ZAGAT SuRvEY: NEW YORK CITY RESTAURANTS (1995)
(rating restaurants by "Food," "Decor," "Service" and "Cost"). Are the operatic waiters
at Asti's part of the service being provided, or do they merely "package" the food being
served? Is Asti's identified by reference to the service a patron receives, the food she is
served, or the overall experience she enjoys (which may or may not include the food and
the service)? Is the "food" the product, or is it the "experience" that is being sold? Cf.
Rachel Beck, Deliciously Beautiful People Are The House Specialty, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 31,
1995, at D10 ("Crowds don't come to the Fashion Cafe for the superb cuisine, but instead
are intrigued by its museum-like setting and near-celebrity experience."); Bill Carey, The
Hard Rock Cafe's Hard Life Franchise Thrives Despite Feuds, Legal Wrangling, CINC.
ENQ., Nov. 22, 1993, at 23 ("Hard Rock isn't a restaurant anyway. It's a clothing store
with food."). Does it make any sense to assay an answer to these questions?
304. Stuart Hall, 51 F.3d at 788.
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Rather, the test should permit a court to consider the empirical bases
upon which the claim of inherent distinctiveness is founded.
The attraction of a system classifying trade dress as packaging or
product design is, however, strong, because a study of decided cases
clearly demonstrates more reliable trade dress protection for items
that can (with relative ease) be referred to as packaging. A termi-
nological distinction between packaging and the product itself also
has an historical basis in judicial efforts to identify the valid subject
matter of trade dress."' The quandaries that are created by the need
to classify trade dress as packaging or product design are not insig-
nificant and are not restricted to restaurant decor cases? 6 A review
of case law and of products readily available to today's consumers
suggests many circumstances where the trade dress sought to be pro-
tected might be regarded as either packaging or product
configuration, as a composite of both, or as something-else lying be-
tween those two poles. 7
305. See Reichman, supra note 8, at 87. Professor Reichman places the assimilation of
packaging and product design as late as 1983. See id. at 87-88; see also 1 McCARTHY,
supra note 1, § 7.25[5], at 7-109, 7-112 (quoting Reichman's identification of 1983 as the
date of assimilation). The distinction was also historically important in that a minority of
courts at one time applied the functionality rule only in product design imitation cases.
See Litman, supra note 20, at 79 n.21; 4f Theodore H. Davis, Jr., Copying in the Shadow
of the Constitution: The Rational Limits of Trade Dress Protection, 80 MINN. L. REV. 595,
624-25 (1996) (arguing that functionality analysis different with packaging as opposed to
product design).
306. There are a surprisingly high number of cases involving restaurant decor. See
Hamstra, supra note 81, at 142 (discussing several cases, some reported and some quickly
settled); see, e.g., Morton v. Rank America, Inc., 812 F. Supp. 1062, 1068 (C.D. Cal. 1993)
(claiming that Planet Hollywood restaurants infringed upon the trade dress of Hard Rock
Cafe); see also Davis, supra note 305, at 598 (listing representative cases addressing the
protectability of restaurant appearance as trade dress). The design of buildings other
than restaurants might also present difficult questions of classification. Does the building
design "package" the amenities available inside, or is it a product in and of itself? See
Rock & Roll Hall of Fame & Museum Inc. v. Gentile Prods., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1140,
1142-43 (N.D. Ohio 1996) (finding the shape of the Rock and Roll Hall of Fame to be
inherently distinctive and enjoining sale of unauthorized posters depicting the building).
A similar question might be posed regarding the features of a golf course hole. See Peb-
ble Beach Co. v. Tour 18 I, Ltd., 936 F. Supp. 1299, 1341 (S.D. Tex. 1996) (trade dress
consisting of "the shapes of plaintiff's golf holes, the length and width of the holes, the
placement and shape of sand and water hazards, the size and shape of the greens, the
slope and elevation of the holes, and the golf holes' surrounding vegetation") The court
in Pebble Beach treated the golf course design as a product feature. See id. at 1343 n.39
(applying Abercrombie based on conclusion that Two Pesos endorsed application of
Abercrombie factors to product features).
307. Nor are trade dress claims limited to the design of specific packaging or products.
In Walt Disney Co. v. Goodtimes Home Video Corp., 830 F. Supp. 762, 766 (S.D.N.Y.
1993), "Disney's claim differ[ed] from most trade dress claims in that the alleged trade
dress [was] not a specific package or the appearance of a single product, but rather the
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For example, in Fabrica v. El Dorado Corp., 's the court pro-
tected the trade dress of a folder used to display samples of carpeting
fabrics. As Professor Reichman has noted, "[t]he design of the
folder... served both as a package, in that it displayed the plaintiff's
carpet samples to the public, and as a product, in that any other car-
pet company could use a similar folder to display its own carpet
samples to its own customers."' 9 Similarly, in Mana Products v. Co-
lumbia Cosmetics Manufacturing,310 plaintiff's cosmetic compacts, in
which trade dress was claimed, could have been viewed as packaging
for the powder, blush, and eye shadow they contained. They might
also have been viewed as products in themselves, with a sales value
quite separate from the contents, much like handbags. Often, the
category into which the trade dress falls may depend upon the precise
elements that are claimed as protectable trade dress. At the oral ar-
gument in Mana, plaintiff's counsel narrowed the scope of its claims
from the broader assemblage of "compact shapes, names, colors,
catalogs, price lists and sales materials regarding the cosmetics" to
the more defined "similar size, shape, and color of certain powder,
blush, and eye shadow compacts. 31 Yet, even with that sharpened
focus, the classification question is not without difficulty.
Our understanding of these terms might be enhanced by focus-
ing on what would be regarded as the essential attributes of "product
features" or "product configuration." The rationale motivating the
abandonment of Abercrombie by the Second and Third Circuits sug-
overall look of a number of different packages." Id- at 767. The Disney-type trade dress
claim is essentially one for "family trade dress" or "product line trade dress." Id. ; see
also Chevron Chem. Co. v. Voluntary Purchasing Groups, Inc., 659 F.2d 695, 705-06
(Former 5th Cir. 1981) (protecting trade dress of series of garden products); Harlequin
Enters. v. Gulf & Western Corp., 503 F. Supp. 647,652-53 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), affd, 644 F.2d
946 (2d Cir. 1981) (protecting cover design of books in series).
308. 697 F.2d 890 (9th Cir. 1983).
309. Reichman, supra note 8, at 87; see also 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 7.25[5], at
7-112 n.25 (commenting that the folder was "an article which was both a package and a
product"). Professor Reichman claims that the expansion of trade dress protection to
product design means that every product "comes equipped with at least two trade
dresses." Reichman, supra note 8, at 115. "One [apparently akin to product design]
comprises the exterior shell or three-dimensional form that houses whatever else the
product consists of," while the traditional trade dress-packaging--consists of "the pack-
age or container placed around the product when sold or transported from one place to
another." Id. This is almost as far as one can proceed in the definitional task, and it is not
very far. See also Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, We Are Symbols and Inhabit Symbols, So
Should We Be Paying Rent? Deconstructing The Lanham Act and Rights of Publicity, 20
COLUM.-VLA. J.L. & ARTS 123, 125 n.14 (1996) (" '[C]onfiguration' refers to the actual
shape of the product.").
310. 858 F. Supp. 361,366 (E.D.N.Y. 1994), affd, 65 F.3d 1063 (2d Cir. 1995). -
311. Id. at364.
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gests that the core aspect of a "product feature" is that it is part of
the product it identifies, thus destroying any assessable relation be-
tween the product and the mark. This raises as many questions as it
answers, however, by bringing to the fore the issue of how permanent
or integral to the product a feature must be in order to be "part of
it." '312 For example, is the dust jacket of a book"3 a product feature or
packaging? Is a feature used by the producer as packaging but re-
tained in place by consumers in the use or storage of the product part
of the product?314
If our understanding of what is "part of the product" were con-
strained by physical connection,315  we might exclude from
consideration as product features the screen display user interfaces of
computer programs.3"6 These interfaces both identify software for
users after sale more directly than any word marks and represent im-
portant aspects of the product to the consumer.317 Yet, they are
312. Cf. Stuart Hall Co. v. Ampad Corp., 51 F.3d 780, 787 (8th Cir. 1995) (treating
restaurant decor akin to product configuration because "part of the restaurant experi-
ence").
313. See Merriam-Webster, Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 35 F.3d 65, 67-68 (2d Cir.
1994) (claiming trade dress rights in dust jacket of dictionary); see also Reader's Digest
Ass'n v. Conservative Digest, Inc., 821 F.2d 800, 805 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (holding format of
magazine cover was protected trade dress); Casa Editrice Bonechi S.R.L. v. Irving Weis-
dorf & Co., 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1417, 1422 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (holding that design of
book covers, including color coding scheme, was distinctive trade dress).
314. For example, does material used by a producer to cushion or encase a product
during transport to the purchaser or showroom presentation (probably viewed as pack-
aging, cf. Reichman, supra note 8, at 115) become a product feature if the consumer
continues to use it to keep the product clean or unscratched even when in use? Would
that determination change depending upon whether consumers perceived that material as
part of the value of what was being purchased? Cf. Audio Fidelity, Inc. v. High Fidelity
Recordings, Inc., 283 F.2d 551,556 (9th Cir. 1960) (protecting trade dress of record sleeve
as packaging); infra notes 319-21 and accompanying text.
315. Cf. Groff, supra note 141, at 67 n.6 (" '[P]roduct design' refers to the physical
attributes of a product itself, rather than those of the product's packaging or labeling.").
316. Cf. Watson, supra note 112, at 284 ("There are many different ways to package a
software product through the use of a [graphic user interface]."). Although a number of
commentators have considered the application of trade dress protection to software user
interfaces, see, e.g., Lauren Fisher Kellner, Note, Trade Dress Protection for Computer
User Interface "Look and Feel," 61 U. CHI. L. REv. 1011, 1019 (1994), only two reported
opinions have addressed the issue. See Oratz, supra note 112, at 3. In neither case did the
plaintiff's trade dress claim succeed. See id.; see also Zimmerman, supra note 244, at 4
(noting that although no court has ever held a user interface to be protectable as trade
dress, trade dress claims have become "popular 'add-on' causes of action to copyright
claims, capable of imposing major litigation costs if not of altering the outcome").
317. See Rudnick, supra note 260, at 382 ("The screen display design, the way the
product looks to and interacts with the user, has become the consumer's primary product
identification."). Increasingly, producers of personal computers (the hardware) are also
recognizing that product design can serve to identify their products and differentiate them
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physically detached from the product (the software) that they iden-
tify, and are connected only electronically.
318
The integrity of the dress to the product, which is at the heart of
these analyses, may also be viewed in economic rather than physical
terms. One such conception of whether a claimed dress is part of the
product might therefore focus on the value of the feature to the
product, and inquire whether the product would be less valuable if
the feature were not included in the purchase.319 Classifying anything
that enhances the value of the product as a product feature, however,
would encompass many features that would clearly be thought of as
packaging, such as packaging that made transport of the product
safer (for example, spillproof or refrigerated containers for bever-
ages), or its presentation as a gift to another more appealing (such as
a box from Tiffany's for a piece of jewelry)."l
from those of other personal computer manufacturers. See Bart Ziegler, Computers Be-
gin To Break Design Barrier: Clunky and Chunky May Give Way to Sleek Physiques,
Array of Colors, ASIAN WALL ST. J., Oct. 18, 1995, at 8; cf. Compaq Computer Corp. v.
Procom Tech., Inc., 908 F. Supp. 1409, 1425 (S.D. Tex. 1995) (asserting claim based upon
trade dress of design of computer hard drive trays but finding no likelihood of confusion).
318. Compare this example with the trade dress claimed (and found infringed) in M.
Kramer Manufacturing v. Andrews, 783 F.2d 421,447-49 (4th Cir. 1986), where plaintiff's
trade dress consisted of the design of the console in which a video game was housed and
the artwork on the glass panel upon which the video graphics were displayed. Would the
test to be applied vary depending upon whether the graphics were generated by the soft-
ware, etched into the glass (as was the case in Kramer), attached as labels or fixed in
place by being wrapped around the console?
319. Alternative economic-based tests could be envisaged. For example, rather than
consider whether the product would be less valuable if the feature were not included in
the purchase, one could inquire as to whether the product could in any way be sold with-
out the features claimed as trade dress. A further potential test might focus on the
converse situation: whether the feature claimed as trade dress could be sold independ-
ently of the other parts of the putative product. For example, if a children's product were
sold along with another small toy as a free gift, would the free gift be considered packag-
ing for the primary product, or a related feature of "the product"? Cf. Warner Vision
Entertainment Inc. v. Empire of Carolina Inc., No. 95 Civ. 9386, 1996 WL 67932, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 15, 1996) (noting that free toys, which were not sold independently of the
video cassettes with which they were distributed "are essentially a premium used to entice
purchasers to buy the video, rather than part of the actual product for sale") (considering
question in order to determine the product markets in which the plaintiff's logo had been
used).
320. Such an approach also strongly evokes the concept of aesthetic functionality,
which at the zenith of its influence voided protection for features that were important
ingredients in the commercial success of a product. See Pagliero v. Wallace China Co.,
198 F.2d 339, 343 (9th Cir. 1952). This formulation of the aesthetic functionality rule can
be traced to the first Restatement of Torts. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 742
cmt. a (1938) ("When goods are bought largely for their aesthetic value, their features
may be functional because they definitely contribute to that value and thus aid the per-
formance of an object for which the goods are intended."). As I discuss in a forthcoming
article:
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Perhaps, instead, the classification question could be answered
by focusing instead on the concept of packaging. Both the Second
and Third Circuit defined or explained the class of subject matter
governed by these new tests in contradistinction to packaging. How-
ever, the packaging of a product is itself a nebulous concept. At its
most nan-ow, it may be taken to mean simply physical wrapping that
is of no independent value: something which is "separate from a
product and to be thrown away once the product is removed from the
packaging."'32' For example, the wrapping by which children recog-
nize their favorite candy; the Coke bottle that serves to identify and
distinguish Coke from other beverages; the container for spray-on
household cleaner that consumers associate with the Fantastik
brand.3" Construed more broadly, however, packaging can be
thought of as all of the means by which the product is marketed or
presented to the purchasing public. 323 Which construction is adopted
The aesthetic functionality doctrine as first articulated can be, and was, sub-
jected to significant and telling criticism. In that virulent form, the doctrine
possessed the potential to emasculate protection for industrial designs, and in
particular for successful designs. It instituted a perverse incentive that rewarded
fruitless designs with unnecessary protection, but exposed successful designs to
unchecked imitation.
Dinwoodie, supra note 17, at 12-13. As a result, "virtually every circuit to consider the
issue in the past ten years has rejected the restrictive Pagliero standard which focuses
exclusively on consumer demand, in favor of standards emphasizing the competitive ef-
fect of affording trade dress protection to product design features." Unikel, supra note
20, at 320; see also Dinwoodie, supra note 17, at 17-21 (arguing for single functionality
standard without reference to aesthetic or utilitarian nature of feature).
321. Stuart Hall Co. v. Ampad Corp., 51 F.3d 780, 788 (8th Cir. 1995). The Eighth
Circuit concluded that because the rooms and furnishings at issue in Two Pesos were part
of the "restaurant experience," Two Pesos involved product configuration. Id. If, as the
Stuart Hall court suggested, the disposable, throwaway nature of the item is essential to
the classification as packaging, items of packaging which consumers frequently retain in
connection with the use of the product arguably cannot be considered as packaging for
this purpose. See supra note 314. A similar problem of differentiating between packaging
and the product itself has been addressed by some European commentators in attempting
to interpret the scope of the exhaustion doctrine found in Article 7 of the E.C. Trademark
Directive. See, e.g., Karen Dyekjer-Hansen, The Trade Mark Directive and the Protection
of Brands and Branding, 18 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 62, 64 (1996) (drawing the line by
reference to whether the alleged packaging is "clearly a severable part in terms of mar-
keting, image building and product safety").
322. See American Chicle Co. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 208 F.2d 560, 560-61 (2d
Cir. 1953) (chewing gum package); Coca-Cola Co. v. Alma-Leo U.S.A., Inc., 719 F. Supp.
725, 728 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (shape of Coca-Cola bottle); In re Morton-Norwich Prods., Inc.,
671 F.2d 1332, 1334 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (shape of container for household cleaner).
323. Cf. CMM Cable Rep., Inc. v. Keymarket Communications, Inc., 870 F. Supp. 631,
638 (M.D. Pa. 1994) (discussing the format of a radio promotion-casting the cash award
offered to listeners as an "hourly wage"-as "packaging," with no intrinsic value as a
product or service); Hhagen-Dazs, Inc. v. Frusen Glhdj6 Ltd., 493 F. Supp. 73, 74
(S.D.N.Y. 1980) (noting plaintiff's objections to the manner in which defendants had
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might be of some consequence: Trade dress protection extends not
only to the appearance of a product or its packaging, but also to the
overall image of a product. 4 Features of a product that pertain or
contribute to its total image might be viewed as-packaging only under
a broad reading of that term."
The uncertainties of the term "packaging" are well illustrated by
the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Original Appalachian Artworks,
Inc. v. Toy Loft, Inc.32 There, the court recognized trade dress rights
in a marketing technique whereby, among other things, the producer
of toy dolls provided each purchaser
with a "birth certificate" and "Official Adoption Papers"
which include[d] an "oath of adoption" to be subscribed to
by the buyer; individually naming each doll that is produced
and communicating this fact by means of a name tag affixed
to each doll's clothing; sending the buyer a birthday card for
his [doll] on the first anniversary of the date of sale; and
signing each doll's derriere "Xavier" while advertising that
the dolls are a "limited signed edition."327
The court characterized this delineation of plaintiff's trade dress
as packaging and supported its classification as such in two ways."
First, it analogized marketing techniques to packaging by describing
packaging as a "sales technique designed to make the product readily
"packaged" their product, meaning the marketing techniques used by the defendant).
324. See Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 764 n.1 (1992) ("The
'trade dress' of a product is essentially its total image and overall appearance." (citation
omitted)); see, e.g., id, 505 U.S. at 765 (claiming trade dress in "a festive eating atmos-
phere having interior dining and patio areas decorated with artifacts, bright colors,
paintings and murals"); Roulo v. Russ Berrie & Co., 886 F.2d 931, 935 (7th Cir. 1989)
("feel" of greeting cards); Hartford House, Ltd. v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 846 F.2d 1268,
1269 (10th Cir. 1988) (trade dress consisting of "non-occasion emotional messages con-
cerning love, personal relationships, and other similar subjects, superimposed on
watercolor or airbrush artwork that generally has a landscape motif or nature theme");
Philip Morris Inc. v. Star Tobacco Corp., 879 F. Supp. 379, 383 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)
(protecting image of the American West as applied to cigarettes); Hampton Inns, Inc. v.
Ameritel Inns, Inc., No. 93-459-5-BLW, 1995 WL 762148, at *2 (D. Idaho Oct. 19, 1995)
(plaintiff claiming trade dress in the "interior and exterior designs of its hotels, including
an emphasis on service at a mid-priced hotel"); Romm Art Creations Ltd. v. Simcha Int'l
Inc., 786 F. Supp. 1126, 114041 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) (protecting look of artist's posters). But
see Hiiagen-Dazs, 493 F. Supp. at 75-76 (denying protection to claimed trade dress of
"unique Scandinavian marketing theme").
325. Cf. Schwinn Bicycle Co. v. Ross Bicycles, Inc., 870 F.2d 1176, 1182 n.12 (7th Cir.
1989) (" 'To determine unfair competition, the court must consider the total image of
plaintiff's product, package and advertising and compare this with defendant's im-
age .... ' " (citation omitted)).
326. 684 F.2d 821 (11th Cir. 1982).
327. Id. at 823.
328. See id. at 831.
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identifiable to consumers and unique in the marketplace." '329 This
broad concept, however, amounts to nothing more than a loose de-
scription of a trademark.33° Second, the court explained that "the
adoption procedure truly is part of the packaging of [plaintiff's]
product both in the sense that dolls are never sold without the adop-
tion papers and birth certificate and because the adoption procedure
is designed to make [plaintiff's] dolls distinctive in the market-
place." '331 This too is circular and counter-intuitive.332
These strained explanations highlight the arbitrariness and incer-
titude that classification as "packaging" or "product design"
engenders.33 The adoption papers and name tags could just as easily
have been treated as a feature of the product. The essence of the
court's conclusion, as revealed in its failed efforts to proffer a defini-
tion of packaging, was that the plaintiff's trade dress identified or was
likely to identify the source of the dolls. That is the heart of the dis-
tinctiveness inquiry, and should be the focus of any analysis.
The nature of how a trade dress, as opposed to a traditional ver-
bal mark, is circumscribed also presents problems for classification.
Trade dress is a complex composite of features. In assessing dis-
tinctiveness, a trade dress must be considered as a whole and not as
merely the sum of its parts.' The appearance or trade dress that may
329. Id.
330. Indeed, packaging is often defined in pre-Two Pesos cases as elements that dis-
tinguish a product from those of competitors. Cf. Litman, supra note 20, at 79 ("There
has been a considerable area of overlap, however, as a product's appearance may function
as its packaging, incorporating elements intended to distinguish it from competing prod-
ucts."). Such an approach to the classification suggests that the packaging/product
terminology operated historically not to mark off the exterior borders of protectable
subject-matter, but rather merely to describe a posteriori those features thought incapable
of identifying source from those considered able to perform that role. Given modern
acceptance of the capacity of product configurations to identify source, even the historical
relevance of the classification perhaps can be called into question.
331. Original Appalachian Artworks, 684 F.2d at 831.
332. The court appears to have concluded that the adoption procedure was packaging
because the product was never sold without the adoption papers. See id. at 831. That is to
say, the court viewed packaging as in some way integral to the product. In contrast, the
intuitive conception of what constitutes packaging is that its primary attribute is its super-
fluousness to the product. See Stuart Hall Co. v. Ampad Corp., 51 F.3d 780,788 (8th Cir.
1995).
333. But see Groff, supra note 141, at 68 (arguing that "courts must make a greater
effort to distinguish the design of a product itself from that of a product's packaging or
labeling, recognizing that the former is typically protectable, if at all, only under the pat-
ent laws").
334. See, e.g., Paddington Corp. v. Attiki Importers & Distribs., Inc., 996 F.2d 577, 584
(2d Cir. 1993) ("One could no more deny protection to a trade dress for using commonly
used elements than one could deny protection to a trademark because it consisted of a
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come to identify goods might well be a combination of the product
and its packaging. For example, in Aromatique, Inc. v. Gold Seal,
Inc., trade dress was claimed in
the combination of natural-looking potpourri packaged in a
pillow-shaped, doubled cellophane bag whose opening was
gathered and tied with cords with a hanging tag attached
thereto. Aromatique does not claim that any one of these
features is protectable; it is, instead, the combination that is
at issue.3 5
By which test should such a trade dress be adjudged,' 6 and should a
combination of commonly used letters of the alphabet."); American Greetings Corp. v.
Dan-Dee Imports, Inc., 807 F.2d 1136, 1141 (3d Cir. 1986) (" 'Trade dress is a complex
composite of features... the law of unfair competition in respect to trade dress requires
that all of the features be considered together, not separately.'" (quoting SK & F Co. v.
Premo Pharm. Labs., 481 F. Supp. 1184, 1187 (D.N.J. 1979)); Kompan A.S. v. Park Struc-
tures, Inc., 890 F. Supp. 1167, 1174 (N.D.N.Y. 1995) (finding that, although each element
of design might not be inherently distinctive, the combination of elements was, and thus
trade dress of playground equipment inherently distinctive); Jaret Int'l., Inc. v. Promotion
in Motion, Inc., 826 F. Supp. 69, 74 (E.D.N.Y. 1993) ("The proper focus under section
43(a) is on 'the entire look of the product or packaging... [and] each aspect should be
viewed in relation to the entire trade dress.'" (quoting Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v.
McNeil-P.P.C., Inc., 973 F.2d 1033, 1042 (2d Cir. 1992)) (emphasis added)); see also
Roulo v. Russ Berrie & Co., 886 F.2d 931, 936 (7th Cir. 1989) (protecting trade dress of
overall appearance of greeting cards).
335. 28 F.3d 863, 873 (8th Cir. 1994); see also Jeffrey Milstein, Inc. v. Greger, Lawlor,
Roth, Inc., 58 F.3d 27, 33 (2d Cir. 1995) (claiming trade dress in appearance of greeting
card, including the blank interior and the cellophane wrapping in which they are pack-
aged); Schwinn Bicycle Co. v. Ross Bicycles, Inc., 870 F.2d 1176, 1182 n.12 (7th Cir. 1989)
(" 'To determine unfair competition, the court must consider the total image of the plain-
tiff's product, package and advertising and compare this with defendant's image .... "
(citation omitted)); Sassafras Enters., Inc. v. Roshco, Inc., 915 F. Supp. 1, 3 (N.D. Ill.
1996) (claiming protectable interest in the total image of a set of pizza utensils and a
"recipe, use and care book"); cf Jaret Int'l Inc. v. Promotion in Motion, Inc., 826 F. Supp.
69,71 (E.D.N.Y. 1993) (candies sold in boxes with clear plastic window showing candies,
and box has graphic design that comprises the claimed trade dress) (trade dress claimed
only in packaging without reference to candies); 1 McCARTHY, supra note 1, § 8.03, at 8-
29 (in determining likelihood of confusion, "[a]lmost any nonfunctional element that the
ordinary purchaser sees is eligible for proof that it serves to identify and distinguish
source. This includes size, shape, color, design, texture, word and symbol marks of both
the product and its dress or package."). The phenomenon of an image derived from a
combination of product and container is common. See, e.g., Estee Lauder, Inc. v. Gap,
Inc., 932 F. Supp. 595, 604 n.18 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (noting that the color of the defendant's
bottle is a result of the bottle contents rather than the bottle itself, but that this is not
readily apparent to the purchaser).
336. This dilemma was confronted recently by Judge Mukasey in the Southern District
of New York. See Fun-Damental Too, Ltd. v. Gemmy Indus., No. 96 Civ. 1103, 1996 WL
125641, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 21, 1996); see also Fundex Inc. v. Imperial Toy Corp., 26
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1061, 1063-64 (S.D. Ind. 1992) (applying Abercrombie to determine
inherent distinctiveness of trade dress comprising composite of product's features and its
packaging). The plaintiff in Fun-Damental Too claimed protection for the trade dress of
its "Toilet Bank" product, a novelty bank in the familiar form of a tank toilet. The Toilet
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different test be applied with respect to different aspects of it?337
Bank, which emitted a "real flushing sound" when its user deposited a coin and pressed
the flush handle, was displayed and sold in stores in an open box. The box bore illustra-
tions of the means of operation (dropping a penny in the bowl), but the toilet bowl was
covered by clear plastic to prevent customers from placing any object in the bowl while
the bank was on display. The defendant's product (the "Currency Can") closely imitated
the design of the product, the nature of its packaging, and the markings on the box,
Judge Mukasey emphasized that the plaintiff's product, "alone and apart from its
packaging" was not at issue in the lawsuit. See Fun-Damental Too, 1996 WL 125641, at
*8. Rather, the trade dress allegedly infringed was a composite of the product's design
and its packaging, and on this basis Judge Mukasey did not employ the Knitwaves test.
Instead, following the approach of the Paddington court in pure packaging cases, Judge
Mukasey assessed the distinctiveness of plaintiffs trade dress under the traditional Aber-
crombie test and found it to be inherently distinctive. See id at *9. Judge Mukasey,
however, proffered no explanation for his adoption of the Paddington packaging test over
the Knitwaves product design test. His opinion quotes the Second Circuit's grounding of
the Knitwaves test in the lesser likelihood of product design identifying the source of a
product, see id. at *8, but does not engage in a comparable analysis of the relative likeli-
hood that a composite of packaging and design (as opposed to pure packaging or pure
design) might identify source. Cf infra note 337. Implicitly, the opinion suggests that a
trade dress consisting of both a product's design and its packaging is no less likely than
packaging alone to identify source. It is not clear, however, whether that conclusion rests
upon the presence of any packaging in the claimed trade dress, or upon the packaging
being the primary component of the protected appearance, or upon some other unarticu-
lated basis. Putting aside the absence of analysis to support any such conclusion, further
line-drawing (whether at the point of "any" packaging, "primarily" packaging, or any
other stop on the continuum between pure design and pure packaging) merely com-
pounds the problems of classification.
If this interpretation of Knitwaves is correct, a plaintiff that can classify any (or a
primary) feature of its product as "packaging" can avail itself of the easier standard in
establishing inherent distinctiveness. It renders the already-questionable process of clas-
sification doubly dubious. Moreover, while the Fun-Damental Too opinion acknowledges
the sensory differences involved in analyzing non-verbal trade dress, see Fun-Damental
Too, 1996 WL 125641, at *1 n.1, it does not address any of the other deficiencies of the
Abercrombie test in the context of non-verbal marks. See supra text accompanying notes
105-13. Given these difficulties, it is perhaps unsurprising that the court's analysis (which
largely focuses on the defendant's lack of need to employ the design, packaging and
markings used by plaintiff) more closely resembles an analysis of functionality than a
prediction of whether consumers are likely to identify the source of the Toilet Bank by its
appearance. See id. at *8-*9.
337. Moreover, if the relative likelihood that a particular class of trade dress will iden-
tify source should determine the level of scrutiny to which a particular trade dress will be
subjected, why should the alleged distinction between packaging and product features
represent the sole dividing line? Trade dress can be (arbitrarily) divided into at least six
categories: two-dimensional packaging design, three-dimensional packaging design,
service dress, product image, two-dimensional product design, and three-dimensional
product design. And, it can be depicted as a composite of any of these categories. Studies
would reveal, on a generalized level, the relative likelihood of consumers relying on fea-
tures in each of these categories (classification difficulties aside). For example, although
the lack of a relation between the product and the mark exists whether the design is two
or three-dimensional, a study of case law would probably suggest that two-dimensional
design is more likely to be protected and thus relied on as an indicium of source. On the
theory of the Duraco court, should we not act on those generalizations and promulgate
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The predicament that attends this exercise merely confirms the
folly of attempting to reach conceptual conclusions as to inherent dis-
tinctiveness by the application of over-generalized rules, without
regard to the empirical bases that guide our analysis or support our
conclusions.33 The mistake is exacerbated by resting those rules on
an arbitrary classification as product or packaging, an inquiry that
yields little clear guidance to the courts. If, instead, inherent dis-
tinctiveness of trade dress generally is judged by a single standard-
whether the claimed trade dress is likely to act as a source-identifier
for consumers--classification problems are avoided. There is no rea-
son to draw spurious bright lines between categories of trade dress
where empirical evidence is available to assist in our appraisal of
likely consumer association. Conclusions that may seal the fate of
the trade dress claim are best assessed by reference not to general-
ized assumptions but more particularized proof. Empirically-
sustainable conclusions regarding the likelihood that a shape will
identify source should trump any category-based predisposition to-
ward that inquiry. Moreover, such an approach is consistent with
"the entire thrust of Two Pesos, [which] was to unify the standards
for trademark and trade dress, not to balkanize this complex field
into yet more subcategories." '339
2. Which Evidence?
A test developed (and a conclusion derived) with reference to
concrete evidence would also meet concerns about intuitive judging
by providing empirical data to guide decisions, while facilitating the
protection from the outset generally prevented by the requirement of
secondary meaning. Conclusions of inherent distinctiveness cannot
be empirically based, because they represent a conceptual assessment
different tests to implement those generalized observations? For precisely the problems
of arbitrariness and over-generalization discussed in the text, the answer must be no.
338. It is equally true, however, that in assessing the facts, we should not lose sight of
the conceptual analysis in whose aid we are considering those facts (i.e., are consumers
likely to associate a product design with a single source?). Without the empirical under-
pinning, the conceptual conclusion is uncertain; without the guidance of a proper
conceptual understanding, those underlying facts are of little consequence. Cf. IM-
MANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON 93 (N. K. Smith trans., 1929) (discussing the
necessary union between "intuitions" (or facts) and conceptual understanding to produce
knowledge). It is the contention of this Article that only by testing our conceptual con-
clusions by reference to the empirical bases upon which they are founded, can a proper
analysis of inherent distinctiveness be performed.
339. Krueger Int'l, Inc. v. Nightingale Inc., 915 F. Supp. 595, 602 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); see
also Stuart Hall Co. v. Ampad Corp., 51 F.3d 780, 788 (8th Cir. 1995) ("[W]e decline to
create a distinction between protection of packaging and protection of product configura-
tion, as such a distinction would run contrary to the holding of Two Pesos.").
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of how consumers will perceive a shape. The bases upon which those
conclusions are reached can, however, be tested.' Abercrombie does
not provide the tools by which to examine the basis for a conclusion
of inherent distinctiveness outside the context of verbal marks?41
Abercrombie's spectrum may provide a means for facilitating and
communicating judicial analysis of word marks but it cannot serve as
the lingua franca for trademarks and trade dress because it cannot
convey the basis for our appraisal of product shapes.
Like many areas of trademark law, the question of inherent dis-
tinctiveness will remain highly case-specific, and concrete guidance
will occur only with the accretion of factually analogous case law.
Setting out the nature of the inherent distinctiveness inquiry in
greater detail will, however, assist in counteracting the potential un-
certainty that individualized applications of a rule of reason can
cause.r 2 Accordingly, this section of the Article articulates the types
of evidence and modes of analysis courts should use in performing
the predictive inquiry.
The Seabrook test represents a starting point, asking whether a
shape or feature is "a 'common' basic shape or design, whether it [is]
unique or unusual in a particular field, [or] whether it [is] a mere re-
finement of commonly-adopted and well-known forms of
340. To require empirical support for those conclusions, rather than merely for the
basis upon which those conclusions were reached, would be to re-impose the requirement
of secondary meaning.
341. But see Opderbeck, supra note 110, at 38 ("The standard [Abercrombie] trade-
mark taxonomy serves as a useful surrogate for public perception."). My call for
empirical content to substantiate and guide the conceptual analysis reflects various con-
cerns. Empirical substantiation affords greater legitimacy to determinations that
necessarily (and appropriately) are conceptual in nature, and places some limits on judi-
cial discretion. But cf. Paul Gewirtz, On "I Know It When I See It," 105 YALE L.J. 1023,
1030-35 (1996) (arguing that nonrational activities of the mind can play an important role
in judging, and suggesting that a conclusion reached with no conscious process of deduc-
tion, and with no after-the-fact attempt to give reasons, is not necessarily less sound than
one produced by sustained analysis). Additionally, resting decisions on empirically ascer-
tainable evidence will enhance predictability for producers and their legal advisers.
342. Greater use of rules of reason rather than per se rules would appear to portend
less guidance ex ante, but in truth this usual drawback to rules of reason is but a minor
inconvenience when viewed in light of the uncertainty induced by the current methodol-
ogy or by alternative bright-line approaches. But cf. Opderbeck, supra note 110, at 38
("The Second Circuit's abandonment of [the Abercrombie] taxonomy in favor of a more
generalized inquiry can only lead to increased litigation and inconsistent results."). The
use of per se rules under a system attempting categorization of cases also typically re-
duces administrative costs, see William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law:
An Economic Perspective, 30 J.L. & ECON. 265, 289 (1987), but those benefits are de-
pendent upon a degree of certainty surrounding the classifications being employed.
Trademark protection of product design does not easily admit of that certainty, particu-
larly in determining distinctiveness.
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ornamentation for a particular class of goods viewed by the public as
a dress or ornamentation for the goods. 'M43 These considerations
serve, in part, the function that dictionaries perform in guiding de-
terminations of the distinctiveness of word marks.
As a preliminary matter, the objective of the inquiry also pro-
vides some general guidance as to the scope of the evidence that
would be relevant. The evidence seeks to facilitate an assessment of
the likelihood that consumers will associate a product feature with its
source in a particular instance.3" It would be different from the evi-
dence adduced in support of a claim of secondary meaning. The
secondary meaning inquiry is directed at whether consumers actually
have made an association with respect to the plaintiff's particular
product.3" Even indirect evidence of secondary meaning, such as
sales volume, is qualitatively different from prediction-enhancing
evidence, because indirect evidence of secondary meaning, while in-
volving some degree of conjecture, relates to the demonstrated
marketplace performance of a specific product. The presumption
343. Seabrook Foods, Inc. v. Bar-Well Foods, Ltd., 568 F.2d 1342, 1344 (C.C.P.A.
1977) (footnotes omitted); see also AmBrit, Inc. v. Kraft, Inc., 812 F.2d 1531, 1536 (11th
Cir. 1986) (applying same test). The amicus curiae brief of the United States Trademark
Association (as it was then called) in Two Pesos suggested the Seabrook test as the proper
inquiry to be made in a trade dress case. See Amicus Brief at 15, excerpted in 82
TRADEMARK REP. 440, 450-51 (1992) ("[A]Ithough certain types of trade dress may be
inherently distinctive and protectable without a demonstration of secondary meaning, a
careful inquiry along the lines set forth in Seabrook is required before reaching that con-
clusion."); see also Krueger Int'l, Inc. v. Nightingale Inc., 915 F. Supp. 595, 603 (S.D.N.Y.
1996) ("The Seabrook test is the most useful of the three tests, in my view, because it
clarifies the importance of market context.... [It] highlights the notion that a design
cannot be considered in a vacuum .... Any test of inherent distinctiveness must ask,
'Inherently distinctive as compared to what?' "); Dillon, supra note 206, at 82 ("The
United States Trademark Association's Brief Amicus was devoted in large part to an
attempt to educate the Court with respect to the nature of the inquiry required.") (citing
Seabrook test).
344. Whether a design is likely to identify a source should not be confused with the
lesser standard of whether it is "capable" of distinguishing goods from those of others,
which provides the basis for registration on the Supplemental Register. Cf. In re Minne-
sota Mining & Mfg. Co., 335 F.2d 836, 840 (C.C.P.A. 1964) (noting difference between
what a mark is likely to do to a purchaser and what it is capable of doing).
345. Cf. Stuart Hall Co. v. Ampad Corp., 51 F.3d 781, 788 (8th Cir. 1995) (criticizing
Duraco test for inherent distinctiveness as varying only from secondary meaning in that
secondary meaning assesses actual consumer recognition while Duraco's test of inherent
distinctiveness would measure likely consumer recognition). Such analysis would also
differ from the secondary meaning inquiry in that its inquiry would be prospective and
thus could be the basis for obtaining immediate protection. See supra text accompanying
note 53.
346. The most persuasive form of secondary meaning evidence, surveys testing actual
consumer association, is fully empirical. Indirect indicia, such as sales and advertising
data, still require courts to engage in a degree of speculative analysis, but with more fo-
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underlying inherent distinctiveness centers on likely performance.
Accordingly, the range of evidence advanced to assist the predictive
inquiry is broader and could relate also to consumers' past and likely
associational responses with respect to products of the type in ques-
tion.4 7
Pertinent predictive evidence would relate, inter alia, to the na-
ture of the design, to the context in which the design is likely to be
perceived by prospective purchasers, or to the nature of the product.
This evidence is intended to provide courts with guidance, with reli-
able predictors, in their inquiry into likely consumer association.
a. Nature of the Design
Consideration of the nature of the design mandates analysis of
whether the design consists of a basic or common geometric shape, as
suggested by the first component of the Seabrook test. Standard
geometric shapes are less likely to make a product stand out from the
crowd. Such designs are thus less likely to be regarded as inherently
distinctive, unless the context in which the shape is used is highly un-
usual or is part of a larger collection which, as a whole, is unusual.
Consideration of this body of evidence might also extend to
whether the design feature is understood by the public to serve other
purposes. While the mere fact that a product feature serves other
purposes should not prevent a finding of inherent distinctiveness,"
normally the fewer functions other than source-identification per-
formed by the feature heightens the likelihood that it will be thought
of as a trademark. For example, the overall shape of the Black &
Decker Snakelight flashlight is associated by consumers with its
source. 9 If the design of the product was, however, also understood
cused guidance. See Herbko Int'l, Inc. v. Gemmy Indus., 916 F. Supp. 322, 329 (S.D.N.Y.
1996) (noting that "such factors as advertising expenditures, sales success, unsolicited
media coverage of the product, attempts to plagiarize, and the length and exclusivity of
use... only guide the analysis... [of whether] the consuming public has come to identify
the design [of the product] with its maker ..... (citations omitted)).
347. See 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 15.02[5], at 15-17 (in determining inherent
distinctiveness of design trade dress, "[t]he issue is whether this shape is so different or
unusual for this type of goods or services that its distinctiveness can be assumed"
(emphasis added)); see also AmBrit, Inc. v. Kraft, Inc., 812 F.2d at 1536 (test for inherent
distinctiveness asks whether a shape "is... a mere refinement of commonly-adopted and
well-known forms of ornamentation for a particular class of goods" (citations omitted)
(emphasis added)); cf. Mana Prods. v. Columbia Cosmetics Mfg., 65 F.3d 1063, 1070 (2d
Cir. 1995) (looking at industry custom to determine whether a design is inherently distinc-
tive).
348. See supra Part IV(D)(2)(b)(ii).
349. See Black & Decker Corp. v. Int'l Sales & Mktg., 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1851,
1853 (C.D. Cal. 1995).
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by the public to take a particular form in order to disperse the light
emanating from the flashlight bulb, many consumers might perceive
that such a design, rather than identifying this particular flashlight
and setting it apart from others, took that form merely to disperse
light as widely as possible."' This predictor parallels the verbal mark
inquiry of whether a mark is descriptive in relation to the product
upon which it is affixed.35 Both analyses seek to determine whether
the likelihood that consumers perceive the mark or dress as a source-
identifier might be reduced by some competing understanding of the
shape or mark.
b. Contextual Marketplace Considerations
Examination of the context in which a design is likely to be per-
ceived serves as a surrogate for examination of the relation that exists
between a verbal mark and the product it identifies.352 In this portion
of its analysis, a court would in effect consider the relation between
the product feature as part of the product and the product feature as
source-identifier. Here, the admission of evidence relating to other
products of the type at issue will be of most significance.
Contextual evidence will often supply the greatest guidance on
the question of inherently distinctive shapes by establishing a back-
ground of the marketplace against which likely association can be
estimated.353 Contextual evidence may be divided into two primary
350. Similarly, if consumers perceived that the Snakelight flashlight consisted of its
particular shape in order to facilitate its attachment to nearby objects and thus to permit
its owner use of both hands, that might reduce the likelihood that consumers would view
the shape as a source-identifier. It does not, however, eliminate that likelihood.
351. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
352. See Krueger Int'l, Inc. v. Nightingale Inc., 915 F. Supp. 595, 603 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)
("Any test of inherent distinctiveness must ask, 'Inherently distinctive as compared to
what?' "); see also id. ("The Seabrook test is the most useful of the three tests, in my view,
because it clarifies the importance of market context.").
353. See G. Heileman Brewing Co. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 873 F.2d 985, 995 (7th
Cir. 1989) ("Consumer perception should be assessed by examining the average potential
consumer in the context of the existing marketplace and exposed to the information cur-
rently available in the marketplace."). Professor Dreyfuss has suggested that trademark
protection for designs that possess both aesthetic and identifying meanings is one of sev-
eral areas in which a contextual focus would be particularly helpful. See Dreyfuss, supra
note 309, at 149-54 (1996) (identifying several settings where courts should evaluate con-
fusion in a "manner that reflects ... [the] context-sensitive dynamic of interpretation").
Dreyfuss concludes:
The more nuanced approach would acknowledge that design can have two
meanings-decoration and identification. It would then ask what, in the pur-
chasing context, consumers would take the design to mean. In some situations,
for instance, where consumers were seeking designs compatible to what they al-
ready own, the likelihood is that the signifier would be perceived in its
1997] 589
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groups. First, existing designs in the market that are similar might
significantly blur the distinctiveness of the design at issue and thus
suggest a lesser likelihood that consumers would identify the shape
with a single source.3" Evidence on this point would defeat any claim
of inherent distinctiveness for product features reflecting market
standardization of design because such features would be unlikely to
identify a single source. In contrast, an unusual or unique design, like
neologisms in the context of verbal marks,355 should fare more fa-
vorably. This focus on the uniqueness of the design implements the
second and third components of the Seabrook inquiry.356
decorative sense. Those uses-in the example, "compatibility uses"-would
then be considered to fall outside the protection of trademark law. In contrast,
in aesthetic functionality cases that are premised on the naked assertion that
consumers like the design, where there are no contextual clues favoring the non-
identifier meaning, it may be reasonable for a court to conclude that there is a
likelihood of confusion.
Id. at 153-54.
354. See Mana Prods. v. Columbia Cosmetics Mfg., 65 F.3d 1063, 1070 (2d Cir. 1995)
(considering industry custom); Paddington Corp. v. Attiki Importers & Distribs., Inc., 996
F.2d 577, 583-84 (2d Cir. 1993) (discussing the effect on distinctiveness analysis of trade
dress being of type commonly used in industry). It is evidence of established usage that
will assist in determining how unusual the shapes are. See In re Colonial Stores Inc., 394
F.2d 549, 551 (C.C.P.A. 1968) ("To make [the distinctiveness] test meaningful, it is neces-
sary, therefore, to consider the established usages and associations which inhere in the
words [sought to be protected as marks]."). Expert evidence may be helpful on this point.
See Judith Ripka Designs, Ltd. v. Preville, 935 F. Supp. 237, 257-58 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)
(considering evidence of expert on the appearance of the products of other manufacturers
in the industry); cf. Ergotron, Inc. v. Hergo Ergonomic Support Sys., Inc., No. 94 Civ.
2732, 1996 WL 143903, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 1996) (rejecting affidavit of industrial
design expert because expertise or knowledge in field not established, and because of lack
of reference in affidavit to industry standards). Expert evidence on the ultimate issue of
likely consumer perception may be of lesser assistance. Cf Amer v. Sharper Image
Corp., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1282, 1290 n.10 (C.D. Cal. 1995) (concluding that "an indus-
trial design expert's testimony regarding what an 'ordinary purchaser' would perceive is
not helpful under Rule 702" of the Federal Rules of Evidence).
355. See supra notes 45, 105, 107 (discussing fanciful marks).
356. The evidence that would be persuasive on this point is not entirely unlike that
needed for the type of lengthy, in-depth analysis of novelty and non-obviousness engaged
in by the Patent Office in examining a design patent application. The plaintiff may have
in its files or collective knowledge, facts gathered in developing the design that bear upon
these issues; but, unless that is the case, this is evidence that (like evidence of secondary
meaning) may still require time-consuming and costly development. In Imagineering, Inc.
v. Van Klassens, Inc., 53 F.3d 1260,1264 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 277 (1995), the
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed a jury finding of inherent distinctive-
ness in light of evidence in the record of media and trade journal descriptions of the
design of plaintiff's furniture as "novel," "exclusive" and possessing a "totally different
look," as well as receipt of design prizes and inclusion in a museum exhibition, and testi-
mony from furniture suppliers that they "had not seen anything like" plaintiff's furniture.
See also Tone Bros., Inc, v. Sysco Corp., 28 F.3d 1192, 1206 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (finding in-
herent distinctiveness of container supported by evidence that plaintiff's container was
"first of its kind in the food service" industry), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1356 (1995); Black
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A second, and important, body of contextual evidence, would
demonstrate the extent to which products of the type at issue are
typically identified by their design as opposed to other indicia of
source. This may be evidenced, inter alia, by trademark registrations
and judicial recognition of valid trade dress rights. The fact that the
primary producer of fiberglass insulation is identified by reference to
the overall color of the product, for example, gives some indication of
the means by which consumers might distinguish competitors' insula-
tion products from that of Owens-Corning. 7
The mere fact that one product design has been found to be dis-
tinctive does not, however, mean that the design of all products of
that type necessarily will be inherently distinctive.3 8 Moreover, the
strength of any inference of likely consumer association will weaken
as the second product at issue becomes more removed from the first
product type. For example, the fact that the shape of a Ferrari car
has acquired distinctiveness makes it more likely that consumers will
identify the source of "sports cars" by their shape. 9 That inference is
strongest with the same product line (e.g., another "classic car"), but
will be entitled to less weight as the identity of product type recedes
(e.g., the Ferrari determination might say little about the likelihood
of truck purchasers identifying the source of their vehicles by refer-
ence to the shape of the truck). This consideration may be of
particular importance-and the predictive inference may be accorded
most weight-in assessing the inherent distinctiveness of "family
trade dress" (i.e., where the dominant and distinctive part of a trade
dress is applied to a variety of products by the same producer).
3'
& Decker Corp. v. Int'l Sales & Mktg., 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1851, 1853 (C.D. Cal. 1995)
(concluding that design of "Snakelight" flashlight inherently distinctive given that "[p]rior
to Black & Decker's introduction of its 'Snakelight' product, no one offered a similar
flashlight in the marketplace," in light of numerous design awards and recognizing that
"the Black & Decker design was a departure from the previous flashlight designs in the
market"). These types of evidence appear to suggest analysis broadly equivalent to a
liberal objective novelty requirement. For a discussion of the requirements of novelty
and non-obviousness in design patent law, see ERNEsT B. LIPSCOMB III, 5 WALKER ON
PATENTS § 16.8 (3d ed. 1986); see also supra note 180 (explaining difference between
design patent requirements and trade dress distinctiveness requirement).
357. See In re Owens-Coming Fiberglass, 774 F.2d 1116, 1128 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
358. See, e.g., Ergotron, Inc. v. Hergo Ergonomic Support Sys., Inc., No. 94 Civ. 2732,
1996 WL 143903, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 1996) (rejecting assertion that design of plain-
tiff's furniture inherently distinctive because the Federal Circuit had found a different
plaintiff's furniture design to be inherently distinctive in Imagineering).
359. See Ferrari S.P.A. Esercizio v. Roberts, 944 F.2d 1235, 1239-40 (6th Cir. 1991); cf
Chrysler Corp. v. Silva, 892 F. Supp. 321, 323-24 (D. Mass. 1995) (design of Dodge Viper
protected by virtue of demonstrated secondary meaning).
360. Cf. 3 McCARTHY, supra note 1, § 23.19 (discussing "family of marks" doctrine).
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Where a product design has acquired distinctiveness, the later use by
the same producer of that shape as part of a related product is more
likely to be understood by consumers as an identification of source,
and thus more easily protected as inherently distinctive. Once con-
sumers recognize the shape of a Cadillac as indicative of its source,
they will more likely identify as Cadillacs subsequent models em-
ploying the same design features.
Even absent registrations or litigated determinations of trade
dress rights, the type of evidence that might shed light on this inquiry
concerning typical modes of identification appears often in the fac-
tual record. For example, in determining the secondary meaning of
the trade dress of guitars and rebutting a claim that guitar heads were
incapable of functioning as trademarks, the Federal Circuit has sus-
tained the admission of expert testimony and excerpts from treatises
and manuals regarding the custom of guitarists to identify guitars by
the shape of the guitar heads. 6' Such evidence, indicative of the like-
lihood that a feature of a particular product would serve to identify
source, is relevant (and, indeed, more appropriately so) to the ques-
tion of inherent distinctiveness.62 In Krueger International, Inc. v.
Nightingale Inc.,36 the court based a finding of inherent distinctive-
ness on affidavits regarding the high density stacking chair market:
"[M]anufacturers of these chairs generally seek unique designs as an
important source identifier. Unlike the clothing industry, in which
labels are prominent because designs change frequently, the chair
industry does not rely heavily on labels to communicate with custom-
ers and its designs remain stable over time., 3  Courts apparently
have taken judicial notice, as part of other analyses, of consumer pur-
chasing propensities regarding particular products.3 6  And courts
frequently are made aware of consumer exposure to and experience
with brand name/private label retail practices.366 The exposure of the
361. See Yamaha Int'l Corp. v. Hoshino Gakki Co., 840 F.2d 1572, 1582-83 (Fed. Cir.
1988).
362. The court did not consider how that evidence might be relevant to inherent dis-
tinctiveness because the applicant had based its application on secondary meaning under
section 2(f) of the Lanham Act. See id. at 1581.
363. 915 F. Supp. 595 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
364. Id. at 607.
365. See Seabrook Foods, Inc. v. Bar-Well Foods Ltd., 568 F.2d 1342, 1346 (C.C.P.A.
1977) (Rich, J., dissenting) ("[Firozen foods ... are purchased ... as everyone knows, to a
large degree on the basis of package appearance as well as by the name of the producer or
specific word marks.").
366. See, e.g., Conopco, Inc. v. May Dept. Stores Co., 46 F.3d 1556, 1565 (Fed. Cir.
1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1724 (1995); Warner Lambert Co. v. McCrory's Corp., 718
F. Supp. 389, 398-99 (D.N.J. 1989). The Conopco court also received testimony from an
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relevant purchasing public (i.e., likely purchasers of that type of
product) to such practices, which may affect the likelihood that con-
sumers will identify the product by reference to its shape, would be
particularly valuable evidence. 7
Consumer receptiveness to identification by shape might also be
suggested by showing the typical manner in which goods of that type
are presented to or seen by prospective purchasers, thus assisting a
prediction of likely association with shape rather than (or in addition
to) a verbal mark. Likely consumer association with product design
might be minimized if goods of that type are seen only rarely absent
packaging or other more traditional indicia of source. In Munsing-
wear, Inc. v. Jockey International, Inc.,36' the plaintiff claimed trade
dress rights in the design of its underwear. Each party adduced evi-
dence regarding the degree of consumer exposure to the product
design in an unpackaged state. The defendant's evidence included
testimony as to the manner in which the product was displayed (on
mannequins), purchased (in clear wrapping bearing manufacturers'
names), and as customarily used by consumers (in a manner not visi-
ble to the general public). The purpose for which the evidence was
elicited was to demonstrate the minimal risk of post-sale confusion.
The generally concealed nature of underwear not only reduces that
possibility, but also arguably reduces the likelihood of consumer as-
sociation developing in the first place.369 In contrast, if products are
routinely presented to the public and seen by the public in an un-
wrapped state, it is more likely that the product design will act as a
expert in consumer psychology regarding the attention paid by consumers to a particular
form of labeling (obscurely placed disclaimer in small print). See Conopco, 46 F.3d at
1572 (Mayer, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
367. See Badger Meter, Inc. v. Grinnell Corp., 13 F.3d 1145, 1152-53 (7th Cir. 1994)
(addressing likelihood of confusion, wherein the court refers to evidence of knowledge of
private labeling practices within the market for small water meters, primarily water utili-
ties); see also Duraco Prods. v. Joy Plastic Enters., 40 F.3d 1431, 1435 (3d Cir. 1994)
(noting that brand-name awareness in the outdoor garden products area is slight).
368. 31 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1146 (D. Minn. 1994).
369. While the Munsingwear court is probably correct that "[t]he lack of post-sale
exposure of the product to the general public reduces the risk that any customers will be
confused as to source," id. at 1150, it does not preclude the possibility. Post-sale confu-
sion (and consumer reliance on product design as a source-identifier) is more easily
dismissed if one assumes an identity of the first purchaser and the wearer of the under-
wear. If, in fact, the product was purchased by someone-else, the wearer might never
have been exposed to the point-of-sale verbal marks or wrapping, and thus might be more
likely to rely on the product design as a means of source-identification (and perhaps may
be confused in purchasing subsequent products on that basis). Further evidence of pur-
chasing patterns might, therefore, affect the strength of this observation in particular
cases.
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source-identifier.3 7°
c. Nature of the Product
Even without contextual evidence of how products are typically
presented to the public, the very nature of the product itself might act
as a predictor of likely reliance on shapes. Evidence that might be
relevant in this regard is also often considered in analyzing likelihood
of confusion. In Chevron Chemical Co. v. Voluntary Purchasing
Groups, Inc.7' for example, the court considered, but dismissed, the
likelihood that consumers would read the packaging label rather than
rely on the overall appearance of the packaging trade dress because
of the nature of the products at issue (toxic garden products)." For
reasons of safety or decency, certain products are more likely than
others to be displayed away from eye level, reducing the scope for
reliance on verbal marks.3r Where the product design is the most
accessible signifier, reliance on it should be more likely. 4
A court might also consider whether the nature of the product is
such that producers are incapable of using supplementary words or
packaging to identify the product.375 Products that are small, or the
surface of which is not susceptible to marking, clearly will not bear
prominent word marks, thereby compelling consumers to differenti-
ate on some other basis.376 The shape of a Phillips screw, for example,
370. The same may be true of products that are typically sold or seen in transparent
and unmarked packaging. Cf. Aromatique, Inc. v. Gold Seal, Inc., 28 F.3d 863, 873-74
(8th Cir. 1994) (pptpourri).
371. 659 F.2d 695 (Former 5th Cir. 1981).
372. See id at 704; see also Dr. Seuss Enters. v. Penguin Book USA, Inc., 924 F. Supp.
1559, 1571 (S.D. Cal. 1996) ("[B]ooks are mixed search-experience goods that are gener-
ally perused but not fully inspected before purchase."); idL at 1571 n.18 (referring to
academic literature regarding search and experience goods and noting that "[s]earch
goods are goods whose quality consumers can inspect before purchase [while e]xperience
goods ... may be evaluated only after purchase and consumption").
373. Cf. Shakespeare Co. v. Silstar Corp. of Am., 906 F. Supp. 997, 1011 (D.S.C. 1995)
(explaining that eye level display of fishing rods facilitated consumer awareness of promi-
nently displayed manufacturers' names).
374. See Landes & Posner, supra note 342, at 291; see also Krueger Int'l, Inc. v.
Nightingale Inc., 915 F. Supp. 595, 607 (S.D.N.Y: 1996) ("The sole permanent label is
molded into the plastic underneath the seat, where a sophisticated buyer would find it but
a less sophisticated one might not. No consumer would see the label without looking for
it.") (considering practices in high density stacking chair market).
375. See supra text accompanying notes 261-64.
376. It is also worth noting various items of evidence that would not be highly proba-
tive because of reduced value as predictors. In particular, neither intent of the producer,
see supra Part IV (D)(2)(b)(i), nor the motivation of the purchaser, see supra note 208,
are reliable indicators.
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might be expected to act as an identifier of its source more readily
than the Phillips brand name embossed in minute form on the side of
the screw." Consumers probably do not expect cufflinks to bear a
verbal mark because of their size. Thus it is more likely that consum-
ers would identify the source of the Carrick Company's Rennie
Mackintosh-style cufflinks by their "trellis and rose" design. 8
d. The Need for Evidence
Evidence clearly can, and to enhance accountability and predict-
ability should, be developed to assist a determination of whether a
design feature is likely to engender consumer association. 9 This ap-
proach acknowledges the fact-specific nature of the bases for the
analysis and the varying likelihood that a shape, however classified,
would act as a source identifier. It might well lead (even inevitably or
appropriately) to greater numbers of inherently distinctive packaging
than product configurations, and to greater numbers still of inher-
ently distinctive verbal marks." Each claimed mark would be
377. Cf. Qualitex Co. v. Jacobsen Prods. Co., 115 S. Ct. 1300, 1308 (1995) (recognizing
that a firm might find it difficult to "place a usable symbol or word on a product (say, a
large industrial bolt that customers normally see from a distance)," and that in such in-
stances the manufacturer might wish to use color alone to identify the product). Trade
dress protection of the shape of the "Phillips screw" (which has become a standard fea-
ture of many consumer products) might, of course, now implicate the competitive
concerns at the root of the functionality exclusion. See supra note 79.
378. The Rennie Mackintosh Collection, which is based on the designs of the cele-
brated Scottish artist and architect Charles Rennie Mackintosh (1868-1928), is a series of
jewelry pieces produced by the Carrick Jewellery of Glasgow, Scotland. The "trellis and
rose" pattern is derived from the decor of the Willow Tea Rooms, which Mackintosh
designed in 1903. See generally ELIZABETH WILHIDE, THE MACKINTOSH STYLE:
DESIGN AND DECOR (1995). The Carrick Jewellery probably would not face the prob-
lems in proving distinctiveness encountered by the manufacturer of reproduction
Stickley-design furniture, see supra note 35, because Mackintosh never applied his designs
to jewelry. See Fiona MacCarthy, Glasgow Nouveau Charles Rennie Mackintosh Was
Honoured Everywhere But In His Home City: That Is The Legend, But It's Not True,
GUARDIAN (London), April 13,1996, at T044.
379. Cf. Remcraft Lighting Prods., Inc. v. Maxim Lighting, Inc., 706 F. Supp. 855, 858
(S.D. Fla. 1989) (commenting that question of inherent distinctiveness is a question of fact
requiring evidence regarding whether the design is sufficiently distinct that it can be dif-
ferentiated from other products).
380. A review of existing case law suggests that lines of furniture, jewelry, unwrapped
products, and products of a type never marked would probably represent the products
with the greatest chance of demonstrating likely consumer association. Courts have not
attempted to develop the evidence discussed here for the purpose of predicting likely
consumer association, however, and the opportunity to make an argument of likely asso-
ciation should not be limited to particular products. If the empirical basis for making the
prediction can be shown, advancement of the argument should be permitted without in-
troducing additional hurdles for product design plaintiffs.
1997]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
assessed by the same yardstick, however, avoiding both the arbitrari-
ness of classification and the prejudging of ultimate issues involved in
holding claimants to different standards based on premises that do
not necessarily equate with the facts of a particular case. There is no
reason, by formulating a fixed legal rule, to entrench a particular per-
spective concerning the factual question of the likelihood that a
product would be identified by its shape. 8'
That courts might (and, other than Seabrook courts, largely do)
shrink from such an approach is hardly surprising in light of a dearth
of explanation or empirical support for judgments made on the like-
lihood that verbal marks will immediately operate as source-
identifiers. With word marks, the factual record often comprises lit-
tle more than reliance on judicial notice of the English language-
although that can, in part, be attributed to judicial knowledge of the
English language operating as empirical evidence of meaning." The
proposal advanced in this Article seeks to refocus the inherent dis-
tinctiveness inquiry and create a workable test for trade dress in an
age where word marks are no longer the sole means of source-
identification. Examining the commercial context of a product is
crucial to a secondary meaning analysis of actual association, and
there is nothing to suggest that such contextual consideration could
381. Although in particular factual contexts consumers might not primarily rely on
product configuration to identify source, embedding an overly-generalized premise in the
governing test appears destined not to identify those product designs that truly are inher-
ently distinctive. The incorporation of factual premises into a rule of law might be
justified on grounds of efficiency, of predictability, of equal treatment, or on other public
policy bases such as placing the burden of proof on the party in whose possession evi-
dence to contradict the premise is most likely to be found. See generally Cass R. Sunstein,
Problems With Rules, 83 CAL. L. REV. 953, 971-77 (1995) (articulating benefits of rules).
Neither the Duraco nor the Knitwaves court provided any such justifications for the crea-
tion of a stricter test for product configurations. Competitive concerns can be
accommodated by applying the functionality rule, and the relative likelihood of product
and packaging shapes identifying source should adequately be measured by asking that
very question rather than creating rules designed to ensure the outcome thought generally
likely to ensue.
I have argued in this Article that there is no need to impose a blanket assumption re-
garding likely consumer response, and that, instead, resort should be had to empirical
evidence regarding actual association or the basis for likely consumer response. Of
course, the analogous argument failed in Two Pesos, where the Supreme Court rejected
the assertion that where empirical evidence of distinctiveness (in the form of secondary
meaning, or lack thereof) was available, it should prevail over judicial predictions or pre-
sumptions regarding distinctiveness (inherent distinctiveness). See Brief for Petitioner at
16 n.8, Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763 (1992) (No. 91-971) (on file
with author); see also supra note 76.
382. See supra note 108.
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not also inform an analysis of inherent distinctiveness?3
3. Assessing Alternatives in Distinctiveness Inquiries
Any such test, in common with the Seabrook test, obviously
would pay heed to other products on the market, thus bearing a su-
perficial similarity to the functionality inquiry.3 4 In this Article, I
have suggested that the functionality inquiry be separately conducted
further along in the trade dress analysis, thus striking a balance be-
tween the imposition of unreasonable constraints on creation and the
potential purchaser confusion that could arise with a second-coiner's
unregulated use of a shape with which consumers have come to asso-
ciate a specific source.' Whether a trade dress is distinctive is a
question wholly separate from the matter of its functionality. The
functionality of a dress need not even be considered if distinctiveness
is not established.3
In practice, courts and litigants habitually conflate arguments
addressed to each of these separate questions.3 Indeed, in many in-
stances courts have directly adverted to functionality in determining
whether a mark is distinctive." Language in those opinions fuses the
383. "Trademark strength is an 'amorphous concept with little shape or substance
when divorced from the mark's commercial context.'" McGregor-Doniger, Inc. v. Driz-
zle, Inc., 599 F.2d 1126, 1133 (2d Cir. 1979) (quoting E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v.
Yoshida Int'l, 393 F. Supp. 502,512 (E.D.N.Y. 1975)).
384. Although the AbercrombielChevron test does not mandate such a comparison,
courts purporting to apply that test often look at the range of alternatives in assessing
inherent distinctiveness, perhaps because the Chevron court cited the unlimited packaging
alternatives in support of the concept of inherently distinctive trade dress. See supra note
104.
385. See supra notes 89-101 and accompanying text.
386. See Turtle Wax, Inc. v. First Brands Corp., 781 F. Supp. 1314, 1323 n.12 (N.D. Ill.
1991) (functionality need only be addressed once plaintiff has established a protectable
trade dress); see also Schwinn Bicycle Co. v. Ross Bicycles, Inc., 870 F.2d 1176, 1183 n.14
(7th Cir. 1989) (functionality to be addressed separately from distinctiveness); In re Mor-
ton-Norwich Prods., Inc., 671 F.2d 1332, 1343 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (same); UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, TRADEMARK MANUAL OF EXAMINING PROCEDURE
§ 1202.03(a) (2d ed. 1993) (distinctiveness and functionality should be analyzed sepa-
rately).
387. See Knitwaves, Inc. v. Lollytogs Ltd., 71 F.3d 996, 1006 (2d Cir. 1995) (arguments
raised by defendant "under rubric of functionality, however, support a related (and more
successful) argument," namely that the claimed trade dress was not distinctive); see also
Krueger Int'l, Inc. v. Nightingale Inc., 915 F. Supp. 595, 603-04 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (noting
that several tests of distinctiveness are essentially tests of functionality); Carillon Import-
ers Ltd. v. Frank Pesce Group, 913 F. Supp. 1559, 1564 (S.D. Fla. 1996) ("In many ways,
functionality is a close corollary to distinctiveness, and it reinforces the idea that the law
protects a product's image in the mind of a consumer rather than aspects of a product that
are required for its use.").
388. See, e.g., Sno-Wizard Mfg. v. Eisemann Prods., 791 F.2d 423, 427 n.4 (5th Cir.
1997]
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two inquiries, frequently defining functionality in contradistinction to
distinctiveness.389 It is from conceptual confusion such as this that
consideration of competitive impact inappropriately enters the dis-
tinctiveness evaluation. The confusion is often spawned by language
in Chevron and is most prevalent in courts applying that test.3 " One
1986); Sicilia Di R. Biebow & Co. v. Cox, 732 F.2d 417,425 (5th Cir. 1984) ("If a particu-
lar configuration or design is found to be inherently or sufficiently distinctive, it cannot
also be functional in the legal sense."); see also Allied Mktg. Group, v. CDL Mktg., Inc.,
878 F.2d 806, 813 n.6 (5th Cir. 1989) ("In Sicilia, we noted that a configuration or design
that is sufficiently distinctive cannot also be functional in a legal sense."); Dorr-Oliver
Inc. v. Fluid-Quip, Inc., 894 F. Supp. 1190, 1198 (N.D. Ill. 1995) (analyzing inherent dis-
tinctiveness by reference to functionality and number of alternative designs, and then
separately addressing functionality as an affirmative defense), rev'd on other grounds, 94
F.3d 376 (7th Cir. 1996); cf. Kurt S. Adler, Inc. v. World Bazaars, Inc., 897 F. Supp. 92, 96-
97 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (analyzing inherent distinctiveness by reference to whether protection
would foreclose competitors from using utilitarian or aesthetic features necessary to com-
pete).
389. See, e.g., Sicilia Di R. Biebow & Co., 732 F.2d at 425 & n.3 ("To find legal func-
tionality is to find that plaintiff's trade dress does not serve as a trademark.... A trade
dress feature is distinctive if it is arbitrary or fanciful and not descriptive or functional.");
see also In re DC Comics, Inc., 689 F.2d 1042, 1049 n.5 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (Rich, J., concur-
ring) (noting confluence in some courts of functionality and distinctiveness, and of
aesthetic functionality with secondary meaning in particular); cf. Versa Prods. Co. v. Bi-
fold Co., 50 F.3d 189, 197-98 n.5 (3d Cir. 1995) ("[The] district court concluded that the
trade dress was inherently distinctive because it was 'arbitrary,' meaning it was not
'dictated by functional considerations' (which appears to be the same standard the court
employed for its functionality inquiry)."). The dichotomy is often set up from the oppo-
site starting point. See, e.g., Dratler, supra note 8, at 939 ("[F]eatures of an article that
merely serve to identify the source or sponsorship of the article are not functional and can
serve as trademarks."). The best explanation offered for a connection between the two
concepts has been served up by Professor McCarthy:
A subsidiary reason against the protection of functional features may be that the
distinctiveness of a symbol varies in inverse proportion to its functionality. If a
feature is functional, it is likely that all similar articles will have a similar func-
tional feature, and one seller's feature is not likely to evoke any response in
buyers that it is unique or is a distinctive symbol of origin.
1 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 7.26[1], at 7-118. But see In re Morton-Norwich Prods.,
Inc., 671 F.2d 1332, 1343 (C.C.P.A. 1982) ("We cannot say that there exists an inverse
proportional relationship in all cases between distinctiveness of design and functional-
ity."). Even this explanation, to some extent, misses the precise point. The likelihood
that consumers would not distinguish the product because of several similar designs flows
from the presence of such designs, which may be the result of a great variety of factors.
The competitive need to design the product in that particular shape (functionality) may
be one such reason, but there may be others unrelated thereto. Similarly, the mere fact
that a-product is legally functional (in the sense that to protect it against copying would
cause competitive problems) might not affect distinctiveness if the product is as yet the
only such product on the market.
390. See, e.g., Stuart Hall Co. v. Ampad Corp., 51 F.3d 780, 786 (8th Cir. 1995) ("The
question [the Abercrombie definitions] present is whether, and how much, the trade dress
is dictated by the nature of the product .... ); Krueger, 915 F. Supp. at 603 (commenting
that Chevron test is "essentially a test of functionality"); see also supra notes 92, 104
(discussing the role of competitive need and lack of alternatives in distinctiveness analy-
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court in the Northern District of Illinois has insightfully explained
that these courts use the term "functionality" in two senses:
[The first use of the term] relates only to application of the
Chevron test and to [the] conclusion that the trade dress is
nonarbitrary in that it serves a 'function' to describe plain-
tiff's product and to assist in its effective packaging.... Such
a functionality analysis requires a completely different in-
quiry than that involved in the consideration of a
functionality defense to trade dress infringement.9
The confusion exhibited (and engendered) by some of these
courts can perhaps also be explained by the close parallels between
the functionality doctrine and the concept of generic marks, the latter
of which clearly implicates the distinctiveness inquiry.3" Both require
that trademark law be wary of according protection to a mark that is
approaching the status of an industry standard, and many commenta-
tors have acknowledged the similarities.393 Consider the hypothetical
example of "packaging lime-flavored soda in green twelve-ounce
cans," discussed by the Second Circuit in Paddington Corp. v. Attiki
Importers & Distributors, Inc. 3 4 The court suggested that such pack-
aging trade dress would be generic because it is "so common in the
soft drink industry that such packaging probably is not inherently dis-
tinctive, although without the industry practice green cans would be
either suggestive or arbitrary and therefore inherently distinctive.,
395
Other courts, if faced with that example, might have as easily avoided
awarding the exclusive rights to use green cans to one soda company
by invoking the doctrine of functionality. The rationale for doing so
would, however, be different. Those courts basing their decision on
sis).
391. Turtle Wax, Inc. v. First Brands Corp., 781 F. Supp. 1314, 1322-23 n.12 (N.D. IIl.
1991); see also Duraco Prods. v. Joy Plastic Enters., 40 F.3d 1431, 1451 (3d Cir. 1994)
("[T]he primarily source-designating inquiry is different from the functionality inquiry,
for it limits inherently distinctive product configurations not to those that are important
for competitors to be able to copy, but rather to those whose primary significance is as an
intrinsic indicator of the product's source.").
392. See In re DC Comics, Inc., 689 F.2d 1042, 1048 (1982) ("[A] finding of... func-
tionality is, in a sense, similar to a rejection for genericness."); see also Duraco, 40 F.3d at
1442 ("In trade dress law, the inquiry into functionality resembles the genericness inquiry
in trademark law; the two doctrines share essentially the same underlying rationale, pre-
serving competition.").
393. See, e.g., Dratler, supra note 8, at 951-52 (comparing functionality doctrine with
test for genericness); cf Hudis, supra note 152, at 9 (noting that functionality is "akin to
the concept that generic words or phrases are not capable of trademark protection, be-
cause a single proprietor cannot appropriate common vernacular from the English
language used to refer to products").
394. See 996 F.2d 577,583-84 (2d Cir. 1993).
395. Id. at 583-84.
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the genericism doctrine premise their conclusion on the green cans
no longer representing a single source. The packaging would not be
distinctive.96 Those courts permitting copying on the basis of func-
tionality would in essence be determining that it was not possible to
compete effectively in the soda market unless able to sell the soft
drink in green cans.39
Clearly, also, similar evidence may impinge upon both the issue
of inherent distinctiveness and the analysis of functionality. The per-
spective with which a court views alternative products for the
purpose of the inherent distinctiveness test should, however, be quite
different from how it regards similar (but not necessarily identical)
evidence in determining functionality. Competing products or shapes
might speak to several assorted concerns and be probative of various
matters.
Products of the same shape are relevant to inherent distinctive-
ness because consumer association is more likely to exist where there
are no similar shapes to blur consumer perception of specific affilia-
tion. It is the current (or recent past) presence on the market of
products of the same shape, however, that might suggest a lesser
likelihood of consumer reliance on a shape as a source-identifier.398
396. See 15 U.S.C. § 1064(3) (1994) (whether registered mark has become generic is to
be determined by primary significance of the mark to the public; no mention of competi-
tive consequences). But see Duraco, 40 F.3d at 1440 (explaining generic doctrine in terms
of competitive consequences).
397. But see Dratler, supra note 8, at 951-52 (suggesting alternative difference in pur-
pose: functionality doctrine preserves integrity of the patent system, while generic
doctrine preserves competition). The basis upon which a court denied full relief to the
plaintiff in the green can hypothetical might be of importance, in that if the dress is dis-
tinctive but functional, the court might require the copier to label its competing product in
order to differentiate it from plaintiff's. See supra text accompanying notes 97-99.
398. See, e.g., Tone Bros., Inc. v. Sysco Corp., 28 F.3d 1192, 1206 (Fed. Cir. 1994)
("[Tihe inherent distinctiveness of a trade dress depends on what other types of trade
dress were being used in the particular field prior to the introduction of the trade dress at
issue."), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1356 (1995); Paddington Corp. v. Attiki Importers & Dis-
tribs., Inc., 996 F.2d 577, 583-84 (2d Cir. 1993) ("[P]ackaging lime-flavored soda in green
twelve-ounce cans is so common in the soft drink industry that such packaging probably is
not inherently distinctive, although without the industry practice green cans would be ei-
ther suggestive or arbitrary and therefore inherently distinctive." (emphasis added));
Callaway Golf Co. v. Golf Clean, Inc., 915 F. Supp. 1206, 1212 (M.D. Fla. 1995) (finding
product design inherently distinctive and noting that "when [plaintiffs] introduced their
Big Bertha irons in 1994 they looked noticeably different than any other club on the mar-
ket"); Black & Decker Corp. v. Int'l Sales & Mktg., 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1851, 1853
(C.D. Cal. 1995) (trade dress of "SnakeLight" flashlight inherently distinctive given lack
of prior similar design in marketplace); Philip Morris Inc. v. Star Tobacco Corp., 879 F.
Supp. 379, 383 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) ("This trade dress is inherently distinctive .... [N]o ciga-
rette manufacturer had evoked the image of the American West for the purpose of selling
a particular brand until the Marlboro Man saddled up and rode into Marlboro country.");
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The predictive calculation of inherent distinctiveness should not be
affected by whether the same product could be manufactured and
sold competitively in another or only the same shape. Unknown, as-
yet undeveloped or unmarketed, possible alternatives do not affect
the likelihood that consumers will identify the shape with a specific
source because consumers are probably unaware of those possibili-
ties. The evidentiary inquiry, therefore, should simply be whether
there are other products of similar shapes commonly on the market.399
The only means by which the lack of possible alternatives might af-
fect inherent distinctiveness is if that dearth of options is reflected in
general, commonplace use of the product feature.400 In that case,
however, it is the prevalence of many similar products, rather than
the absence of alternatives that led to that phenomenon, which de-
tracts from the claim of inherent distinctiveness.
The functionality analysis considers whether it is competitively
possible for the shape of a rival product to be different from the
plaintiff's trade dress. There are two dimensions to this inquiry that
set it apart from the determination of inherent distinctiveness. First,
it requires analysis of the chances of an alternative shape being pro-
Blue Coral, Inc. v. Turtle Wax, Inc., 664 F. Supp. 1153, 1163 (N.D. Ill. 1987) ("[I]n decid-
ing whether a trade dress is inherently distinctive.., we still must consider how unique
this new compilation is in comparison to what is already in the field.").
399. See Paddington, 996 F.2d at 584 (finding trade dress of Ouzo bottle inherently
distinctive where "[tihere is no evidence in the record of any industry practice of using a
design like the one that appears on the bottles' labels"); Roulo v. Russ Berrie & Co., 886
F.2d 931, 936 (7th Cir. 1989) (determining inherent distinctiveness by analysis of evidence
of greeting cards already on the market), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1075 (1990); Hanig & Co.
v. Fisher & Co., No. 92 C 1779, 1994 WL 97758, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 24, 1994) ("In order
to determine whether a trade dress is distinctive, it is necessary ... [to] compare it with
the trade dress of competitors. A trade dress that might be distinctive in the first instance
will not be seen as distinctive if similar ones are common in the marketplace."); Turtle
Wax, Inc. v. First Brands Corp., 781 F. Supp. 1314, 1320-21 (N.D. Ill. 1991) (finding lack
of inherent distinctiveness because dress consisted of elements that were already present
in the relevant market); Robarb, Inc. v. Pool Builders Supply of the Carolinas, Inc., 696 F.
Supp. 621, 625 (N.D. Ga. 1988) (no evidence presented which shows that third party us-
age has been so extensive as to undermine inherent distinctiveness of trade dress of
plaintiff's pool cleaner, which had been first of its type on the market). In Duraco Prod-
ucts v. Joy Plastic Enterprises, 40 F.3d 1431 (3d Cir. 1994), for example, the court was
presented evidence regarding (1) the similarity between the plaintiff's product and all
others in the market; (2) "patently different" designs that competitors had come up with;
and (3) "five designs by [plaintiff's] expert designer that.., could compete effectively in
the market." Id at 1436. The third set of evidence would be relevant only to functional-
ity.
400. See Mana Prods. v. Columbia Cosmetics Mfg., 65 F.3d 1063, 1070 (2d Cir. 1995)
("[W]hen the possibilities of the ultimate trade dress for a product are limited and the
trade dress is therefore in commonplace use, it is unlikely that consumers will view the
trade dress as distinctive of the goods or services of a particular seller." (emphasis
added)).
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duced and marketed competitively. The mere fact that some alterna-
tive is available is not determinative of that issue. 40' Second, the
functionality analysis should extend (but not limit) its scrutiny to any
other possible shapes, even if they are not yet available on the mar-
ket, i.e., courts evaluating functionality should consider products that
could be introduced to the market as well as those already on the
market.
In sum, whereas distinctiveness will be harmed by evidence of
many available similar designs, nonfunctionality will be adversely af-
fected by a lack of possible different designs, necessitating a still more
conjectural inquiry into competitive possibilities rather than current
market perception.'2 The evidence that informs those two analyses
may well be similar, but the analyses are different and the policy con-
cerns divergent. 3
CONCLUSION
In the modern consumer marketplace product design features
may simultaneously serve many purposes, including aesthetic, func-
tional and identificatory. Product designs can and do serve to
401. "Functionality does not depend on whether other possible designs are feasible.
Rather the test is whether the particular features claimed as a trademark are necessary
for effective competition." Ohio Art Co. v. Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc., 799 F. Supp. 870,
885 (N.D. Ill. 1992) (citations omitted); see also Elmer v. ICC Fabricating, Inc., 67 F.3d
1571, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (availability of alternative designs alone does not determine
functionality issue where not shown that those alternatives substantially eliminate any
competitive need for the claimed features); Keene Corp. v. Paraflex Indus., Inc., 653 F.2d
822, 827 (3d Cir. 1981) ("[M]erely because there are other shapes and designs 'which
defendant could use and still produce a workable' product, the design used is not thereby
non-functional."); Interactive Network, Inc. v. NTN Communications, Inc., 875 F. Supp.
1398, 1407 (N.D. Cal. 1995) ("Where a feature is the best one, or one of a few superior
designs, competition would be hindered by a monopoly on this scheme."). See generally
Dinwoodie, supra note 17, at 33-35 (discussing relevance of alternatives to functionality
inquiry).
402. Compare AmBrit, Inc. v. Kraft, Inc., 812 F.2d 1531, 1537 (11th Cir. 1986)
(rejecting challenge to inherent distinctiveness, and noting that "the record reveals no
prior use of any combination of the [product's] trade dress elements that is at all similar
to the unique impression conveyed by [plaintiff's] trade dress" (emphasis added)), with
Stormy Clime, Ltd. v. ProGroup, Inc., 809 F.2d 971, 978 (2d Cir. 1987) (noting that, in
determining functionality, district court should have considered whether any feasible
shingled rain jacket could be manufactured that would not appear similar in key respects
to that of plaintiff).
403. Courts too easily and too frequently elide these distinctions. See, e.g., Vornado
Air Circulation Sys., Inc. v. Duracraft Corp., 92-1543-WEB, Memorandum and Order at
28 (D. Kan. Mar. 4, 1994) (design of fan not arbitrary or fanciful where, because of con-
sumer performance expectations and economic limitations, the universe of feasible
designs was limited) (on file with author), rev'd on other grounds, 58 F.3d 1498 (10th Cir.
1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 753 (1996).
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identify the source of products; they can, in the trademark vernacu-
lar, be distinctive. Trademark law must accept that reality and
refrain from relegating product design trade dress to a second-class
status. The common-law rule requiring trade dress to demonstrate
secondary meaning as a condition to protection effected just that dis-
criminatory treatment, exposing trade dress to imitation in the early
stages of marketing.
The arguments advanced in support of this unequal treatment do
not hold water. There is no reason, either in the text of the Lanham
Act or on broader policy grounds, to deny a producer the opportunity
to prove the distinctiveness of its product's design by means available
to other marks. The Supreme Court's acceptance of this argument in
Two Pesos, however, merely opened an equally significant debate.
Neither in Two Pesos, nor in its later Qualitex opinion, does the
Court provide the solution to the distinctiveness conundrum: how a
producer should demonstrate the inherent distinctiveness of its prod-
uct design trade dress.
The answer to this question must derive from the notion central
to the concept of inherent distinctiveness, namely, whether consum-
ers are likely to perceive the product design as a source-identifier.
The competitive impact of protecting the product feature as a trade-
mark is of no relevance to the question of distinctiveness, but instead
should be addressed by the later application of the rule against the
protection of functional designs. This approach balances concerns
surrounding two equally anti-competitive situations: the imposition
of unreasonable constraints on creation, and potential purchaser con-
fusion that could arise with a second-comer's unregulated use of a
shape with which consumers have come to associate a specific source.
Determination of inherent distinctiveness is thus a predictive in-
quiry. However, while the well-tested Abercrombie analysis exists to
assist in this inquiry for verbal marks, that form of appraisal does not
make a successful transition to product design. Its defining con-
cepts-descriptiveness and suggestiveness-are linguistically
conditioned. The limits of lexicon and established usage thus mesh
with the substance of the test to provide invaluable guidance on likely
consumer perception. Product design features are not subject to the
same constraints on comprehension or meaning as words, and do not
fit easily within the linguistic concepts at the heart of the Abercrom-
bie analysis.
Those courts that have adopted Abercrombie to assess the inher-
ent distinctiveness of product design in the wake of Two Pesos have
recognized a significantly increased number of inherently distinctive
1997]
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product configurations. However, those decisions evince intuitive
judging, and fail to reveal (as they must) the basis for a prediction
that the product design features being protected will give rise to con-
sumer association. To the extent that any less intuitive analysis is
being conducted, it is misdescribed by explanation in terms of the
Abercrombie concepts.
Courts must thus acknowledge not only the similarities that ver-
bal and non-verbal marks possess when functioning as trademarks,
but also the differences required of the precise means by which we
assess our understanding of words and shapes. Both the Second and
Third Circuits have recognized this fact, and the deficiencies of Aber-
crombie it reveals, in devising a different test by which to adjudicate
the inherent distinctiveness of product designs. The respective tests
formulated by each to replace Abercrombie fail, however, to articu-
late an appropriate vision of distinctiveness. Each provides
significantly more slender protection for product design by holding
product design to a higher standard of inherent distinctiveness than
other forms of trade dress. That higher standard is implemented by
tests that focus inappropriately on the intent of the producer, and
that repudiate judicial recognition of the capacity of product designs
simultaneously to comprise the product and to identify source. In-
tent is of little relevance to the concept of distinctiveness, which is
founded on consumer association. And, while an increased number
of roles played by a product feature reduces the likelihood that it will
serve to identify source, acceptance of the dual capacity of designs is
too well entrenched to be reversed now by such blatant revisionism.
These tests, by holding product design to a higher standard than
other forms of trade dress, repeat the error of courts requiring secon-
dary meaning as a condition to protection. Indeed, particularly for
functionalist design, reimposition of the secondary meaning require-
ment might be what each test has achieved, relegating product
configuration once more to a lesser class of source-identifiers. The
mere possibility that this is the case could be the catalyst for an ero-
sion of the basis for consumer reliance upon product configurations
as indicia of source, which in turn could further reduce the basis for
offering designs protection immediately upon use. Such a develop-
ment would effectively restrict producers' options (and ultimately
consumer choice), and also restrict the informational role of trade
dress by limiting the range of ways in which the producer can reliably
communicate with the consumer.
The distinction between "packaging" and "product design," cen-
tral to these new tests, rests on questionable foundations. The
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arguments advanced by the Second and Third Circuits in support of a
different test for each category of trade dress are either irrelevant to
the distinctiveness question (in the case of competitive concerns) or
reflect inappropriate generalizations of what are highly fact-specific
questions concerning likely consumer behavior. The rationale for a
stricter test for product design is circular, encourages arbitrariness
and incertitude by introducing difficult questions of classification,
and may prejudge the issue of likely association. That product de-
signs currently are less likely to operate as source-identifiers should
not give rise to forms of analysis that will ensure that result. Con-
sumer understanding is complex and varied. It should not be
oversimplified by application of over-generalized assumptions, but
instead should be ascertained by application of fact-sensitive tests.
For these reasons, I advocate a single standard for all trade dress, re-
quiring a predictive inquiry involving analysis of the commercial
background against which the product will be marketed and the pre-
diction made: Is it likely that consumers will identify the product by
reference to the features claimed as trade dress? Pertinent predictors
would include the nature of the design, the context in which the de-
sign is likely to be perceived by prospective purchasers, and the
nature of the product. These predictors reflect empirical bases, the
grounded justifications upon which courts may reach the conceptual
conclusion that consumers are likely to associate the product design
with its source.
Trade dress protection is not, and should not be, the sole means
by which product design can be protected against unfair imitation. It
is, however, an appropriate form of protection for product designs
that are distinctive. The confusing reproduction of distinctive prod-
uct designs appropriates not only the fruit of a manufacturer's
creativity, which might be remedied by the patent or copyright laws,
but also the goodwill that attaches to that design as a source-
identifier. Nothing is more central to the idea of trademark protec-
tion; no consequence is more offensive to the notion of fair
competition.
The most pressing challenge for courts, which the Supreme
Court has thus far declined to accept, is to develop a workable con-
cept of inherent distinctiveness as applied to product design. The
intuitive attraction of building on what years of experience have
shaped for verbal marks should be resisted. Those were years in
which product designs were treated as a second-class identifier. In-
stead, courts must recognize that the Supreme Court has created a
clearing, currently unbounded, the proper development of which re-
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quires casting aside the remnants of linguistic analyses and refocusing
instead on what inherent distinctiveness is all about. It is about a
predictive inquiry, an inquiry about likely consumer response. It is
from this reconceptualization that the work must commence, and
from which the modes of analysis should not stray far.
